Since the 1970s, prenatal testing has been integrated into many health care systems on the basis of two competing and largely irreconcilable rationales. The reproductive autonomy rationale focuses on nondirective counseling and consent as ways to ensure that women's decisions about testing and subsequent care are informed and free of undue pressures. It also represents an easily understandable and ethically convincing basis for widespread access to prenatal testing, since the value of autonomy is well established in Western bioethics and widely (...) recognized by funders of health care. In contrast, the public health rationale approaches prenatal testing as designed to reduce the incidence of certain conditions in the population to reduce the burden of disease. This rationale emphasizes the societal consequences of reproduction and the aggregate impact of women's individual reproductive decisions on the overall health of future populations. In this essay, I argue that, despite what could be seen as a persistent failure to meet the ideals of reproductive autonomy, resisting the public health rationale as a basis for prenatal screening is ethically and pragmatically crucial. I recommend policy mechanisms that can enhance reproductive autonomy at a societal level to support choice at the individual level. (shrink)

Although the importance of including vulnerable populations in medical research is widely accepted, identifying how to achieve such inclusion remains a challenge. Ensuring that the language of informed consent is comprehensible to this group is no less of a challenge. Although a variety of interventions show promise for increasing the comprehensibility of informed consent and increasing a climate of exchange, consensus is lacking on which interventions should be used in which situations and current regulations provide little guidance. We argue that (...) the notion of individual autonomy — a foundational principle of informed consent — may be too narrow for some vulnerable populations by virtue of its failure to acknowledge their unique histories and current circumstances. It has a different meaning for members of structured groups like American Indians than for unstructured groups, such as African Americans, whose complicated histories foster group identity. Ensuring broad participation in research and selecting appropriate methods for obtaining informed consent — namely, methods aligned with the source of vulnerability and level of risk — require new ways of thinking that might produce guidelines for matching informed consent models and processes with subpopulations. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Prompted by developments in human genetics, a recurrent bioethical question concerns a person’s ‘right to know’ and ‘right not to know’ about genetic information held that is intrinsically related to or linked to them. In this paper, we will revisit the claimed rights in relation to two particular test cases. One concerns the rights of the 500,000 participants in UK Biobank whose biosamples, already having been genotyped, will now be exome sequenced, and the other concerns the rights of pregnant women (...) who undergo non-invasive prenatal testing —a simple blood test that can reveal genetic information about both a foetus and its mother. This two-part paper is in four principal sections. First, we sketch the relevant features of our two test cases. Secondly, we consider the significance of recent legal jurisprudence in the UK and Singapore. Thirdly, we consider how, the jurisprudence apart, the claimed rights might be grounded. Fourthly, we consider the limits on the rights. We conclude with some short remarks about the kind of genetically aware society that we might want to be and how far there is still an opportunity meaningfully to debate the claimed rights. (shrink)