In Emile, Rousseau claims that the value of women ought to be determined by the opinion that men have of them. Women, contrary to commodities and men, escape what I call Rousseau's “dual theory of value.” According to the latter, the apparent value of commodities and men is determined by opinion and either unrelated or inverse to “real value,” which is assessed through objective criteria. The dual theory of value is the basis of Rousseau's critique of commercial society. However, women (...) warrant an exception to this theory. As women's apparent worth is their real worth, women are the unique object in the world that ought to be subjected to the rule of opinion, which is the rule of commercial market that Rousseau so violently rejects. This article investigates why this is the case and locates three functions to the unique position of women in Rousseau's theory of value. (shrink)

Yirminci yüzyılın son çeyreğinde modern dönem toplum sözleşmeci geleneği yeniden canlandıran John Rawls, hak kavramını iyi kavramına öncelikli kıldığı ahlak teorisinde adil ve iyi düzenlenmiş bir toplumun nasıl yaratılacağı yönünde teorik bir açılım yapmıştır. Bireyi kendine has bir şekilde ahlaki, eşit ve rasyonel özne olarak kodlayan Rawls, bu bireyden yola çıkarak teorik öncüllerini oluşturmuş ve geliştirdiği teori aracılığıyla özgürlük ve eşitlik nosyonlarını uzlaştırma çabasına girmiştir. Rawlsın bu çabasına yönelik literatürde yer alan tartışmalar; ya Rawlsın adalet ilkelerinin birbirini çürüttüğü ya da (...) bu ilkelerin birbirine diyalektik olarak zorunlu bir bağlılık arz ettiği yönündeki argümanlardan oluşmaktadır. Bu makalede ise; sorunun Hakkaniyet Olarak Adalet İlkeleri’nin birbiriyle çelişip çelişmediği veya birbirini zorunlu olarak tamamlayıp tamamlamadığı olmadığı özellikle tartışılarak, bu ilkeleri uygulayacak olan Rawlsçı Mülk Sahipliği Demokrasisi Modelinde bile özgürlük ve eşitliğin Rawslın beklentisi doğrultusunda toplumsal boyutta yaşanamayacağı yönünde argümanlar öne sürülmüştür. (shrink)

Contemporary egalitarian political philosophy has become increasingly interested in the ways the international order may protect or undermine states’ capacities to deliver domestic egalitarianism. This paper draws on Miriam Ronzoni’s helpful discussion of the various different ways in which both philosophical and practical commitments can move beyond a contrast between a world of closed societies and a cosmopolis to explore how successful the theorizing prompted by that interest has been. Problems scholars like Peter Mair and Wolfgang Streeck have suggested the (...) EU faces also suggest that there are difficulties views like Ronzoni’s have to overcome to usefully orient us towards the threats posed by the interactions between domestic and international politics. These problems can be usefully framed by what the intellectual historian István Hont called jealousy of trade and used to understand debates between members of what is commonly understood as the republican tradition, especially in the eighteenth century. Jealousy of trade revolves around the way that international economic competition intensifies international political competition, requiring the restructuring of domestic politics to ensure the survival of the state, which then further intensifies international economic competition. The ways of navigating and controlling the increasing costs of an increasingly belligerent international order eighteenth century political theorists found help illustrate the challenges contemporary internationalising egalitarians face. Isaac Nakhimovsky’s work on Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s closed commercial state is, I argue, specially useful given the similarity of some of Fichte’s commitments to those of contemporary internationalising egalitarians. (shrink)

In Rousseau’s Social Contract, political laws are rationally binding because they satisfy the interests that motivate individuals to obey such laws. The later books of Emile justify morality by showing that it is continuous with the natural dispositions of a well-brought-up subject and is thus conducive to genuine happiness. In both the moral and political cases, Rousseau argues for an internal connection between the rational ground of an obligation and the broader aspects of human psychology that are satisfied and expressed (...) by acting from that obligation. Yet, inspired by Kantian philosophy, the recent and influential Social Autonomy interpretation has disjoined rationality and psychology. Criticising this interpretation, I argue that for Rousseau, obligations are justified because they satisfy the demands made by our moral psychology, most notably amour-propre, i.e. the desire to have one’s worth recognised by others. (shrink)

Le présent article vise à reconstruire la lecture que Rawls fait du Second Discours et du Contrat social de Rousseau sur les thèmes de l’amour-propre, de l’autonomie, de la volonté générale et de la stabilité. L’objectif est ainsi de mieux comprendre l’héritage rousseauiste dans la pensée politique rawlsienne. Lorsque Rawls développe les notions de liberté et de sens de la justice dans Théorie de la justice, de raison publique et de citoyenneté dans Libéralisme politique et d’utopie réaliste dans Le Droit (...) des peuples, il s’inspire en grande partie de sa lecture de la philosophie sociale et politique du penseur du xviii e siècle. L’idée est donc de lire Rawls dans le sillage de Rousseau, de montrer comment il s’est réapproprié certaines de ses thèses et certains de ses concepts afin d’en proposer quelque chose d’original et de profondément riche. (shrink)

The article argues that the possibility of an unlimited gap in income and wealth between the top and bottom segments of society is incompatible with a democratic commitment to political equality. T...

In arguing for justice as fairness, John Rawls distinguishes between two types of social institutions and, according to this distinction, proposes two principles of justice with a lexical order. According to the first principle, citizens have an equal right to the most adequate scheme of basic liberties. Then he arranges the list of basic liberties based on the necessary requirements to develop and exercise two moral powers. A new approach called market democracy claimed that, on Rawlsian assumption and justificatory framework, (...) the thick conception of economic liberties should be included in the list of basic liberties. So, justice as fairness entails the acceptance of classical liberalism, i.e., the legitimacy of thick economic liberties. With a critical reflection on and reference to Rawlsian assumptions, this study tries to show the inconsistency of market democracy’s claims. First, with reference to essential requirements to develop and exercise of the moral powers, thick economic liberties could not be justified; second, these liberties are not consistent with the distributional requirements of the first and second principles; third, market democracy is inconsistent with the argument form original position. (shrink)