In his book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson defends first-order necessitism using simplicity as a powerful argument. However, simplicity is decomposed into two different, even antagonistic, sides: elegance and parsimony. On the one hand, elegance is the property of theories possessing few and simple principles that allow them to deploy all their theoretical power; on the other hand, parsimony is the property of theories having the fair and necessary number of ontological entities that allow such theories give an account (...) of themselves. Since necessitism endorses Barcan Formulae for the sake of elegance, it is committed to a vast number of contingently non-concrete objects, so one may think that it is not qualitatively parsimonious. I argue that necessitism could be viewed as an additive case in the sense that Alan Baker characterizes the adjective so quantitative parsimony should be considered when it comes to necessitism instead of qualitative parsimony. (shrink)

During the course of the eighteenth century important changes occurred in the conception of matter held by British natural philosophers. Historians of science have described these changes in different ways, but certain common features can be abstracted from the more recent accounts. First, there was a movement away from Newtonian matter theory, which saw all matter as the various organizations of homogeneous particles and the forces of attraction and repulsion acting between them. In place of this theory increasing favour was (...) shown towards a more empirical or ‘chemical’ approach to matter which assumed the existence of several essentially distinct types of matter each endowed with different specific qualities or properties. Second, there was an increasing tendency to accept activity as a property of matter itself rather than to ascribe it to immaterial forces. (shrink)

Locke is often interpreted as having attempted to build a foundation for knowledge based on ideas. However, textual evidence shows that the corpuscular philosophy is also a fundamental part of that foundation. Somewhat anachronistically, but also very usefully, Locke can be described as inferring corpuscularianism by an inference to the best explanation. Locke felt justified in believing that the corpuscular philosophy was the correct description of the world because it provided us with a better explanation of a wider variety of (...) phenomena than competing hypotheses.Keywords: John Locke; Robert Boyle; Induction; Inference to the best explanation; Corpuscular philosophy. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim once refrained from excluding distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient physical cause of the effect. At that time, Kim also refrained from excluding distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect. More recently, he has excluded distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient cause of the effect, since the physical cause is individually sufficient for the effect. But there has been, to this point, no parallel (...) shift in the explanatory realm, such that distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect are excluded since the physical explanation is objectively complete. In this paper I consider, defend, and apply this update to the principle of explanatory exclusion—an update, which, in the final analysis, demonstrates a significant advantage that non-reductive physicalism has over reductive physicalism. (shrink)

The official model of explanation proposed by the logical empiricists, the covering law model, is subject to familiar objections. The goal of the present paper is to explore an unofficial view of explanation which logical empiricists have sometimes suggested, the view of explanation as unification. I try to show that this view can be developed so as to provide insight into major episodes in the history of science, and that it can overcome some of the most serious difficulties besetting the (...) covering law model. (shrink)

Do the hard problem of consciousness and the simulation argument potentially resolve each other? Here we will argue for four possible views: that consciousness may be possible only (a) outside of, (b) inside and/or outside of, (c) inside of, or (d) interfacing with simulations. The first two of these views have been explored by David Chalmers and are used as jumping off points to introduce the latter two views, which are underdeveloped. If any one of these views could be proven (...) true, this would simultaneously both support a kind of account of properties of consciousness and also provide a kind of sign as to whether or not we are indeed living in a simulation. Given that none of these views are proven true but all are plausible, these considerations should tend to neutralize our credences that we are either simulated or not simulated, by themselves giving us no sign one way or the other. (shrink)

This chapter poses questions about the existence and character of the Scientific Revolution by deriving its initial categories of analysis and its initial understanding of the intellectual scene from the writings of the seventeenth century, and by following the evolution of these initial categories in succeeding centuries. This project fits the theme of cross cultural transmission and appropriation -- a theme of the present volume -- if one takes the notion of a culture broadly, so that, say, seventeenth and eighteenth (...) or nineteenth century European intellectual cultures are deemed sufficiently distinct that one can speak of the "transmission" of texts and ideas from the one to the other as cross cultural. I maintain that a process of transforming and assimilating seventeenth century achievements manifests itself in two distinct cultures of interpretation, one developed by historians of philosophy, the other by scientists and historians of science. The first, following actor's categories, interprets the revolution in the seventeenth century as a philosophical displacement, partly fomented by a radical change in astronomical theory; the second, retrospectively applying the post nineteenth century sense of the term "science" to seventeenth century events, finds a "scientific" revolution, or the birth of modern science. The chapter proposes interpreting the Scientific Revolution as a revolution in natural philosophy and metaphysics. (shrink)

An attempt to revise the special relativity genesis at the expense of comprehending all Einstein’s 1905 papers as a whole is provided. It is argued that light quanta hypothesis and special relativity turn out to be mere stages of implementation of the programme of maxwellian electrodynamics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics reconciliation. The conception of luminiferous ether was an insurmountable stumbling block for Einstein’s statistical thermodynamics programme in which the leading role was played by the light quanta paper . Einstein’s 1905 (...) unificationist modus operandi was close to Mach’s principle of economy of thought in ingenious conjunction with bashful inclinations of Kantian epistemology. Keywords: intertheoretic context, special relativity, light quanta , Unity of Nature, Mach, Kant. (shrink)

Argues that a coherent theory of ethics requires an account of selfhood.

Approaching Infinity addresses seventeen paradoxes of the infinite, most of which have no generally accepted solutions. The book addresses these paradoxes using a new theory of infinity, which entails that an infinite series is uncompletable when it requires something to possess an infinite intensive magnitude. Along the way, the author addresses the nature of numbers, sets, geometric points, and related matters. The book addresses the need for a theory of infinity, and reviews both old and new theories of infinity. It (...) discussing the purposes of studying infinity and the troubles with traditional approaches to the problem, and concludes by offering a solution to some existing paradoxes. (shrink)

Newton’s absolute pace-time view is the basis of his classical mechanics, and his description of relative motion is based on absolute space. However, the existence of this absolute space has been questioned by the academic circles. In order to defend its theoretical foundation, Newton established a famous bucket experiment to prove the existence of absolute space. But his experiment was also questioned, and the experiment is also divided into different opinions. This paper hopes to find the answer to the question (...) from Kantian perspective. (shrink)

The analysis of unpublished manuscripts and of the published textbook on mechanics written between about 1730 and 1744 by Euler reveals the invention, application, and establishment of important physical and mathematical principles and procedures. They became central ingredients of an “embryonic” lunar theory that he developed in 1744/1745. The increasing use of equations of motion, although still parametrized by length, became a standard procedure. The principle of the transference of forces was established to set up such equations. Trigonometric series expansions (...) together with the method of undetermined coefficients were introduced to solve these equations approximatively. These insights constitute the milestones achieved in this phase of research, which thus may be characterized as “developing the methods”. The documents reveal the problems Euler was confronted with when setting up the equations of motion. They show why and where he was forced to introduce trigonometric functions and their series expansions into lunar theory. Furthermore, they prove Euler’s early recognition and formulation of the variability of the orbital elements by differential equations, which he previously anticipated with the concept of the osculating ellipse. One may conclude that by 1744 almost all components needed for a technically mature and successful lunar theory were available to Euler. (shrink)

Leonhard Euler (1707–1783) published two lunar theories in 1753 and 1772. He also published lunar tables in 1745, 1746, and—anonymously—in 1750. There are notebook records, unpublished manuscripts, and manuscript fragments by Euler reflecting the development of his lunar theories between about 1725 until about 1752. These documents might be used to reconstruct Euler’s theory on which he based his calculations of those lunar tables and to analyze the development of his lunar theories within this time span. The results of this (...) analysis will be published here in three parts representing three stages of Euler’s research on this topic: First approaches (about 1725–1730), developing the methods (about 1730–1744), and the breakthrough (about 1744–1752). In this part, I analyze Euler’s manuscripts and, predominantly, Euler’s records of his first two notebooks written between 1725 and 1730. I found that his early theoretical approach is coined by his development of analytical (rational) mechanics of punctiform bodies moved by central forces. He tried to describe the Moon’s motion in terms of two simultaneously acting centripetal forces, Huygens’ centrifugal theorem, and associated osculating radii. (shrink)

In cognitive science, the dynamical systems theory (DST) has recently been advocated as an approach to cognitive modeling that is better suited to the dynamics of cognitive processes than the symbolic/computational approaches are. Often, the differences between DST and the symbolic/computational approach are emphasized. However, alternatively their commonalities can be analyzed and a unifying framework can be sought. In this paper, the possibility of such a unifying perspective on dynamics is analyzed. The analysis covers dynamics in cognitive disciplines, as well (...) as in physics, mathematics and computer science. The unifying perspective warrants the development of integrated approaches covering both DST aspects and symbolic/computational aspects. The concept of a state-determined system, which is based on the assumption that properties of a given state fully determine the properties of future states, lies at the heart of DST. Taking this assumption as a premise, the explanatory problem of dynamics is analyzed in more detail. The analysis of four cases within different disciplines (cognitive science, physics, mathematics, computer science) shows how in history this perspective led to numerous often used concepts within them. In cognitive science, the concepts desire and intention were introduced, and in classical mechanics the concepts momentum, energy and force. Similarly, in mathematics a number of concepts have been developed to formalize the state-determined system assumption [e.g. derivatives (of different orders) of a function, Taylor approximations]. Furthermore, transition systems - a currently popular format for specification of dynamical systems within computer science - can also be interpreted from this perspective. One of the main contributions of the paper is that the case studies provide a unified view on the explanation of dynamics across the chosen disciplines. All approaches to dynamics analyzed in this paper share the state-determined system assumption and the (explicit or implicit) use of anticipatory state properties. Within cognitive science, realism is one of the problems identified for the symbolic/computational approach - i.e. how do internal states described by symbols relate to the real world in a natural manner. As DST is proposed as an alternative to the symbolic/computational approach, a natural question is whether, for DST, realism of the states can be better guaranteed. As a second main contribution, the paper provides an evaluation of DST compared to the symbolic/computational approach, which shows that, in this respect (i.e. for the realism problem), DST does not provide a better solution than the other approaches. This shows that DST and the symbolic/computational approach not only have the state-determined system assumption and the use of anticipatory state properties in common, but also the realism problem. (shrink)

Sklar ([1974]) claimed that relationalism about ontology-the doctrine that space and time do not exist-is compatible with Newtonian mechanics. To defend this claim he sketched a relationalist interpretation of Newtonian mechanics. In his interpretation, absolute acceleration is a fundamental, intrinsic property of material bodies; that a body undergoes absolute acceleration does not entail that space and time exist. But Sklar left his proposal as just a sketch; his defense of relationalism succeeds only if the sketch can be filled in. I (...) argue that this cannot be done. There can be no (relationalist) dynamical laws of motion based on Sklar's proposal that capture the content of Newton's theory. So relationalists must look elsewhere for a relationalist interpretation of Newtonian mechanics. (shrink)

Never shall this be proved, that things that are not are. ParmenidesTo say that something does not exist, or that there is something which is not, is clearly a contradiction in terms; hence “ ” must be true. Moreover, we should certainly expect leave to put any primitive name of our language for the “x” of any matrix “ … x … ”, and to infer the resulting singular statement from “ ”; it is difficult to contemplate any alternative logical (...) rule for reasoning with names. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge two widespread convictions about unification in physics: unification is an aim of physics and unification is driven by metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions. I call these external explanations of why there is unification in physics. Against this, I claim that unification is a by-product of physical research and unification is driven by basic methodological strategies of physics alone. I call this an internal explanation of why there is unification in physics. To support my claims, I will (...) investigate the actual practice undertaken in physics in paradigmatic examples of unification. (shrink)

The following article describes a pilot study on the possible integration of digital historiography into teaching practice. It focuses on Émilie Du Châtelet’s considerations of space and time against the background of Leibniz’s program of analysis situs. Historians have characterized philosophical controversies on space and time as a dichotomy between the absolute and relational concepts of space and time. In response to this, the present case study pursues two aims: First, it shows that the common portrayal simplifies the complex pattern (...) of change and the semantic shift from absolute-relational concepts of space and time to invariance and conservation principles. Second, against this background, I present the Online Reading Guide on Émilie Du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics, a teaching and research project designed to help navigate Du Châtelet’s Institutions physiques. This project makes Du Châtelet’s important text visible to a broad audience and allows for a more critical and deeper view on classical topics of the history of philosophy and science in a more accessible way than traditional introductions. (shrink)

Experiments with the simple pendulum are easy, but its motion is nevertheless confounded with simple harmonic motion. However, refined theoretical models of the pendulum can, today, be easily taught using software like CALCODE. Similarly, the cycloidal pendulum is isochronous only in simplified theory. But what are theoretically equal intervals of time? Newton accepted Barrow’s even tenor hypothesis, but conceded that ‘equal motions’ did not exist – the refutability of Newtonian physics is independent of time measurement. However, time measurement was the (...) key difficulty in reconciling Newtonian physics with electrodynamics. On Poincaré’s criterion of convenience, equal intervals of time ought be so defined as to make the enunciation of physics simple. Hence he postulated constancy of the speed of light. (The Michelson–Morley experiment was not critical.) The theory of relativity followed. But does there exist a proper clock? (shrink)

In the past five years, there have been a series of papers in the journal Evolution debating the relative significance of two theories of evolution, a neo-Fisherian and a neo-Wrightian theory, where the neo-Fisherians make explicit appeal to parsimony. My aim in this paper is to determine how we can make sense of such an appeal. One interpretation of parsimony takes it that a theory that contains fewer entities or processes, (however we demarcate these) is more parsimonious. On the account (...) that I defend here, parsimony is a ‘local’ virtue. Scientists’ appeals to parsimony are not necessarily an appeal to a theory’s simplicity in the sense of it’s positing fewer mechanisms. Rather, parsimony may be proxy for greater probability or likelihood. I argue that the neo-Fisherians appeal is best understood on this interpretation. And indeed, if we interpret parsimony as either prior probability or likelihood, then we can make better sense of Coyne et al. argument that Wright’s three phase process operates relatively infrequently. (shrink)

The main goal of quantum logic is the bottom-up reconstruction of quantum mechanics in Hilbert space. Here we discuss the question whether quantum logic is an empirical structure or a priori valid. There are good reasons for both possibilities. First, with respect to the possibility of a rational reconstruction of quantum mechanics, quantum logic follows a priori from quantum ontology and can thus not be considered as a law of nature. Second, since quantum logic allows for a reconstruction of quantum (...) mechanics, self-referential consistency requires that the empirical content of quantum mechanics must be compatible with the presupposed quantum ontology. Hence, quantum ontology contains empirical components that are also contained in quantum logic. Consequently, in this sense quantum logic is also a law of nature. (shrink)

Primitives are both important and unavoidable, and which set of primitives we endorse will greatly shape our theories and how those theories provide solutions to the problems that we take to be important. After introducing the notion of a primitive posit, I discuss the different kinds of primitives that we might posit. Following Cowling (2013), I distinguish between ontological and ideological primitives, and, following Benovsky (2013) between functional and content views of primitives. I then propose that these two distinctions cut (...) across each other leading to four types of primitive posits. I then argue that theoretical virtues should be taken to be meta-theoretical ideological primitives. I close with some reflections on the global nature of comparing sets of primitives. (shrink)

This article presents a novel argument against a common principle of parsimony in philosophy. First, it identifies a widely employed principle of positive ontological parsimony, according to which we should, ceteris paribus, prefer smaller ontologies to larger ontologies. Next, it shows how this principle is used as part of a strategy by which to argue for antirealist positions in many subfields of philosophy: the ockhamistic antirealist strategy. Third, it argues that this principle commits its adherents to an implausible epistemological thesis—the (...) Eroding Ontology Thesis—according to which evidence for the existence of some entity is at least prima facie evidence against the existence of all other entities. Antirealists might decide to adopt a related position, ontological conservatism, according to which we should simply resist changing our ontology, but the article shows that it is independently unjustified. Therefore, it concludes, philosophers have good reason to cease employing one very common antirealist strategy. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the remarkable popularity of William Paley’s argument from design among contemporary naturalists in biology and the philosophy of science. In philosophy of science Elliott Sober has argued that creationism should be excluded from the schools not because it is not science but because it is ‘less likely’ than evolution according to fairly standard confirmation theory. Creationism is said to have been a plausible scientific option as presented by Paley but no longer to be acceptable according to the (...) same standards that once approved it. In biology C. G. Williams and Richard Dawkins have seen in Paley a proto-adaptationist. This paper shows that the historical assumptions of Sober’s arguments are wrong and that the philosophical arguments themselves take alternatives to science to be alternatives in science and conflate the null hypothesis, chance, with a competing explanatory hypothesis. It is also shown that the similarity of Paley’s adaptationism to that of contemporary biology is not what it is made out to be. (shrink)

Will Ladislaw's words, which so disillusion the young Dorothea, might also depress the modern interpreter of Newton's theology. Encountering the bulk of Newton's manuscript theology, it is tempting to sympathize with Dorothea's eventual response toThe Key to all Mythologies, and to want nothing of it. The assessment of John Conduitt, Newton's son-in-law and executor, that his ‘relief and amusement was going to some other study, as history, chronology, divinity, and chemistry’ has in the past provided an ample excuse for those (...) who have wished to take such a course, and to ignore Newton's biblical criticism. In the last three decades, however, Newton scholarship has come to terms with its hero's twilight activities, and reclassified them as being at least as important to him as the natural philosophy of thePrincipia, and intimately bound up with the thinking behind that philosophy. But although many modern scholars are now reluctant to see Newton as Stephen Hawking in breeches, historians of science have tended to concentrate on the implications for Newton's philosophy of his religious and alchemical writings, and in the process often have distorted their religious context. Historians of ideas have been beguiled by Newton's disciples, and by the esoteric texts from Newton's library, to ride hobbyhorses of their own which do not always illuminate Newton's reasons for writing theology. There is a danger of ‘knowing what is being done by the rest of the world’ before troubling with what Newton was up to when he worried about religion and theology, channelling his energies into treatise after treatise on the interpretation of prophecy. I want to suggest what some of Newton's concerns may have been, by looking at his ideas of religious duty and of the Church, and to liberate Newton from his disciples for long enough to consider some of his ideas about the relationships of prophetic and natural philosophical explorations of divinity. (shrink)

ABOUT WEAK AND STRONG EMPIRICAL NECCESSITY. CATEGORICAL, DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES AND LAWS OF NATURE Pohľady na empirickú nevyhnutnosť možno rozdeliť do dvoch skupín: teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti a teórie silnej nevyhnutnosti. Do prvej teórie patria koncepcie, ktoré uvažujú svet zložený z pasívnych vlastností, akými sú kategorické vlastnosti. Za zmeny vo svete sú zodpovedné zákony prírody, ktoré sa od možného sveta k svetu líšia, a preto aj prejavy týchto vlastností sú odlišné. Druhú teóriu, teóriu silnej nevyhnutnosti, zastávajú filozofi, ktorí predpokladajú existenciu silovo aktívnych (...) vlastností, dispozícií. Práve tieto sú zodpovedné za zmeny vo svete, a vo všetkých možných svetoch sa prejavujú nevyhnutne rovnako. Autor argumentuje v prospech existencie dispozičných vlastností a tvrdí, že dispozičný výklad sveta netrpí modálnymi absurdnosťami, ktorými trpia teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti. Hoci aj dispozičné teórie majú svoje problémy a hlavne mysterióznosti, ktoré môžu viesť až do metafyziky dispozičných monád. Kľúčové slová: dispozičné vlastnosti, kategorické vlastnosti, modality, nevyhnutnosť, zákony prírody. (shrink)

ABOUT WEAK AND STRONG EMPIRICAL NECCESSITY. CATEGORICAL, DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES AND LAWS OF NATURE Pohľady na empirickú nevyhnutnosť možno rozdeliť do dvoch skupín: teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti a teórie silnej nevyhnutnosti. Do prvej teórie patria koncepcie, ktoré uvažujú svet zložený z pasívnych vlastností, akými sú kategorické vlastnosti. Za zmeny vo svete sú zodpovedné zákony prírody, ktoré sa od možného sveta k svetu líšia, a preto aj prejavy týchto vlastností sú odlišné. Druhú teóriu, teóriu silnej nevyhnutnosti, zastávajú filozofi, ktorí predpokladajú existenciu silovo aktívnych (...) vlastností, dispozícií. Práve tieto sú zodpovedné za zmeny vo svete, a vo všetkých možných svetoch sa prejavujú nevyhnutne rovnako. Autor argumentuje v prospech existencie dispozičných vlastností a tvrdí, že dispozičný výklad sveta netrpí modálnymi absurdnosťami, ktorými trpia teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti. Hoci aj dispozičné teórie majú svoje problémy a hlavne mysterióznosti, ktoré môžu viesť až do metafyziky dispozičných monád. Kľúčové slová: dispozičné vlastnosti, kategorické vlastnosti, modality, nevyhnutnosť, zákony prírody. (shrink)

Among the many controversial contributions of E. A. Milne to cosmology, the only one which is taken seriously today (to the extent that it has been absorbed as a premise in most scientific approaches to the problem of the universe as a totality) is his early suggestion that a formal equivalence may be made between Newtonian and Relativistic cosmology. My own paper suggests that, over and above any logical validity in the alleged equivalence, the actual way in which it has (...) subtly insinuated itself into nearly all contemporary speculation reveals as few things could some of the epistemological foundations that underlie the current assumptions in cosmological science. (shrink)

Hume's regularity theory of causation was partly motivated by a criticism of Descartes' causal account of collisions. According to Descartes, bodies are things with extension, and since having extension does not entail any ability to cause changes of motion in other bodies, such changes must be explained by attributing a ‘causal power’ to bodies, logically independent of their extension. Hume's point is that we can't observe any such causal power and we should not use ideas about such unobserved qualities of (...) bodies. Given his form of empiricism, the regularity theory is the only choice; causation is no more than constant correlation. However, there is a third option beside attributing a metaphysical ‘causal power’ and mere regularity; if we follow Newton and say that bodies are characterised and individuated by their mass, not their extension, we can give another analysis of causal interaction between bodies. It is by having mass a body can cause changes in the motion of other bodies. Thus, using classical mechanics we can give an alternative to Hume's regularity theory of causation in which the necessary connection between cause and effect is understood as a conceptual connection between certain descriptions of cause and effect. It does not satisfy Hume's strictures on concept formation, but no additional metaphysics is necessary. In a sense it is an intermediate position between Humean regularity and an account in terms of metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

In 1859 Charles Darwin in chapter nine of the Origin of Species showed how he had calculated that the age of the Weald was three hundred million years and that consequently the age of the earth was considerably greater than that. Darwin of course needed such a long period of time for the process of evolution by natural selection to occur. Arguments which showed that the earth could not be that old would therefore cast serious doubt on his theory. Such (...) views were advanced in 1862 by William Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, professor of Natural Philosophy at Glasgow. He specifically challenged the result of Darwin's calculation of the age of the Weald by arguing that the sun could not have emitted its heat and light for that length of time. The consequences of this assertion for the biological and geological sciences for the remainder of the nineteenth century have already been delineated by Burchfield. What I wish to do in this paper is to show that the theoretical basis of Thomson's 1862 assertion had not been specifically developed as a response to Darwin, but that it was a consequence of the formulation of the first two laws of thermodynamics. I shall also show that Thomson's work was not done in isolation but that the question of the maintenance of solar energy was a serious concern of a number of physicists who had formulated the laws of thermodynamics. (shrink)

Newton’s First Law of Motion is typically understood to govern only the motion of force-free bodies. This paper argues on textual and conceptual grounds that it is in fact a stronger, more general principle. The First Law limits the extent to which any body can change its state of motion –– even if that body is subject to impressed forces. The misunderstanding can be traced back to an error in the first English translation of Newton’s Principia, which was published a (...) few years after Newton’s death. (shrink)

Over the recent decades, the concept of resilience has spread from environmental science to a number of disciplines dealing with crisis and disaster management. From psychology, public health, and human resource management to development and security studies, resilience is replacing an earlier focus on resistance and adaptability within these fields. There exist several studies dealing with resilience discourse as a key to a diagnostic of the present. While some hail resilience as a new register of ecological resistance for social movements, (...) other decries resilience as a discourse legitimating the neoliberal state’s abandonment of the poor to catastrophe. This article proposes a framework for reading together these highly diverging interpretations of resilience through a historicising of the concept of resilience, tracing its rise genealogically in relation to the concepts of resistance and adaptability. Through readings of authors such as Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Herbert Spencer, and C.J. Holling, the article shows how these concepts were imported from scientific materialism into pragmatic and normative discourses of defence of life against shifting threats to individual and social life. The article shows how the shifting importance of the concepts of resistance, adaptability and resilience must be related to changing social-ecological problems and the forms of contestation and governance that respond to them. (shrink)

One of the reasons for relativistic attitudes toward science is the impossibility of justifying scientists’ decisions in the face of alternative theories. According to this paper, an alternative theory can challenge scientific rationality only if the conditions of “methodological shortcomings of scientists” and the “existence of alternative theories” are met at a specific time. A commonly used technique to counter relativism is to try to supplement and equip scientists’ methodologies when confronted with alternative theories. However, this paper focuses on evaluating (...) the possibility of “existence an alternative theory.” To this end, by referring to the different definitions of being alternative, we try to show that only “after the decision” and “the conversion of the scientific community” can a theory be considered justifiably “alternative.” Therefore, the relativistic claim is inconsistent because relativists must first accept the validity of scientists’ decisions to attribute being alternative to a theory. In this work, we provide evidence for our claim using a historical example. We also defend conservatism as a corollary of our discussion. (shrink)

To solve the direct problem of central forces when the trajectory is an ellipse and the force is directed to its centre, Newton made use of the famous Lemma 12 (Principia, I, sect. II) that was later recognized equivalent to proposition 31 of book VII of Apollonius’s Conics. In this paper, in which we look for Newton’s possible sources for Lemma 12, we compare Apollonius’s original proof, as edited by Borelli, with those of other authors, including that given by Newton (...) himself. Moreover, after having retraced its editorial history, we evaluate the dissemination of Borelli's edition of books V-VII of Apollonius’s Conics before the printing of the Principia. (shrink)

From 1754 to 1756 Kant wrote on such central, related topics as the axial rotation of the Earth, the theory of heat, and the composition of matter, focusing on space, force, and motion. It has been noted that each of these topics pertains to his 1755 Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, in which he drew on extant cosmogonies and the analogical form of Newtonianism developed by naturalists including Buffon, Haller, and Thomas Wright. How does Kant build on (...) these various sources? This article aims to provide a nuanced account of specific features of the relation between natural history and natural philosophy in Kant’s early developmental theory of the universe and to illuminate the strategy that guides his innovative, selective appropriation of contemporaneous insights. -/- . (shrink)

Zeno's challenge to the usual mathematical characterization of extension is still with us. Butchvarov, considering the limits of ontological analysis, writes, “I shall not explore [the decision to accept the infinite regress in which the pursuit of the analytical ideal is involved], beyond noting that the infinite divisibility of space is the reductio ad absurdum of any attempt to understand space in terms of its ultimate, simple parts.” Grünbaum states this problem, commonly known as the Measure Paradox, concisely, “[How can (...) one conceive] of an extended continuum as an aggregate of unextended elements?”. (shrink)

Discussions of the metaphysical status of spacetime assume that a spacetime theory offers a causal explanation of phenomena of relative motion, and that the fundamental philosophical question is whether the inference to that explanation is warranted. I argue that those assumptions are mistaken, because they ignore the essential character of spacetime theory as a kind of physical geometry. As such, a spacetime theory does notcausally explain phenomena of motion, but uses them to construct physicaldefinitions of basic geometrical structures by coordinating (...) them with dynamical laws. I suggest that this view of spacetime theories leads to a clearer view of the philosophical foundations of general relativity and its place in the historical evolution of spacetime theory. I also argue that this view provides a much clearer and more defensible account of what is entailed by realism concerning spacetime. (shrink)

Abstract Einstein intended the general theory of relativity to be a generalization of the relativity of motion and, therefore, a radical departure from previous spacetime theories. It has since become clear, however, that this intention was not fulfilled. I try to explain Einstein's misunderstanding on this point as a misunderstanding of the role that spacetime plays in physics. According to Einstein, earlier spacetime theories introduced spacetime as the unobservable cause of observable relative motions and, in particular, as the cause of (...) inertial effects of ?absolute? motion. I use a comparative analysis of Einstein and Newton to show that spacetime is not introduced as an explanation of observable effects, but rather is defined through those effects in arguments like Newton's ?water bucket? argument and Einstein's argument for special relativity. I then argue that to claim that a spacetime theory is true, or to claim that a spacetime structure is ?real?, is not to claim that a theoretical object explains the observable. Rather, it is to claim that the fundamental definitions that link spacetime structure to physical phenomena are empirically sound, i.e. that they can be successfully applied empirically. This leads to a new and clearer view of the empirical content of spacetime theories and of the meaning of ?realism? about spacetime. (shrink)

The obvious metaphysical differences between Newton and Leibniz concerning space, time, and motion reflect less obvious differences concerning the relation between geometry and physics, expressed in the questions: what are the invariant quantities of classical mechanics, and what sort of geometrical frame of reference is required to represent those quantities? Leibniz thought that the fundamental physical quantity was “living force” (mv2), of which every body was supposed to have a definite amount; this notion violates the classical principle of relativity, since (...) it makes a physical distinction between uniform velocity and absolute rest. But Leibniz did not try to represent this physical quantity in a spatio-temporal reference frame, assuming, instead, that all such frames are equivalent so long as they agree on the relative motions (changes in the mutual Euclidean distances) among bodies. (shrink)

The ArgumentCarl Gottfried Neumann was born in Königsberg, Prussia, in 1832 and died in Leipzig in 1925. His father was the physicist Franz Neumann, notable for his contributions not only to the study of electricity and magnetism but also to the development of physics education in nineteenth-century Germany. Carl Neumann studied at the University of Königsberg and received his doctorate in 1855 with a work on the application of elliptic integrals to mechanics. In 1858 he became Privatdozent, and in 1863 (...) Professor of Mathematics at Halle. Later that same year he moved to Basel, and in 1865 he became Ordinary Professor of Mathematics at Tübingen. Finally in 1868 he was appointed Professor of Mathematics at Leipzig, a post he held until he retired in 1911; of the two mathematics professorships at Leipzig, this was the one formerly held by F. A. Möbius, and it was officially devoted to “the higher mathematics, especially physics”. So Neumann's academic career, along with his role as one of the founding editors of the Mathematische Annalen beginning in 1869, can be seen as reflecting the enormous advance in mathematical sophistication that German physics underwent in the latter part of the nineteenth century. (shrink)