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  1. Pobreza y justicia globales. Una interpretación moderada de los argumentos de Thomas Pogge.Julieta Manterola - 2016 - Dissertation, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
    Este trabajo se propone defender una interpretación moderada de los argumentos de Thomas Pogge sobre justicia y pobreza globales, elaborados en su libro La pobreza en el mundo y los derechos humanos. Para esto, se analizará minuciosamente la reconstrucción que los críticos hacen de los argumentos de Pogge. Con esto, se espera poner de manifiesto que dicha reconstrucción se aleja en muchos casos de una interpretación mínimamente caritativa y malinterpreta los argumentos originales de este autor. Así, en este trabajo, se (...)
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  • Moral Demands and the Far Future.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):567-585.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • ¿Cuánto Debemos Donar a Las Agencias Humanitarias?: Defensa de Una Posición Moderada.Francisco García Gibson - 2013 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 39 (2):245-271.
    En el presente artículo me ocupo de la discusión acerca de cuán exigentes son nuestras obligaciones de contribuir con dinero y tiempo a las agencias humanitarias que asisten a personas en situación de pobreza extrema en el mundo. Defiendo una posición intermedia, moderada, frente a la posición extrema formulada por Peter Singer y frente a la posición según la cual nuestras obligaciones son mínimas. La objeción principal contra esas dos posiciones es que, cuando analizan la situación en que los potenciales (...)
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  • Which Moral Requiriments Does Constituvism Support?W. Davis Ryan - unknown
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  • Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1):24 - 60.
    Agents often face a choice of what to do. And it seems that, in most of these choice situations, the relevant reasons do not require performing some particular act, but instead permit performing any of numerous act alternatives. This is known as the basic belief. Below, I argue that the best explanation for the basic belief is not that the relevant reasons are incommensurable (Raz) or that their justifying strength exceeds the requiring strength of opposing reasons (Gert), but that they (...)
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  • Altruism and Ambition in the Dynamic Moral Life.Tom Dougherty - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):716-729.
    Some people are such impressive altruists that they seem to us to already be doing more than enough. And yet they see themselves as compelled to do even more. Can our view be reconciled with theirs? Can a moderate view of beneficence's demands be made consistent with a requirement to be ambitiously altruistic? I argue that a reconciliation is possible if we adopt a dynamic view of beneficence, which addresses the pattern that our altruism is required to take over time. (...)
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  • Maximalism Versus Omnism About Reasons.Douglas Portmore - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2953-2972.
    The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pie as well as the option of baking, and baking a pie entails baking. Now, suppose that I have both reason to bake and reason to bake a pie. Which, if either, grounds the other? Do I have reason to bake in virtue of my having reason to perform some instance of baking, such as pie baking? Or do I have (...)
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  • Imperfect Duties and Corporate Philanthropy: A Kantian Approach.David E. Ohreen & Roger A. Petry - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 106 (3):367-381.
    Nonprofit organizations play a crucial role in society. Unfortunately, many such organizations are chronically underfunded and struggle to meet their objectives. These facts have significant implications for corporate philanthropy and Kant’s notion of imperfect duties. Under the concept of imperfect duties, businesses would have wide discretion regarding which charities receive donations, how much money to give, and when such donations take place. A perceived problem with imperfect duties is that they can lead to moral laxity; that is, a failure on (...)
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  • Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View.Julia Nefsky - 2021 - In Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford, UK: pp. 201-221.
    This chapter concerns the nature of our obligations as individuals when it comes to our emissions-producing activities and climate change. The first half of the chapter argues that the popular ‘expected utility’ approach to this question faces a problematic dilemma: either it gives skeptical verdicts, saying that there are no such obligations, or it yields implausibly strong verdicts. The second half of the chapter diagnoses the problem. It is argued that the dilemma arises from a very general feature of the (...)
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  • Nudge Me, Help My Baby: On Other-Regarding Nudges.Hafez Ismaili M'hamdi, Medard Hilhorst, Eric A. P. Steegers & Inez de Beaufort - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (10):702-706.
    There is an increasing interest in the possibility of using nudges to promote people's health. Following the advances in developmental biology and epigenetics, it is clear that one's health is not always the result of one's own choices. In the period surrounding pregnancy, maternal choice behaviour has a significant influence on perinatal morbidity and mortality as well as the development of chronic diseases later in life. One's health is thus a matter of one's own as well as one's maternal choices. (...)
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  • It’s Good to Be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective Consent, and the Foundation of Consent in the Criminal Law. [REVIEW]Jonathan Witmer-Rich - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):377-398.
    What is the foundation of consent in the criminal law? Classically liberal commentators have offered at least three distinct theories. J.S. Mill contends we value consent because individuals are the best judges of their own interests. Joel Feinberg argues an individual’s consent matters because she has a right to autonomy based on her intrinsic sovereignty over her own life. Joseph Raz also focuses on autonomy, but argues that society values autonomy as a constituent element of individual well-being, which it is (...)
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  • Kant and the Demandingness of the Virtue of Beneficence.Paul Formosa & Martin Sticker - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):625-642.
    We discuss Kant’s conception of beneficence against the background of the overdemandingness debate. We argue that Kant’s conception of beneficence constitutes a sweet spot between overdemandingess and undemandingess. To this end we defend four key claims that together constitute a novel interpretation of Kant’s account of beneficence: 1) for the same reason that we are obligated to be beneficent to others we are permitted to be beneficent to ourselves; 2) we can prioritise our own ends; 3) it is more virtuous (...)
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  • Transitivity, Moral Latitude, and Supererogation.Douglas W. Portmore - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (3):286-298.
    On what I take to be the standard account of supererogation, an act is supererogatory if and only if it is morally optional and there is more moral reason to perform it than to perform some permissible alternative. And, on this account, an agent has more moral reason to perform one act than to perform another if and only if she morally ought to prefer how things would be if she were to perform the one to how things would be (...)
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