Claims about whether or not infertility is a disease are sometimes invoked to defend or criticize the provision of state-funded treatment for infertility. In this paper, I suggest that this strategy is problematic. By exploring infertility through key approaches to disease in the philosophy of medicine, I show that there are deep theoretical disagreements regarding what subtypes of infertility qualify as diseases. Given that infertility's disease status remains unclear, one cannot uncontroversially justify or undermine its claim to medical treatment by (...) claiming that it is or is not a disease. Instead of focusing on disease status, a preferable strategy to approach the debate about state-funded treatment is to explicitly address the specific ethical considerations raised by infertility. I show how this alternative strategy can be supported by a recent theoretical framework in the philosophy of medicine, which avoids the problems associated with the concepts of health and disease. (shrink)

Should offenders with psychopathy or those exhibiting extreme forms of antisocial behav- iour be considered criminally responsible? The current debate seems to have reached a stalemate. Several scholars have argued that neuropsychologi- cal data on individuals with psychopathy might be relevant for determining their criminal responsibil- ity. However, relying on such data has not produced a consensus among legal scholars and philosophers on whether individuals with psychopathy should be excused from responsibility. We offer a diagnosis about why this debate has (...) reached a standoff. We argue that part of the problem is that psychopathy, being a syndrome-based category, is too heterogeneous and thus offers low prospects for being integrated with neuropsychological data that might support significant conclusions about the criminal responsibility of individuals with psychopathy. Moreover, the construct of psychopathy was not originally devised to discriminate criminally accountable from unac- countable antisocial individuals. To overcome these difficulties and advance the debate, we extend a currently less discussed theoretical framework for bridging biopsychology and the law that focuses on neuropsychological constructs, domains, and processes that directly measure capacities of offenders that are relevant for criminal responsibility, without necessarily relying on mediating syndrome-based constructs. The novelty of our contribution is that the biopsy- chological bases of exculpation can be further devel- oped and used for determining more fine-grained cat- egorisations of antisocial personality types. We show how this framework provides guidelines for inter- disciplinary research that can significantly advance our understanding of the preconditions for criminal responsibility and help the legal practice of ascribing or withholding it. (shrink)

In their paper “Is psychopathy a mental disease?”, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argue that according to any plausible account of mental disorder, neural and psychological abnormalities correlated with psychopathy should be regarded as signs of a mental disorder. I oppose this conclusion by arguing that at least on a naturalistically grounded account, such as Wakefield’s ‘Harmful Dysfunction’ view, currently available empirical data and evolutionary considerations indicate that psychopathy is not a mental disorder.

The question of whether psychopaths are criminally and morally responsible has generated significant controversy in the literature. In this paper, we discuss what relevance a psychopathy diagnosis has for criminal responsibility. It has been argued that figuring out whether psychopathy is a mental illness is of fundamental importance, because it is a precondition for psychopaths’ eligibility to be excused via the legal insanity defense. But even if psychopathy counts as a mental illness, this alone is not sufficient to show the (...) insanity defense is applicable; it must also be shown that, as a result of the illness, specific deficits in moral understanding or control are present. In this paper, we show that a diagnosis of psychopathy will generally not indicate that a defendant is eligible for an insanity defense. This is because the group of individuals subsumed under the diagnosis is so heterogeneous that while some psychopaths do show significant impairments in affect and control which may impact on their responsibility, many psychopaths are not incapacitated in a way relevant to responsibility. (shrink)

Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal, and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We frame the issue in terms of the question whether ‘psychopathy’ designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine three ways (...) of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualized. We argue that while a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and theoretical advancements, we also emphasize its role in clinical and forensic research that makes it an important pragmatic kind. (shrink)

Psychopathy is typically characterized as a constellation of deviant personality traits and behavioral tendencies. The link between psychopathic personality traits and pervasive antisocial behavior raises a crucial question concerning the legal accountability of offenders with psychopathy. Some argue that the unique clinical profile and neurobiological peculiarities of individuals with psychopathy mitigate their responsibility, while others maintain that current scientific knowledge does not support the use of psychopathy as an exculpatory condition for criminal offending. Our overview mainly centeres on whether offenders (...) with psychopathy can be considered legally insane. In this regard, our overview suggests that there is still an ongoing debate whether psychopathy should be used as a legally relevant construct for determining criminal responsibility. Moreover, our discussion indicates that careful attention should be put on empirical and conceptual issues surrounding the role of (neuro)scientific data for determining whether individuals with psychopathy should be considered criminally blameworthy for their wrongdoings. (shrink)

The harm usually associated with psychopathy requires therapeutically, legally, and ethically satisfactory solutions. Scholars from different fields have, thus, examined whether empirical evidence shows that individuals with psychopathic traits satisfy concepts, such as responsibility, mental disorder, or disability, that have specific legal or ethical implications. The present paper considers the less discussed issue of whether psychopathy is a disability. As it has been shown for the cases of the responsibility and mental disorder status of psychopathic individuals, we argue that it (...) is undecided whether psychopathy is a disability. Nonetheless, based on insights from disability studies and legislations, we propose that interventions to directly modify the propensities of individuals with psychopathic tendencies should be balanced with modifications of the social and physical environments to accommodate their peculiarities. We also suggest how this social approach in some practical contexts that involve non-offender populations might be effective in addressing some of the negative effects of psychopathy. (shrink)

The recurring claim that the construct of psychopathy is value laden often is not qualified in enough detail. The chapters in this part of the volume, instead, investigate in depth the role and significance of values in different aspects of the construct of psychopathy. Following these chapters, but also by offering a background to them, we show how certain values are involved in the characterisation of psychopathy, inform societal needs satisfied by this construct, and have a central role in determining (...) whether psychopathy is a mental disorder. Moreover, we relate this description to our criticism of the view that the entrenchment of the notion of psychopathy with values in principle renders it irreconcilable with sound psychiatric theory and practice. However, we also recognize that the value-ladenness of psychopathy leaves open other important challenges. Meeting them needs addressing interdisciplinary interrelated issues that have empirical, normative, and theoretical dimensions. (shrink)

Editorial introduction to the special issue of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy.

One of the philosophical discussions stimulated by the recent scientific study of psychopathy concerns the mental illness status of this construct. This paper contributes to this debate by recommending a way of approaching the problem at issue. By relying on and integrating the seminal work of the philosopher of psychiatry Bill Fulford, I argue that a mental illness is a harmful unified construct that involves failures of ordinary doing. Central to the present proposal is the idea that the notion of (...) failure of ordinary doing, besides the first personal experience of the patient, has to be spelled out also by referring to a normative account of idealised conditions of agency. This account would have to state in particular the conditions which are required for moral responsibility. I maintain that psychopathy is a unified enough construct that involves some harms. The question whether the condition involves also a failure of ordinary doing, as this notion is understood in this paper, is not investigated here. (shrink)