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Scepticism

New York,: Routledge (1969)

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  1. Beyond the 'french Fries and the frankfurter': An agenda for critical theory.Lorraine Y. Landry - 2000 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 26 (2):99-129.
    Debates between Habermas and the poststructuralists - specifically, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard - over the nature of critiques of Enlightenment rationality and modernity are investigated in order to argue for an agenda for critical theory beyond the 'French Fries and the Frankfurter'.1 Part I interrogates key elements of Habermas' theory of communicative rationality in his reconstruction of Enlightenment modernity and his critique of the poststructuralists. This orients the discussion toward an evaluation of Habermas' neo-Kantianism, theory of language (discourse ethics), and (...)
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  • Epistemology and the sociology of knowledge.Charles Kurzman - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):267-290.
    Epistemology, I will argue, is of crucial importance to the sociology of knowledge— not just by way of definition of the phenomenon under study, but also because approaches to the sociology of knowledge rely on too-often implicit epistemological stances. I will make this argument through a series of categorizations: first, I will classify the field of epistemology into its three main forms; second, I will classify the sociology of knowledge into epistemological categories; third, I will classify the sociology of science (...)
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  • The Life and Learning of Arne Naess: Scepticism as a Survival Strategy.Inga Bostad - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):42-51.
    ABSTRACT It is obvious that Arne Naess had his most important philosophical experience, and quite possibly made his most significant achievement, in confrontation with the variety of philosophical scepticism known as Pyrrhonism. Naess maintained, however, that he did not defend scepticism as a philosophical position, and he was concerned to distinguish Pyrrhonism from the inverse form of dogmatism often associated with the term ?scepticism?. Naess was primarily preoccupied with the practical implications of this radical form of scepticism, in which he (...)
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