This article is about Otto Neurath’s infamous proposal to combat metaphysics by creating and publishing an index of prohibited words. The logic of this proposal is explicated in the frameworks of Neurath’s philosophy of science and his International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. I reconstruct two arguments within Neurath’s project to defend the proposal against criticisms from Neurath’s colleagues and against the charge that philosophers ought not be censors.

The first part of this book - consisting of chapters 2, 3 and 4 - is a philosophical exploration of the characteristics of an economics that intends to be relevant for the problem of sustainability. In chapter 2, 1 will analyse economic and political theories as conceptual constructs referring to the economic and political sphere respectively. I will argue that such conceptual constructs inevitably are value-laden and that, hence, different conceptual constructs of the same sphere can exist. I will argue, (...) moreover, that and why it is important to distinguish between the economic and the political sphere. I will derive the latter arguments from a confrontation between Buchanan's and Arendt's political theory.In chapter 3, 1 will discuss an economy as consisting of two dimensions, a symbolic or institutional one and an ecological one. Such interpretation will allow us to understand the ecological performance of an economy as the counterpart of its institutional organisation. I will further argue that, in order to get insights into the internal relationships between an economy and its ecological performance, we need insights into the institutional whole of an economy. And I will elaborate on what I mean by "an institutional whole". I will suggest that it is a matter of conceptually analysing different types of economic institutions and different hierarchies of institutions. Chapter 3 will thus offer us some substantive norms for an economics that aims at contributing successfully to the political objective of "sustainability".In chapter 4, 1 will derive four norms for the nature, rather than the content, of a politically successful economics. I will suggest that a politically successful economics should, to start with, be objective in the sense that it should aim at intersubjective consensus among economists. Objectivity as intersubjective consensus does, however, not imply neutrality. I will suggest, further, that economics should provide economic policy with insights, rather than instruments. This means that economics should aim at description and explanation, not at prescription and prediction. I will assert, finally, that economics should be rather impartial than partial. It should explain economic sources of political inequality and contribute to political freedom. Both Arendt's interpretation of politics as a deliberative democracy and Weber's and Neurath's philosophical reflections on the nature of the social sciences will function as the breeding ground for these norms.In the second part of this book, i.e., chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, 1 will confront the norms developed concerning both the content and the nature of an ecologically successful economics with the writings of David Pearce and Daniel Bromley. Chapters 5 and 7 are a substantive reconstruction of Pearce's and Bromley's theoretical work respectively, Chapters 6 and 8 are an analysis of the nature of their economics. Chapters 5 and 7 will make clear to what extent their writings comply with the substantive norm 1 propose in chapter 3. Chapters 6 and 8 will illuminate to what extent their writings meet the four norms suggested , in chapter 4, for the nature of an ecologically successful economics.Part 1 and 11 will be closed by chapter 9, in which 1 will give an overview of the main conclusions of this research project. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine, in the light of some recent works in general philosophy of science and special philosophy of biology, the different forms assumed by the thesis of the unity of science, in order to be able to determine in what sense one can speak of a unity of the biological sciences.

The objective of this papper is to examine, under the light of some recent works in general philosophy of science as well as in special philosophy of biology, the different forms that assumes the thesis of the unity of science, in order to be able to determine in what sense it can be spoken about the unity of biological sciences.

This dissertation aims at a systemic presentation of Neurath’s thinking as a coherent and sui generis whole. In order to satisfy this desideratum, the main idea put forth in this dissertation is that a specific two-way relation holds between two of Neurath’s main philosophical theses: Semantic Coherentism: a sentence is true if, and only if, it belongs to, or can be deduced from, a coherent set of sentences. Sociological Relativism: the value of a social change depends on how it influences (...) the living conditions of a certain group of individuals. The two-way relation is the following: from the reconstructive point of view, Neurathian semantic coherentism entails his sociological relativism; but, from the point of view of the conceptual structure underlying Neurath’s thinking, it is his sociological relativism that entails his semantic coherentism. We thus arrive at a virtuous circle. On the one hand, the appeal to sociological relativism (together with Neurath’s first order sociological commitments) allows us to explain his view of science; on the other hand, only once we have acquired a justification for sociological relativism, via his theory of truth, are we entitled to explain his view of science in this way. The exposition will be guided by the attempt to find an answer to the three following questions: (i) Does Neurath accept the standard threefold definition of knowledge? (ii) What kind of coherentism is endorsed by Neurath? (iii) Is Neurath’s coherentism compatible with empiricism? The answer to the first question will be negative. It will be argued that radical physicalism (i.e. the conjunction between physicalism and epistemic naturalism) entails the rejection of this definition. The answer to the second question will amount to showing that Neurath’s endorsement of semantic coherentism does not entail, as it is sometimes stated, the endorsement of epistemic coherentism. Finally, the third question will be answered negatively by showing that, given Neurath’s theory of protocol sentences, his coherentism and his empiricism are compatible. The exegetical work prompted by the need to answer these questions will provide us with the elements we need in order to substantiate the main idea mentioned above. (shrink)