- The Expertise Defense and Experimental Philosophy of Free Will.Kiichi Inarimori - 2024 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 24:125-143.details
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Experimental philosophy and moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 494–516.details
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Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and the Comprehension of Determinism.Daniel Lim, Ryan Nichols & Joseph Wagoner - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.details
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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Seeing Responsibility: Can Neuroimaging Teach Us Anything about Moral and Legal Responsibility?.David Wasserman & Josephine Johnston - 2014 - Hastings Center Report 44 (s2):37-49.details
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Who can blame who for what and how in responsibility for health?Paul C. Snelling - 2015 - Nursing Philosophy 16 (1):3-18.details
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Freedom from what? Separating lay concepts of freedom.Claire Simmons, Paul Rehren, John-Dylan Haynes & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103318.details
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What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice?Jason Shepard & Aneyn O’Grady - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:138-148.details
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How Libet-Style Experiments May Challenge Lay Theories of Free Will.Jason Shepard - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):45-47.details
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Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7).details
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Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (2):482-502.details
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Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems.Adina L. Roskies - 2016 - Neuroethics 11 (3):245-257.details
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Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention.Matthew Rachar - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):475-488.details
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Exclusion Criteria in Experimental Philosophy.Sara Kier Praëm, Jacob Busch & Carsten Bergenholtz - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1531-1545.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection.Koji Ota - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):295-319.details
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Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.details
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It’s OK if ‘my brain made me do it’: People’s intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction.Eddy Nahmias, Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter - 2014 - Cognition 133 (2):502-516.details
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Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy.Jennifer Nagel & Kaija Mortensen - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 53-70.details
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The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Lisa Thomson Ross - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics.Thomas Nadelhoffer, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (8):e12873.details
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Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Samuel Murray & Elise Dykhuis - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2515-2536.details
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Folk intuitions and the conditional ability to do otherwise.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Siyuan Yin & Rose Graves - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):968-996.details
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Situationism, going mental, and modal akrasia.Dylan Murray - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):711-736.details
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Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility.Dylan Murray & Tania Lombrozo - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (2):447-481.details
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A simple linguistic approach to the Knobe effect, or the Knobe effect without any vignette.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1613-1630.details
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On the very concept of free will.Joshua May - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866.details
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Twenty years of experimental philosophy research.Jincai Li & Xiaozhen Zhu - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):29-53.details
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Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David Gordon Limbaugh & Robert Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.details
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Taking Responsibility for Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2019 - Public Health Ethics 12 (2):103-113.details
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Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across both Demographic Groups and Situations.Joshua Knobe - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):11-76.details
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Difference and Robustness in the Patterns of Philosophical Intuition Across Demographic Groups.Joshua Knobe - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (2):435-455.details
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The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.details
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Behavior Genetics and Agent Responsibility.Wendy Johnson, Rüdiger Bittner & Joachim Wündisch - 2019 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 2 (1):21-34.details
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For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Edouard Machery, David Rose, Stephen Stich, Christopher Y. Olivola, Paulo Sousa, Florian Cova, Emma E. Buchtel, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniûnas, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas López, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Hrag A. Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):381-394.details
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Libet-style experiments, neuroscience, and libertarian free will.Marcelo Fischborn - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502.details
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Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30 (C):234-246.details
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Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action.Gabriel De Marco - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1953-1972.details
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Why people believe in indeterminist free will.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054.details
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When do circumstances excuse? Moral prejudices and beliefs about the true self drive preferences for agency-minimizing explanations.Simon Cullen - 2018 - Cognition 180 (C):165-181.details
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Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey.Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano - 2014 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support.Florian Cova - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.details
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Responsibility, Determinism, and the Objective Stance: Using IAT to Evaluate Strawson’s Account of our ‘Incompatibilist’ Intuitions.Daniel Blair Cohen, Jeremy Goldring & Lauren Leigh Saling - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):99-112.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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