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  1. Experience, awareness, and consciousness: Suggestions for definitions as offered by an evolutionary approach. [REVIEW]Mario Vaneechoutte - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (4):429-456.
    It is argued that the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. the fact that we have experience, stems from a conceptual confusion between consciousness and experience. It is concluded that experience has to be considered as a basic characteristic of ongoing interactions at even the most simple level, while consciousness is better defined as reflexive awareness, possible since symbolic language was developed. A dynamic evolutionary point of view is proposed to make more appropriate distinctions between experience, awareness and consciousness. Experience can (...)
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  • Building blocks of consciousness: Revealing the shared, hidden depths of our biological heritage.Juri van den Heever & Chris Jones - 2020 - HTS Theological Studies 76 (1).
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  • Pure Experience and Disorders of Consciousness.Laura Specker Sullivan - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (2):107-114.
    The presence or absence of consciousness is the linchpin of taxonomy for disorders of consciousness (DOCs), as well as a focal point for end-of-life decision making for patients with DOCs. Focus on consciousness in this latter context has been criticized for a number of reasons, including the uncertainty of the diagnostic criteria for consciousness, the irrelevance of some forms of consciousness for determining a patient’s interests, and the ambiguous distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. As a result, there have been recent (...)
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  • Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts.Jenny Hung - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (3):580-600.
    A phenomenal concept is a concept that one possesses only if one has the relevant experience. In this essay, I argue that phenomenal concept theorists, namely, those who believe that we acquire phenomenal concepts through being acquainted with the relevant experience, can never succeed in determining which species of non-human animals are phenomenally conscious because they prohibit any a priori correlation between phenomenal and non-phenomenal concepts. I make my argument by first discussing several ways in which a phenomenal concept theorist (...)
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  • Animal consciousness.Colin Allen & Michael Trestman - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.