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  1. Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • Computers, cognition and philosophy.Robert Wilensky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):449-450.
  • The thermostat and the philosophy professor.Donald O. Walter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):449-449.
  • Simulation games.William E. Smythe - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):448-449.
  • How to turn an information processor into an understander.Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):447-448.
  • Intrinsic intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.
  • Understanding Searle.Roger C. Schank - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):446-447.
  • Searle and the special powers of the brain.Richard Rorty - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):445-446.
  • Mysticism as a philosophy of artificial intelligence.Martin Ringle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):444-445.
  • The behaviorist reply.Howard Rachlin - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):444-444.
  • The ‘causal power’ of machines.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):442-444.
  • The chess room: further demythologizing of strong AI.Roland Puccetti - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):441-442.
  • The primary source of intentionality.Thomas Natsoulas - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):440-441.
  • Decentralized minds.Marvin Minsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):439-440.
  • Is the pen mightier than the computer?E. W. Menzel - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):438-439.
  • Beliefs, machines, and theories.John McCarthy - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435-435.
  • Intentionality: Hardware, not software.Grover Maxwell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):437-438.
  • Artificial intelligence—the real thing?John C. Marshall - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435-437.
  • The functionalist reply.William G. Lycan - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):434-435.
  • Mental phenomena and behavior.B. Libet - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):434-434.
  • Reductionism and religion.Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):433-434.
  • Programs, causal powers, and intentionality.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):432-433.
  • Searle on what only brains can do.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):431-432.
  • A dualist-interactionist perspective.John C. Eccles - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):430-431.
  • The milk of human intentionality.Daniel Dennett - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428-430.
  • The use and mention of terms and the simulation of linguistic understanding.Arthur C. Danto - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428-428.
  • Brains + programs = minds.Bruce Bridgeman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):427-428.
  • What intuitions about homunculi don't show.Ned Block - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):425-426.
  • Searle's argument is just a set of Chinese symbols.Robert P. Abelson - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):424-425.