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  1. The nature of probability.Patrick Suppes - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):89 - 102.
    The thesis of this article is that the nature of probability is centered on its formal properties, not on any of its standard interpretations. Section 2 is a survey of Bayesian applications. Section 3 focuses on two examples from physics that seem as completely objective as other physical concepts. Section 4 compares the conflict between subjective Bayesians and objectivists about probability to the earlier strident conflict in physics about the nature of force. Section 5 outlines a pragmatic approach to the (...)
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  • Aristotle's concept of matter and its relation to modern concepts of matter.Patrick Suppes - 1974 - Synthese 28 (1):27 - 50.
  • The experimental physics of Jacques Rohault.Aaron Spink - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):850-870.
    ABSTRACTJacques Rohault is often considered to be one of the most meticulous followers of Descartes. Despite this, Rohault’s natural philosophy lacks much of the metaphysical bulwark that typifies Cartesian treatises of the seventeenth century. Instead, Rohault’s work, as well as his popular weekly meetings, strongly emphasized rigorous observation and experimentation. Traditionally, this emphasis on experiment over metaphysics is seen as a pragmatic omission to avoid the perils associated with censorship and Cartesian metaphysics. However, I find that the lack of explicit (...)
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  • Descartes, the Sceptics, and the Rejection of Vitalism in Seventeenth-Century Physiology.Phillip R. Sloan - 1977 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 8 (1):1.
  • French Cartesian Scholasticism: Remarks on Descartes and the First Cartesians.Tad M. Schmaltz - 2018 - Perspectives on Science 26 (5):579-598.
    In a 1669 letter to his mentor Thomasius, Leibniz writes that "hardly any of the Cartesians have added anything to the discoveries of their master" insofar as they "have published only paraphrases of their leader."1 The book that is the focus of my remarks here—Roger Ariew's Descartes and the First Cartesians —shows that Leibniz was most certainly incorrect. In particular, Ariew draws attention to the fact that there was a concerted effort to present a new sort of Cartesianism that conforms (...)
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