Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue (...) that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined. (shrink)

Despite recent major advances in the neuroscience underlying cognition, the processes of its emergence and evolution are far from being understood. In our view, current interrelated concepts of mind; knowledge; epistemology; perception; cognition and information fail to reflect the real dynamics of mental processes, their ontology and their logic. It has become routine to talk about information in relation to these processes, but there is no consensus about its most relevant qualitative and functional properties. We present a theory of human (...) cognition based on an ontology and epistemology of information and information processes originally proposed by Wu including an ontological doctrine of the different grades of information; and an informational epistemology based on a noegenesis of the doctrine of informational intermediaries that mediate between the cognitive subject and object. This theory is supported by the new, non-propositional logic proposed recently by Brenner. We demonstrate the utility of our approach for the reconceptualization of the virtual properties of reality and cognition. It is strongly anti-representationalist and can provide the basis for the integration of inputs from outside the brain into cognitive structures. For us, the philosophy of information is a metaphilosophy, implying major changes in both the content and methodology of standard philosophical disciplines. We suggest that this philosophy of information and our informational approach may help guide research in a number of current areas of cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to demonstrate a problem with two medieval European views of existence: The property view and the essence view. Adopting a style of reasoning employed by the Indian Madhyamaka philosopher Nāgārjuna, I argue that both the property view and the essence view understand the relation between an object and its existence in terms of difference: The former understands the difference as the difference between an object and its property of existence, and the latter, as the difference (...) between an object’s essence and existence. Neither understanding is without problems, and both lack explanatory power. We must reject both the views. (shrink)

Attempting to provide an ontological framework for the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being proposed elsewhere, this paper – after some basic definitions – focuses on substances, one pillar of that notion. It recognizes only to individual substances a material existence, viewed as the entire complex of the properties instantiated in each of them. It then examines features of the general essence of substances. While such essence can be comprehended via abstract definitions, their individual essence cannot, I argue, because (...) it is not a concept but a reality, which I refer to as Being. This manifests powers, is inexhaustible growth and is one, although expressed differently in each individual. The possible connection of the human being with this reality is the second pillar of the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being, which I summarize and compare to other scenarios at the end. (shrink)

This article introduces the concept of ‘hyperdimensional neutral monism’ as an elaboration and exploration of neutral monism. Neutral monism states that there is a single type of neutral, ontologically primary ultimate, which both the physical and the mental supervene on (Banks Philosophical Psychology, 23(2), 173-187, 2010). Hyperdimensional neutral monism (HNM) states that these ultimates exist in a more-than-4-dimensional realm and that the physical world of spacetime is a 4-dimensional aspect of this realm. Consciousness is the localized protrusion of spacetime into (...) more than four dimensions. In order to explain these concepts, I utilize an aquatic metaphor of vortices appearing within a physical ocean. I compare HNM to panqualityism, which is another version of neutral monism (Coleman, Erkenntnis, 79(1), 19–44 2014 & Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 249–282 2016), and cosmopsychism (Shani Philosophical Papers, 44(3), 389-437, 2015, Shani & Keppler, 2018) which relies on a similar aquatic metaphor. I argue that HNM is a viable means of addressing the mind–body problem and the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 2015, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, 179(214), 2017, Chalmers, 2019). (shrink)

Aquinas’ theory of being has received a growing amount of attention from contemporary scholars, both from a historic and a philosophical point of view. An important source of this attention is Geach’s seminal Form and Existence. In it, Geach argues that Aquinas subscribes to a tensed notion of existence and a theory of time according to which past and future entities do not exist in act. Subsequent commentators, such as Kenny in his Aquinas on Being, have agreed with Geach on (...) both points. In this paper, I argue that in several passages of his corpus, most notably those in which he is concerned with God’s knowledge of future contingents, Aquinas implicitly subscribes to a theory of being and time according to which: past and future entities are attributed existence in act, there is theoretical need for introducing a tenseless notion of existence. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes between definiteness and determinacy. Definiteness is seen as a morphological category which, in English, marks a uniqueness presupposition, while determinacy consists in denoting an individual. Definite descriptions are argued to be fundamentally predicative, presupposing uniqueness but not existence, and to acquire existential import through general type-shifting operations that apply not only to definites, but also indefinites and possessives. Through these shifts, argumental definite descriptions may become either determinate or indeterminate. The latter option is observed in examples like (...) ‘Anna didn’t give the only invited talk at the conference’, which, on its indeterminate reading, implies that there is nothing in the extension of ‘only invited talk at the conference’. The paper also offers a resolution of the issue of whether possessives are inherently indefinite or definite, suggesting that, like indefinites, they do not mark definiteness lexically, but like definites, they typically yield determinate readings due to a general preference for the shifting operation that produces them. (shrink)

Both through his own work and that of his students, Franz Clemens Brentano had an often underappreciated influence on the course of 20 th - and 21 st -century philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ offers full coverage of Brentano’s philosophy and his influence. It contains 38 brand-new essays from an international team of experts that offer a comprehensive view of Brentano’s central research areas—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and value theory—as well as of the principal (...) figures shaped by Brentano’s school of thought. A General Introduction serves as an overview of Brentano and the contents of the volume and three separate bibliographies point students and researchers on to further avenues of inquiry. Systematic and detailed, _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ provides readers with a valuable reference to Brentano’s work, and to his lasting importance in the history of philosophy and in contemporary debates. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is show how an initially appealing objection to David Hume's account of judgment can only be put forward by philosophers who accept an account of judgment that has its own sizable share of problems. To demonstrate this, I situate the views of John Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid with respect to each other, so as to illustrate how the appealing objection is linked to unappealing features of Locke's account of judgment.

As physical entities that translate symbols into physical actions, computers offer insights into the nature of meaning and agency. • Physical symbol systems, generically known as agents, link abstractions to material actions. The meaning of a symbol is defined as the physical actions an agent takes when the symbol is encountered. • An agent has autonomy when it has the power to select actions based on internal decision processes. Autonomy offers a partial escape from constraints imposed by direct physical influences (...) such as gravity and the transfer of momentum. Swimming upstream is an example. • Symbols are names that can designate other entities. It appears difficult to explain the use of names and symbols in terms of more primitive functionality. The ability to use names and symbols, i.e., symbol grounding, may be a fundamental cognitive building block. • The standard understanding of causality—wiggling X results in Y wiggling—applies to both physical causes (e.g., one billiard ball hitting another) and symbolic causes (e.g., a traffic light changing color). Because symbols are abstract, they cannot produce direct physical effects. For a symbol to be a cause requires that the affected entity determine its own response. This is called autonomous causality. • This analysis of meaning and autonomy offers new perspectives on free will. (shrink)