This paper examines whether firms strategically legitimize large labor dismissals by performing ex-ante downward earnings management. We further assess whether the effect is larger under stakeholder pressure and whether these practices influence the external perception of firms’ behavior. As laying off employees without an economic reason is perceived as a breach of the social contract, stakeholders pressure firms to provide economic justification for LLDs. We argue that firms strategically legitimize LLDs by artificially worsening their financial performance through downward earnings management. (...) From a sample of European listed firms for the period 1998–2014, using a propensity score matching model to control for differences in observable characteristics between LLD and non-LLD firms, we find that firms manage their earnings downward in the year prior to LLDs. These results are more pronounced in the presence of high stakeholder pressure. As such, firms with stronger trade unions, higher visibility, stricter employment protection legislation, and more stakeholder-oriented legal environments have stronger incentives to manage earnings downward before LLDs. Finally, we document that downward earnings management prior to LLDs is effective at legitimizing LLDs, offsetting the negative external perceptions of firms in the aftermath of LLDs. This study contributes to the business ethics literature by identifying unintended consequences of stakeholder pressure around LLDs. It also brings important empirical insights into how ethically questionable decisions are strategically legitimized through further unethical practices. (shrink)

This study explores the downsizing propensity of family and non-family firms by considering their territorial embeddedness during both periods of economic stability and financial crisis. By drawing on a panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 2002–2015, we show that, all things being equal, family firms have a lower propensity to downsizing than non-family firms. When considering the effect of territorial embeddedness, we found that territorially embedded family firms have an even lower propensity to downsizing than their non-family (...) counterparts. Furthermore, the concern of territorially embedded family firms for their employees’ welfare was particularly pronounced during the years of the global financial crisis. This result is explained by the existence of socially proximate relationships with the firms’ immediate surroundings, based on similarity and a sense of belonging, which push deeply rooted family firms to treat their employees as salient stakeholders during hard times. Overall, our study stresses the importance of local roots in moderating the relationship between family firms and downsizing. (shrink)