The article argues that civil disobedience must be perceived as an action with progressive and political significance, thus reflecting, from a Kantian perspective, the recognizable paradox between morality and law, as expressed in Kant’s moral and political writings. Hence, this article firstly analyzes on which grounds Kant claims rebellion to be unjust. Secondly, it examines how and if people, from a Kantian point of view, can defend themselves against an unjust sovereignty. On this basis, it argues that ‘civil disobedience’ can (...) be juxtaposed with the Kantian idea of ‘freedom of the pen,’ thus having the same function as a political corrective. However, two questions are still to be answered, namely if civil disobedience must be punished, and if civil disobedience as a political corrective can be justified? By considering civil disobedience primarily as political agency, both questions are answered in the affirmative. (shrink)

It is generally acknowledged that Kant's political philosophy stands on a par with the great works of the Western liberal tradition. It is also a matter of agreement that the rational principles on which it rests represent an adequate philosophical expression of the progressive agenda that was inaugurated by the Enlightenment and fulfilled, with varying degrees of success, by the French Revolution. Yet Kant's philosophical position is ambiguous when it comes to evaluating that momentous event in modern history. We know, (...) from anecdotal evidence, some surviving letters, several cryptic references in his published works, as well as a number of posthumously published reflections, that Kant was enthusiastic about and strongly approved of the changes that were taking place in France at the time. He certainly condemned, in strong and unequivocal terms, the execution of Louis XVI. But this did not translate into a repudiation of his support for the revolution. And he seems to have found even in this case mitigating circumstances that explained the revolutionaries' decision to execute the monarch, thus in fact excusing their action. Moreover, he argued that all post-revolutionary governments ought to command the same kind of loyalty from their subjects as the ones they replaced, which appears to justify Kant's contention in the Idea for a Universal History that political violence can be a vehicle of progress. Furthermore, in the Contest of Faculties Kant went so far as to identify in the enthusiastic response of the ‘spectators’ to the French Revolution a clear sign of the moral disposition of humankind. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

En este trabajo proponemos examinar una doble exigencia formulada por Kant en El conflicto de las Facultades –a saber, la exigencia de libertad y la exigencia del orden–, a fin de señalar la premisa básica subyacente a dicha exigencia, esto es: la idea de que el orden público constituye la condición fundamental para la preservación del estado civil, entendido como el único estado en el que los hombres pueden ejercer plenamente su derecho innato a la libertad. Atendiendo a este objetivo, (...) examinaremos el modo en que Kant caracteriza la contienda entre las Facultades, destacando el sentido eminentemente político del conflicto, y analizaremos la función específica que asigna a cada una de las Facultades, haciendo especial énfasis en la determinación de los límites establecidos para el libre ejercicio de la razón filosófica. (shrink)

El presente ensayo tiene por finalidad mostrar que el rechazo de Kant a un pretendido derecho a la revolución no implica que una situación de injusticia deba ser necesariamente tolerada. En su lugar, el rechazo kantiano a un derecho a la revolución es explicado aquí por medio de la categoría de comunidad entendida como una construcción de relaciones de coexistencia recíprocas. El énfasis sobre el tipo de vínculo que implica la categoría de comunidad permite sostener que el requisito para cualquier (...) restitución de justicia legítima es que dicha acción debe considerar a todos los integrantes de la comunidad. La revolución no puede cumplir con este requisito pues siempre supone un uso unilateral de la violencia que, aunque cuente con el apoyo mayoritario de un determinado grupo social, es tan sólo un tipo de coacción parcial que no puede representar legítimamente a una comunidad. (shrink)