Evaluation scales are used in the care of elderly people. They are useful for estimating the workload, the necessary resources, the care cost, the patient’s dependency or autonomy in daily life, and/or the patient’s needs. The large number of grids already indicates their insufficiency.This article explores the stakes implied by the evaluations, which use concepts more or less clearly defined as autonomy, dependency, deficiency, incapacity. It also questions our understanding of interdependence, vulnerability, and responsibility, and their implications in the care (...) relations with elderly people. (shrink)

The right to refuse treatment is generally accepted in the legal and bioethics discourses; however, the use of advance directives remains contentious. Some jurisdictions have introduced statutory frameworks to govern the creation and implementation of advance directives, underpinned primarily by the recognition of respect for personal autonomy. Although there are no legislation and judicial decisions on advance decision-making in Malaysia, the considered view is that healthcare practitioners perceived its utility in managing patient care. This paper examines the potential and challenges (...) of applying a statutory framework in Malaysia, drawing from relevant regulatory examples. It argues for greater public awareness within the healthcare discourse and knowledge dissemination regarding the availability, usage and clinical guidance on advance decision-making. The main conclusion drawn from this exploratory analysis is that further understanding of and education about advance decision-making within the population and healthcare practitioners should precede the implementation of a statutory regime in Malaysia. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze some of the major difficulties of informed consent. We consider insufficient to base IC on the principle of autonomy. We must not forget that the patient may be in a situation of extreme vulnerability and the good doctor should assume a degree of commitment and responsibility with his/her decisions. Our aim is to introduce the ethics of responsibility of Levinas in practice and theory of IC in order to generate a beneficent medical practice in which (...) the supervision and overseeing of the patient do not undermine his/her autonomy. (shrink)

This paper explores the value of respect for personal autonomy in relation to clearly immoral and irrational acts committed freely and intentionally by competent people. Following Berlin's distinction between two kinds of liberty and Darwall's two kinds of respect, it is argued that coercive suppression of nonautonomous, irrational, and self-harming acts of competent persons is offensive to their human dignity, but not disrespectful of personal autonomy. Irrational and immoral choices made by competent people may claim only the negative liberty to (...) be left alone. Lives disposed to autonomy are worthy of solidarity and active support in addition to the right of free choice and action. Autonomous premeditated desires (distinguished from mere consent) may embody transcendental choices, which transcend consideration of physical and psychological well-being. Choices made by incompetent persons (e.g., children and the mentally disabled) are not related to autonomy, but to self-directedness. The value of human dignity confers protection to self-directedness, but not at the expense of other vital interests. (shrink)