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  1. Vagueness and Kataleptic Impressions.Katja Maria Vogt - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):165-183.
    The Stoics’ theory of kataleptic impressions looks different once we attend to their analysis of the Sorites paradox. In defending this view, I reject the long-standing assumption that the Stoics develop their theory by focusing on sensory impressions. The Stoic approach to vagueness shows, for example, that non-sensory impressions can be seemingly indistinguishable by belonging to a series. It also draws attention to an understudied dimension of Stoic theory: in aiming to assent only to kataleptic impressions, one aims to avoid (...)
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  • Chrysippus on Imagination in Aetius 4.12.Pavle Stojanović - 2020 - Classical Quarterly 70 (1):332-346.
    According to Diogenes Laertius, the concept of ‘appearance’ played a central role in Stoic philosophy. As staunch corporealists, the Stoics believed that appearances are physical structures in our corporeal soul which provide the foundation for all our thoughts. One of the crucial features of appearance is that it is a representational mental state that has the ability to provide us with accurate awareness of the world through causal interaction between our senses and external objects, and thus supply the means for (...)
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  • The Stoic Appeal to Expertise: Platonic Echoes in the Reply to Indistinguishability.Simon Shogry - 2021 - Apeiron 54 (2):129-159.
    One Stoic response to the skeptical indistinguishability argument is that it fails to account for expertise: the Stoics allow that while two similar objects create indistinguishable appearances in the amateur, this is not true of the expert, whose appearances succeed in discriminating the pair. This paper re-examines the motivations for this Stoic response, and argues that it reveals the Stoic claim that, in generating a kataleptic appearance, the perceiver’s mind is active, insofar as it applies concepts matching the perceptual stimulus. (...)
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  • The Starting-Points for Knowledge: Chrysippus on How to Acquire and Fortify Insecure Apprehension.Simon Shogry - 2022 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 67 (1):62-98.
    This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus’ account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ explanation of how sophisms and counter-arguments lead one to abandon one’s insecure apprehension. One such counter-argument originates in the sceptical Academy and targets the Stoic claim that insecure apprehension can be acquired on the basis of custom (συνήθεια). I show how Chrysippus could defend the (...)
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  • Misprinted Representations in Stoicism.Christian Pineda - forthcoming - Apeiron.
    This paper deals with the Stoic concept of misprinted representation (φαντασία παρατυπωτική), which has received little attention compared to other concepts of Stoic epistemology and philosophy of mind. I aim at showing that a better understanding of this concept is important for grasping some elements of the Stoic account of mental representations that have been ignored or misunderstood in modern Stoic scholarship. First, by clarifying the status of the misprinted representation as a genuine representation, we can understand what it means (...)
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  • Pyrrhonian Scepticism, the Infinite Regress of Reasons, and Ancient Infinitism.Tamer Nawar - 2023 - Rhizomata 10 (2):283-306.
    in this paper, I examine how the Mode of Infinite Regress functions in Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue that it is used both to generate an infinite regress of reasons and to show that such infinite regresses are epistemically defective. I clarify precisely how this occurs while examining the Mode’s efficaciousness and whether ancient philosophers might have accepted infinite regresses of reasons. I ultimately argue that they would not for reasons which have hitherto not been adequately appreciated and which shed further (...)
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  • The Roots of Occasionalism? Causation, Metaphysical Dependence, and Soul-Body Relations in Augustine.Tamer Nawar - 2021 - Vivarium 59 (1):1-27.
    It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of (...)
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  • Thrasymachus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 1.Tamer Nawar - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):359-391.
    In defending the view that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus puzzlingly claims that rulers never err and that any practitioner of a skill or expertise (τέχνη) is infallible. In what follows, Socrates offers a number of arguments directed against Thrasymachus’ views concerning the nature of skill, ruling, and justice. Commentators typically take a dim view of both Thrasymachus’ claims about skill (which are dismissed as an ungrounded and purely ad hoc response to Socrates’ initial criticisms) and Socrates’ (...)
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  • Augustine on Active Perception, Awareness, and Representation.Tamer Nawar - 2020 - Phronesis 66 (1):84-110.
    It is widely thought that Augustine thinks perception is, in some distinctive sense, an active process and that he takes conscious awareness to be constitutive of perception. I argue that conscious awareness is not straightforwardly constitutive of perception and that Augustine is best understood as an indirect realist. I then clarify Augustine’s views concerning the nature and role of diachronically unified conscious awareness and mental representation in perception, the nature of the soul’s intentio, and the precise sense in which perception (...)
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  • Clear and Distinct Perception in the Stoics, Augustine, and William of Ockham.Tamer Nawar - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):185-207.
    There is a long history of philosophers granting a privileged epistemic status to cognition of directly present objects. In this paper, I examine three important historic accounts which provide different models of this cognitive state and its connection with its objects: that of the Stoics, who are corporealists and think that ordinary perception may have an epistemically privileged status, but who seem to struggle to accommodate non-perceptual cognizance; that of Augustine, who thinks that incorporeal objects are directly present to us (...)
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  • Platonic know‐how and successful action.Tamer Nawar - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):944-962.
    In Plato's Euthydemus, Socrates claims that the possession of epistēmē suffices for practical success. Several recent treatments suggest that we may make sense of this claim and render it plausible by drawing a distinction between so-called “outcome-success” and “internal-success” and supposing that epistēmē only guarantees internal-success. In this paper, I raise several objections to such treatments and suggest that the relevant cognitive state should be construed along less than purely intellectual lines: as a cognitive state constituted at least in part (...)
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  • Augustine's Defence of Knowledge against the Sceptics.Tamer Nawar - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 56:215-265.
    In his Contra Academicos, Augustine offers one of the most detailed responses to scepticism to have come down to us from antiquity. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s defence of the existence of infallible knowledge in Contra Academicos 3. I challenge a number of established views (including those of Myles Burnyeat, Gareth Matthews, and Christopher Kirwan) concerning the nature and merit of Augustine’s defence of knowledge and propose a new understanding of Augustine’s response to scepticism (including his semantic response to (...)
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  • Cartesian Clarity.Elliot Samuel Paul - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (19):1-28.
    Clear and distinct perception is the centrepiece of Descartes’s philosophy — it is the source of all certainty — but what does he mean by ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’? According to the prevailing approach, what it means for a perception to be clear is that its content has a certain objective property, like truth. I argue instead that clarity is at least partly a subjective, phenomenal quality whereby a content is presented as true to the perceiving subject. Clarity comes in degrees. (...)
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  • Rational Assent and Self–Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics.Ursula Coope - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 50:237-288.
  • Ancient skepticism.Leo Groarke - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  • Stoicism.Dirk Baltzly - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stoicism was one of the new philosophical movements of the Hellenistic period. The name derives from the porch (stoa poikilê) in the Agora at Athens decorated with mural paintings, where the members of the school congregated, and their lectures were held. Unlike ‘epicurean,’ the sense of the English adjective ‘stoical’ is not utterly misleading with regard to its philosophical origins. The Stoics did, in fact, hold that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or passionate love of anything (...)
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  • Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind.Vanessa de Harven - 2018 - In John Sisko, Rebecca Copenhaver & Christopher Shileds (eds.), The History of Philosophy of Mind: Pre-Socratics to Augustine, ed. John Sisko, Vol. 1 of six-volume series The History of the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields. Routledge Publishing. pp. 215-35.
    This paper seeks to elucidate the distinctive nature of the rational impression on its own terms, asking precisely what it means for the Stoics to define logikē phantasia as an impression whose content is expressible in language. I argue first that impression, generically, is direct and reflexive awareness of the world, the way animals get information about their surroundings. Then, that the rational impression, specifically, is inherently conceptual, inferential, and linguistic, i.e. thick with propositional content, the way humans receive incoming (...)
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  • Quintilian's Theory of Certainty and Its Afterlife in Early Modern Italy.Charles McNamara - 2016 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation explores how antiquity and some of its early modern admirers understand the notion of certainty, especially as it is theorized in Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, a first-century educational manual for the aspiring orator that defines certainty in terms of consensus. As part of a larger discussion of argumentative strategies, Quintilian turns to the “nature of all arguments,” which he defines as “reasoning which lends credence to what is doubtful by means of what is certain” (ratio per ea quae certa (...)
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