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  1. A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
    Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main (...)
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  • The impertinence of Frankfurt-style argument.Daniel James Speak - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.
    Discussions of the principle of alternative possibilities have largely ignored the limits of what Frankfurt-style counter-examples can show. Rather than challenging the coherence of the cases, I argue that even if they are taken to demonstrate the falsity of the principle, they cannot advance the compatibilist cause. For a forceful incompatibilist argument can be constructed from the Frankfurtian premise that agents in Frankfurtian circumstances would have done what they did even if they could have done something else. This 'counterfactual stability' (...)
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  • Agency and responsibility: The personal and the political.Sofia Jeppsson - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):70-82.
    In this paper, I review arguments according to which harsh criminal punishments and poverty are undeserved and therefore unjust. Such arguments come in different forms. First, one may argue that no one deserves to be poor or be punished, because there is no such thing as desert-entailing moral responsibility. Second, one may argue that poor people in particular do not deserve to remain in poverty or to be punished if they commit crimes, because poor people suffer from psychological problems that (...)
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  • The importance of Frankfurt-style argument.John Martin Fischer - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.
    I reply to the challenges to Frankfurt-style compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility presented in Daniel Speak's paper 'The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument'. I seek to show how Speak's critiques rest on an 'all-or-nothing' attitude in various ways, and I attempt to defend the importance of Frankfurt-style argumentation in defence of compatibilism.
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  • The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom. [REVIEW]John Davenport - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):62 - 88.
    Readers familiar with Harry Frankfurt’s argument that we do not need leeway-liberty (or the power to bring about alternative possible actions or intentions) to be morally responsible will probably also know that the most famous and popular response on behalf of leeway-libertarianism remains a dilemma posed in similar forms by David Widerker, Robert Kane, and Carl Ginet: either the agent retains significant residual leeway in Frankfurt-style cases, or these cases beg the question by presupposing causal determinism. In the last few (...)
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  • Excuses and Alternatives.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):1-16.
    A version of the principle of alternate possibilities claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too high to reasonably opt for—is a good excuse. Yet, this principle is (...)
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  • Moral Luck.Dana K. Nelkin - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Azar y ética: responsabilidad y suerte moral.Felipe Curcó Cobos - 2021 - Signos Filosóficos 23 (46):60-89.
    Resumen En 1976, Nagel y Williams presentaron -en una reunión de la Aristotelian Society- dos célebres textos dirigidos a exhibir el desafío que el azar y la fortuna representan para la imputación kantiana de responsabilidad moral. Desde entonces han proliferado cientos de artículos centrados en analizar este dilema. Dicho debate, no obstante, rara vez es situado al interior del análisis de las implausibles y falsas premisas que dan lugar a él. En este trabajo reconstruyo las coordenadas centrales en las que (...)
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