Starting from Marr's ideas about levels of explanation, a theory of the data structures and access processes in human memory is demonstrated on 10 tasks. Functional characteristics of human memory are captured implementation-independently. Our theory generates a multidimensional task classification subsuming existing classifications such as the distinction between tasks that are implicit versus explicit, data driven versus conceptually driven, and simple associative versus higher order, providing a broad basis for new experiments. The formal language clarifies the binding problem in episodic (...) memory, the role of input pathways in both episodic and semantic memory, the importance of the input set in episodic memory, and the ubiquitous calculation of an intersection in theories of episodic and lexical access. (shrink)

Amidst the progress being made in the various (sub-)disciplines of the behavioural and brain sciences a somewhat neglected subject is the problem of how everything fits into one world and, derivatively, how the relation between different levels of discourse should be understood and to what extent different levels, domains, approaches, or disciplines are autonomous or dependent. In this paper I critically review the most recent proposals to specify the nature of interdiscourse relations, focusing on the concept of supervenience. Ideally supervenience (...) is a relation between different discourses which has all the advantages of reduction, but without its disadvantages. I apply the more abstract considerations to two concrete cases: schizophrenia and colour. Usually an interlevel or interdiscourse relation is seen as asymmetrical: the overlaying discourse depends on the underlying discourse (and not vice versa), where the out- or un-spoken assumption is that the ultimate underlying discourse is physical. Instead I argue that scientific categories referred to in interdiscourse relations are, ultimately, dependent on common sense categories and common sense normative criteria. It is the manifest categories and common sense ideas about what is reasonable and what is right that determine the relevant categorisations at the deeper, underlying levels. I suggest that the implications of this are not merely methodological or epistemological. (shrink)

[Comment, pp 759-780] Lockhead (1992) [Target Article] is undoubtedly right to attack so-called intensity scaling or the estimation of subjective magnitudes as an invalid perversion of tasks requiring quantitative judgments of aspects of objects, stuffs, and situations. He goes too far, however, in claiming that feature scales do not exist... ... A perceived physical pattern (sensory feature or channel) and the cognitive process that integrates it with its context are characterized by determining to which particular combination of specified stimulus patterns (...) the response is most sensitive. This is the principle of causal system analysis that is at the basis of all theory-building science. (shrink)