Straipsnyje tyrinėjamos dvi akrasijos sampratos ir jų santykis su atsakomybės priskyrimu Douglaso Husako baudžiamosios atsakomybės teorijoje. Nuo Platono Protagoro laikų akrasijos problema filosofijoje glaudžiai siejama su moralinio žinojimo klausimu. Pasitelkiant Antikos bei krikščioniškajai etikai itin reikšmingus tekstus, taip pat šiuolaikinius akratiško elgesio tyrinėjimus, straipsnyje išryškinama kita – vidiniu konfliktu paremta akrasijos samprata. Husako teorijoje taikoma akrasijos samprata akcentuoja moralinį žinojimą-nežinojimą. Tačiau jos prielaidų šaltinis yra ne Antika, o šiuolaikiniai moralinės atsakomybės priskyrimo skeptikai, nors paties Husako teorija nėra skeptinė. Darbe išryškinami (...) esminiai Husako teorijos trūkumai. Šie trūkumai atsiremia į Husako akratiško veikėjo sampratą ir kaip tokiam veikėjui priskiriama atsakomybė. Jų nagrinėjimas leidžia parodyti vidiniu konfliktu grįstos akrasijos sampratos pranašumus konstruojant neskeptinę baudžiamosios atsakomybės teoriją. (shrink)

In the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the “spirited” part of the soul as the “ally of reason”: like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit’s distinctive “job” in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and (...) most importantly, defense against unruly appetites within the individual’s own soul.1 Spirit, according to this picture, is by nature reason’s faithful auxiliary in the soul, while appetite is always a potential enemy to be watched .. (shrink)

Abstract The main thesis of the paper is that, in the coda to the Protagoras (360e-end), Plato tells us why and with what justification he demands a definition of virtue: namely, in order to resolve a particular aporia . According to Plato's assessment of the outcome of the arguments of the dialogue, the principal question, whether or not virtue can be taught , has, by the end of the dialogue, emerged as articulating an aporia , in that both protagonists, Socrates (...) and Protagoras, have argued equally on both its sides. The first part of the paper provides an extensive analysis of the coda, with the aim of establishing the main thesis. The second part provides a comprehensive review of the arguments in the dialogue, with the aim of determining whether their outcome is what Plato says in the coda that it is. I undertake this review in three steps: on Plato's conception of reasons (logoi); Socrates' arguing on both sides; and Protagoras' arguing on both sides. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that although the Republic’s tripartite theory of the soul is not explicitly endorsed in Plato’s late work the Laws, it continues to inform the Laws from beneath the surface of the text. In particular, I argue that the spirited part of the soul continues to play a major role in moral education and development in the Laws (as it did in earlier texts, where it is characterized as reason’s psychic ‘ally’). I examine the programs of (...) musical and gymnastic education in the Laws and highlight parallels to the accounts of the spirited part of the soul and its role in moral education and virtue that are offered in Republic and Timaeus. I also examine the educational role given to the laws themselves in Magnesia, and I suggest that the education provided through them is largely directed at the spirited part of the soul as well. (shrink)