This article considers the appeal of the cute body and its ambiguous relationship with the lovable. While cuteness is an aesthetic that is subjectively determined and expressed, it can also embellish a body with features that are standardized by systems of commodification. The cute body possesses a diminutive and vulnerable charm, but it is also an object that is augmented to solicit the subject’s love and control. Hence, the aesthetic of cuteness may seem to disempower the object, but it is (...) likewise, an acute seduction that bears witness to the craft or technē that captures the subject. Developing a framework for cuteness as a stylistic device or technology embedded in the subject-object relationship, the article argues that the qualities and experience of the lovable constitute a condition of the affected subject, who must bear the paradox of embracing and effacing the object’s difference. (shrink)

This research seeks to expand on the current literature surrounding scientific and aesthetic concepts of cuteness through a biosemiotic lens. By first re-evaluating Konrad Lorenz’s Kindchenschema, and identifying the importance of schematic vs featural perception, we identify the presence of a series of perceptual errors that underlie existing research on cuteness. There is, then, a need to better understand the cognitive structure underlying one’s perception of cuteness. We go on to employ the methodological framework of Modeling Systems Theory to identify (...) and establish the forms that underlie both the encoding and decoding of cute phenomena. In redefining cuteness as a cohesive code, and establishing Kindchenschema as a schematic metaform, we set the foundation for the incorporation of biological and cultural theories of cuteness. This research offers an initial methodological framework for the examination of cute artifacts, that can be utilized in the fields of normative aesthetics, marketing, and design. (shrink)

Félix Aubé Beaudoin | : Le dilemme darwinien, formulé par Sharon Street, somme les réalistes moraux d’expliquer pourquoi de nombreux jugements qui sont des candidats au statut de vérités morales indépendantes sont aussi ceux qui ont une grande valeur sélective. Les réalistes peuvent soit nier, soit affirmer l’existence d’un lien entre pressions évolutionnistes et vérités morales. Selon Street, la première option mène au scepticisme tandis que la seconde est indéfendable sur le plan scientifique. Peter Singer et Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek optent (...) pour la première branche de ce dilemme. Dans cet article, la stratégie argumentative qu’ils adoptent — la réponse naturelle — sera soumise à un examen critique. Deux objections seront formulées. La première est d’ordre épistémologique : l’intuitionnisme philosophique défendu par les auteurs fait face à des difficultés majeures. La seconde, plus fondamentale, est que leur solution ne permet pas d’expliquer autrement que par un heureux hasard l’alignement entre les vérités morales et les jugements ayant une valeur sélective. | : According to Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma, moral realists must explain why many judgments that are likely to be independent moral truths are those it would be evolutionarily adaptive to hold. Realists can either deny or assert the existence of a relation between evolutionary influences and moral truths. The first option leads to skepticism, while the second is unacceptable on scientific grounds, says Street. Peter Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek take the first horn of this dilemma. In this article, the argumentative strategy they adopt — the Natural Reply - is submitted to critical scrutiny. Two objections are raised. The first objection is epistemological : philosophical intuitionism, as defended by the authors, is an untenable position. The second objection is that their solution must appeal to unlikely coincidences to account for the overlap between independent moral truths and evolutionarily adaptive attitudes. (shrink)