- Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
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Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):425-438.details
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Vigilance and control.Samuel Murray & Manuel Vargas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):825-843.details
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Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”.Carlos J. Moya - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):585-605.details
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Culpability and Irresponsibility.Martin Montminy - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):167-181.details
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Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases.Aleksandr Mishura - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (4):393-402.details
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How is Self-Forgiveness Possible?Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Reasonable Pluralism about Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense.J. P. Messina - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1):189-208.details
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Source compatibilism and that pesky ability to do otherwise: comments on Dana Nelkin’s making sense of freedom and responsibility. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.details
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Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas.Michael McKenna - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):243-263.details
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Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.details
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Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):698-733.details
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A dilemma for morally responsible time travelers.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):379-389.details
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Alternative possibilities and asymmetry.Erasmus Mayr - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):105-125.details
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Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility.Benjamin Matheson - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):458-480.details
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Tracing and heavenly freedom.Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):57-69.details
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Intentions, Permissibility, and Choice.Anton Markoč - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (4):493-508.details
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Causal pluralism: agent causation without the panicky metaphysics.Joseph Martinez - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-21.details
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Three Recent Frankfurt Cases.Robert Lockie - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1005-1032.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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What Does Indeterminism Offer to Agency?Andrew Law - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):371-385.details
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Agent Causation, Realist Metaphysics of Powers, and the Reducibility Objection.Davis Kuykendall - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1563-1581.details
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Two faces of desert.Matt King - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):401-424.details
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Moral Responsibility and Merit.Matt King - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-18.details
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Christ and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Randall Kenneth Johnson - 2021 - Journal of Analytic Theology 9:314-321.details
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Irrational Option Exclusion.Sofia Jeppsson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):537-551.details
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Alternative Possibilities and Causal Overdetermination.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):193-217.details
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Oppressive Praise.Jules Holroyd - 2021 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 7 (4).details
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Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities.Frank Hofmann - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):283-297.details
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Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.details
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Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.details
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Beyond the Moral Influence Theory? A Critical Examination of Vargas’s Agency Cultivation Model of Responsibility.Harry Harland - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (4):401-425.details
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Ability, Frankfurt Examples, and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):163-190.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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Kant on the Moral Law as the Causal Law for Freedom.David Forman - 2022 - Kant Studien 113 (1):40-83.details
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Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals.John Martin Fischer - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):117-143.details
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Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):606-622.details
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To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.details
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Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..details
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Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):127-144.details
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Rational Abilities and Responsibility.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):459-466.details
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Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness.A. P. Duggan - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):291-309.details
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The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility.Benjamin De Mesel & Sybren Heyndels - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):790-811.details
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The 'Ought' and the 'Can'.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2018 - Con-Textos Kantianos 8:324-347.details
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Semicompatibilism: no ability to do otherwise required.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):308-321.details
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Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.details
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When do circumstances excuse? Moral prejudices and beliefs about the true self drive preferences for agency-minimizing explanations.Simon Cullen - 2018 - Cognition 180 (C):165-181.details
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Free will fallibilism and the “two-standpoints” account of freedom.Michael Louis Corrado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):1967-1982.details
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Reasons-responsiveness and degrees of responsibility.D. Justin Coates & Philip Swenson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):629-645.details
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