This paper proposes a framework for an ethical impact assessment which can be performed in regard to any policy, service, project or programme involving information technology. The framework is structured on the four principles posited by Beauchamp and Childress together with a separate section on privacy and data protection. The framework identifies key social values and ethical issues, provides some brief explanatory contextual information which is then followed by a set of questions aimed at the technology developer or policy-maker to (...) facilitate consideration of ethical issues, in consultation with stakeholders, which may arise in their undertaking. In addition, the framework includes a set of ethical tools and procedural practices which can be employed as part of the ethical impact assessment. Although the framework has been developed within a European context, it could be applied equally well beyond European borders. (shrink)

The cluster of concerns usually identified asmatters of privacy can be adequately accountedfor by unpacking our natural rights to life,liberty, and property. Privacy as derived fromfundamental natural rights to life, liberty,and property encompasses the advantages of thecontrol and restricted access theories withouttheir attendant difficulties.

This paper defends the thesis that privacy as a right is derived from fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property and does not permit restricting the commodification of bodily material; however, privacy as life, liberty, property does require conventions that ensure a robust and just market in bodily material. The analysis proceeds by defending a general commitment to liberty and markets, but not in the manner one might expect from a ‘doctrinaire’ libertarian. Ethical concerns about commodification are legitimate in the (...) context of new medical and information technologies, but these concerns are not sufficiently well defined to justify political conclusions, since not every ethical concern is in itself a political concern, and the best way to resolve certain ethical difficulties is to draw up political boundaries that facilitate the discovery and testing of various solutions to our ethical puzzles. To illustrate the point, I will indicate how privacy as life, liberty, property defines such a dynamic solution to the problems of commodification of human bodily material and slippery information in insurance markets. (shrink)

The paper investigates the ethics of information transparency (henceforth transparency). It argues that transparency is not an ethical principle in itself but a pro-ethical condition for enabling or impairing other ethical practices or principles. A new definition of transparency is offered in order to take into account the dynamics of information production and the differences between data and information. It is then argued that the proposed definition provides a better understanding of what sort of information should be disclosed and what (...) sort of information should be used in order to implement and make effective the ethical practices and principles to which an organisation is committed. The concepts of “heterogeneous organisation” and “autonomous computational artefact” are further defined in order to clarify the ethical implications of the technology used in implementing information transparency. It is argued that explicit ethical designs, which describe how ethical principles are embedded into the practice of software design, would represent valuable information that could be disclosed by organisations in order to support their ethical standing. (shrink)

The present article focusesupon three aspects of computer ethics as aphilosophical field: contemporary perspectives,future projections, and current resources.Several topics are covered, including variouscomputer ethics methodologies, the `uniqueness'of computer ethics questions, and speculationsabout the impact of globalization and theinternet. Also examined is the suggestion thatcomputer ethics may `disappear' in the future.Finally, there is a brief description ofcomputer ethics resources, such as journals,textbooks, conferences and associations.

This essay critically examines some classic philosophical and legal theories of privacy, organized into four categories: the nonintrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control theories of privacy. Although each theory includes one or more important insights regarding the concept of privacy, I argue that each falls short of providing an adequate account of privacy. I then examine and defend a theory of privacy that incorporates elements of the classic theories into one unified theory: the Restricted Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory of privacy. Using (...) an example involving data-mining technology on the Internet, I show how RALC can help us to frame an online privacy policy that is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to address a wide range of privacy concerns that arise in connection with computers and information technology. (shrink)

The present study examines certain challenges that KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) in general and data mining in particular pose for normative privacy and public policy. In an earlier work (see Tavani, 1999), I argued that certain applications of data-mining technology involving the manipulation of personal data raise special privacy concerns. Whereas the main purpose of the earlier essay was to show what those specific privacy concerns are and to describe how exactly those concerns have been introduced by the use (...) of certain KDD and data-mining techniques, the present study questions whether the use of those techniques necessarily violates the privacy of individuals. This question is considered vis-à-vis a recent theory of privacy advanced by James Moor (1997). The implications of that privacy theory for a data-mining policy are also considered. (shrink)

Are trust relationships involving humans and artificial agents possible? This controversial question has become a hotly debated topic in the emerging field of machine ethics. Employing a model of trust advanced by Buechner and Tavani :39–51, 2011), I argue that the “short answer” to this question is yes. However, I also argue that a more complete and nuanced answer will require us to articulate the various levels of trust that are also possible in environments comprising both human agents and AAs. (...) In defending this view, I show how James Moor’s model for distinguishing four levels of ethical agents in the context of machine ethics :18–21, 2006) can help us to develop a framework that differentiates four levels of trust. Via a series of hypothetical scenarios, I illustrate each level of trust involved in HA–AA relationships. Finally, I argue that these levels of trust reflect three key factors or variables: the level of autonomy of the individual AAs involved, the degree of risk/vulnerability on the part of the HAs who place their trust in the AAs, and the kind of interactions that occur between the HAs and AAs in the trust environments. (shrink)

This essay critically analyzes Luciano Floridi’s ontological theory of informational privacy. Organized into two main parts, Part I examines some key foundational components of Floridi’s privacy theory and it considers some of the ways in which his framework purports to be superior to alternative theories of informational privacy. Part II poses two specific challenges for Floridi’s theory of informational privacy, arguing that an adequate privacy theory should be able to: (i) differentiate informational privacy from other kinds of privacy, including psychological (...) privacy; and (ii) distinguish between descriptive and normative aspects of informational privacy in a way that differentiates a (mere) loss of privacy from a violation of privacy. I argue that Floridi’s privacy theory, in its present form, does not explicitly address either challenge. However, I also argue that his ontological theory provides us with a novel way of analyzing the impact that digital technologies have had for informational privacy. I conclude by suggesting that Floridi’s privacy framework can be interpreted as containing the elements of a “personality theory of privacy,” which would be useful to examine in a separate study. (shrink)

The “struggle between liberties and authorities”, as described by Mill, refers to the tension between individual rights and the rules restricting them that are imposed by public authorities exerting their power over civil society. In this paper I argue that contemporary information societies are experiencing a new form of such a struggle, which now involves liberties and authorities in the cyber-sphere and, more specifically, refers to the tension between cyber-security measures and individual liberties. Ethicists, political philosophers and political scientists have (...) long debated how to strike an ethically sound balance between security measures and individual rights. I argue that such a balance can only be reached once individual rights are clearly defined, and that such a definition cannot prescind from an analysis of individual well-being in the information age. Hence, I propose an analysis of individual well-being which rests on the capability approach, and I then identify a set of rights that individuals should claim for themselves. Finally, I consider a criterion for balancing the proposed set of individual rights with cyber-security measures in the information age. (shrink)

In this article, I offer an outline of the papers comprising the special issue. I also provide a brief overview of its topic, namely, the friction between cyber security measures and individual rights. I consider such a friction to be a new and exacerbated version of what Mill called ‘the struggle between liberties and authorities,’ and I claim that the struggle arises because of the involvement of public authorities in the management of the cyber sphere, for technological and state power (...) can put individual rights, such as privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech, under sharp devaluating pressure. Finally, I conclude by stressing the need to reach an ethical balance to fine-tune cyber security measures and individual rights. (shrink)

The essay proposes to use alienation as a heuristic and conceptual tool for the analysis of the impact of digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) on users. It follows a historical materialist understanding, according to which data can be considered as things produced in an industrial fashion. A representational interpretation, according to which data would merely reflect a given reality, is untenable. It will be argued instead to understand data as an additional layer which has a transformative impact on reality (...) as a whole. The analysis follows the early Marx in thinking of alienation as a structural condition which holds even if it is not experienced psychologically by users. Alienation means that the desire to express oneself and achieve social recognition, self-realization, and participation through the use of ICTs is incongruent to the inherent purposes and functions of these technologies. Digital platforms create the ideological illusion that users contribute to the production of data solely for their own gratification. Users, in turn, react to structural alienation either by internalizing it, in which case they may become enthusiastic data producers, or by imposing alienating conditions on other users. Finally, it will be shown that a strong notion of privacy is less suited to articulate concerns about the impact of ICTs because it expresses a desire for privilege and individual control which has become unfulfillable in the environment of data industries. The essay closes by showing some of the changes in institutional structures and behavior that could follow from the focus on alienation. (shrink)

The primary theme of this paper is the normative case against ownership of one's genetic information along with the source of that information (usually human tissues samples). The argument presented here against such “upstream” property rights is based primarily on utilitarian grounds. This issue has new salience thanks to the Human Genome Project and “bio-prospecting” initiatives based on the aggregation of genetic information, such as the one being managed by deCODE Genetics in Iceland. The rationale for ownership is twofold: ownership (...) will protect the basic human rights of privacy and autonomy and it will enable the data subjects to share in the tangible benefits of the genetic research. Proponents of this viewpoint often cite the principle of genetic exceptionalism, which asserts that genetic information needs a higher level of protection than other kinds of personal information such as financial data. We argue, however, that the recognition of such ownership rights would lead to inefficiency along with the disutility of genetic discoveries. Biomedical research will be hampered if property rights in genes and genetic material are too extensive. We contend that other mechanisms such as informed consent and strict confidentiality rules can accomplish the same result as a property right without the liabilities of an exclusive entitlement. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the political value of the right to privacy. The classical accounts of privacy do not differentiate between privacy as the right of a citizen against other citizens vs. the right to privacy as the right against the state or the government. I shall argue that this distinction should be made, since the new context of the privacy debate has surpassed the historical frames in which the intelligence methods used by governments were comparable to those available (...) to individuals. I also present cases in which political privacy serves as an instrument of protecting important collective agendas exceeding the context of personal privacy. I argue that due to its function, political privacy should be considered a necessary element of democratic governance with the rule of law, imposing legal bounds on governments’ discretionary actions. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the UK National DNA Database and some of the controversies surrounding it with reference to legal and ethical issues, focusing particularly on privacy and human rights. Governance of this database involves specific exemptions from the Data Protection Act, and this gives a rise to concerns regarding both the extent of surveillance on the UK population and the possibility for harm to all citizens. This is of wider importance since every current citizen, and (...) everybody who visits the UK, could become a record in the DNA database. Principally, the paper seeks to explore whether these exemptions would also imply exemptions for software developers from codes of practice and ethics of their professional societies as relate to constructing or maintaining such data and the database.Design/methodology/approachThe paper makes a comparison between the principles of the DPA, as would need to be followed by all other organizations handling personal data, professional responsibilities‐based codes of ethics of professional societies, and the current reality as reported in relation to the NDNAD and the exemptions offered through the DPA.FindingsPrimarily, if NDNAD was not exempted from certain provisions in the DPA, the potential for the kinds of data leakages and other mishandlings could largely be avoided without the need for further considerations over so‐called “data minimization”. It can be seen how the lack of afforded protection allows for a wide range of issues as relate at least to privacy.Originality/valueThe paper provides the first evaluation of the combination of law, codes of ethics, and activities in the real world as related to NDNAD, with concomitant considerations for privacy, liberty, and human rights. Originality is demonstrated through consideration of the implications of certain exemptions in the DPA in relation to crime and taxation and national security and in relating the expected protections for personal data to widely reported evidence that such protections may be variously lacking. In addition, the paper provides a broad overview of controversies over certain newer kinds of DNA analysis, and other relatively recent findings, that seem generally absent from the vast majority of debates over this kind of analysis. (shrink)

Attempts to employ discourse ethics for assessing communication and information technologies have tended to focus on managerial and policy-oriented contexts. These initiatives presuppose institutional resources for organizing sophisticated consultation processes that elicit stakeholder input. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics, this paper supplements those initiatives by developing a more widely usable framework for moral inquiry and reflection on problematic cyberpractices. Given the highly idealized character of discourse ethics, a usable framework must answer two questions: How should those who lack organizational (...) power conduct their moral inquiry under non-ideal conditions of discourse? How ought they to understand the moral force of the judgments they reach under such conditions? In response, I develop the heuristic implications of Habermas’s principle of universalization. To render that principle usable for non-ideal discourse, I propose a modification that yields a scalar measure of “dialogically robust” judgments that are responsive to the actual state of discussion. To illustrate the use of these principles, I sketch two case studies, which examine the moral acceptability of violent video gaming and government cyber-surveillance. (shrink)

Cyber risk has become one of the greatest threats to firms in recent years. Accordingly, boards of directors must be continually vigilant about this danger. They have a duty to ensure that the companies adopt appropriate cybersecurity measures to manage the risk of cyber fraud. Boards should also ensure that the firm disclose material cyber risk and breaches. We examine how the board’s gender composition can influence the extent of such disclosure, based on a sample of the companies listed on (...) the S&P/TSX 60 Index over the period 2014–2018. Results show evidence of a positive association between the presence and level of cybersecurity disclosure and board gender diversity. However, the board must boast a critical mass of at least three women before this positive impact can be observed. Our findings contribute to the debate on the importance of gender diversity by adding the concept of the positive influence of heterogeneity on cyber disclosure. We also augment the literature on the critical mass of women in boardrooms by providing empirical evidence that three or more women constitute the threshold for better governance. Our study has important implications for investors, stakeholders and regulators. If investors wish to increase cybersecurity disclosure, they should ask for more diversified boards. Our findings support regulators in their efforts to increase women’s representation on boards by providing empirical evidence of better outcomes with this type of board composition. (shrink)

Throughout the longstanding debate on privacy, the concept has been framed in various ways. Most often it has been discussed as an area within which individuals rightfully may expect to be left alone and in terms of certain data that they should be entitled to control. The sphere in which individuals should be granted freedom from intrusion has typically been equated with the indisputably private domestic sphere. Privacy claims in the semi-public area of work have not been sufficiently investigated. In (...) this article, the case is made that employees have reasonable expectations on privacy at work. Firstly, in a descriptive analysis, employees’ need for workspace privacy is spelt out. Secondly, a normative analysis explicates the reasons why privacy should be protected. The main thrust is to provide a more inclusive privacy concept and hence, a more adequate basis for privacy protection legislation and codes in the area of work. Contrary to prevailing workplace privacy protection, employees’ need for local privacy should be accommodated as well as informational privacy. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper aims to examine the profound transformations engendered by the information revolution in order to determine aspects of what should be visible or invisible in human affairs. It seeks to explore the meaning of invisibility via an interdisciplinary approach, including computer science, law, and ethics.Design/methodology/approachThe method draws on both theoretical and empirical material so as to scrutinise the ways in which today's information revolution is recasting the boundaries between visibility and invisibility.FindingsThe degrees of exposure to public notice can be (...) understood as a matter of balance between access and control over information in a specific context, as well as a function of the ontological friction in a given region of the environment.Originality/valueThe originality of the case study on a new kind of recommender system is enhanced because of the procedural approach which is suggested to further develop the distinction between “good” and “evil” as anything that enriches, or damages, the informational complexity of the environment. (shrink)

The concept of privacy by design is becoming increasingly popular among regulators of information and communications technologies. This paper aims at analysing and discussing the ethical implications of this concept for personal health monitoring. I assume a privacy theory of restricted access and limited control. On the basis of this theory, I suggest a version of the concept of privacy by design that constitutes a middle road between what I call broad privacy by design and narrow privacy by design. The (...) key feature of this approach is that it attempts to balance automated privacy protection and autonomously chosen privacy protection in a way that is context-sensitive. In personal health monitoring, this approach implies that in some contexts like medication assistance and monitoring of specific health parameters one single automatic option is legitimate, while in some other contexts, for example monitoring in which relatives are receivers of health-relevant information rather than health care professionals, a multi-choice approach stressing autonomy is warranted. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to reconsider the concept of the right to information privacy and to propose, from a Japanese perspective, a revised conception of this right that is suitable for the modern information society.Design/methodology/approachFirst, the concept of privacy and personal information protection in the information society is briefly explained. After that, confused situations in Japan caused by the enforcement of Act on the Protection of Personal Information are described followed by the analysis of the Japanese socio‐cultural circumstances (...) surrounding privacy. Based on these, the effectiveness of the concept of the right to information privacy in the Japanese socio‐cultural and economic context is examined and the need to rethink the concept of the right to information privacy discussed. Finally, a revised conception of the right is proposed.FindingsIn view of the circumstances in Japan, the concept of the right to information privacy, defined as “an individual's right to control the circulation of information relating to him/herself”, as well as the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development's eight principles already become outdated in today's sophisticated information‐communication society. There is a need to control/restrict use of personal information so that individuals' autonomy and freedom is ensured in the current situation and to revise the concept of the right to information privacy based on this idea.Originality/valueThis paper proposes a revision of the concept of the right to information privacy focused on control of, not access to, use of personal information. The revised concept is defined so that individuals' autonomy and freedom is ensured even in the “informational transparent” society. (shrink)

Computing plays an important role in genetics (and vice versa).Theoretically, computing provides a conceptual model for thefunction and malfunction of our genetic machinery. Practically,contemporary computers and robots equipped with advancedalgorithms make the revelation of the complete human genomeimminent – computers are about to reveal our genetic soulsfor the first time. Ethically, computers help protect privacyby restricting access in sophisticated ways to genetic information.But the inexorable fact that computers will increasingly collect,analyze, and disseminate abundant amounts of genetic informationmade available through the (...) genetic revolution, not to mentionthat inexpensive computing devices will make genetic informationgathering easier, underscores the need for strong and immediateprivacy legislation. (shrink)

Use of the concept of `areasonable person and his or her expectations'is widely found in legal reasoning. This legalconstruct is employed in the present article toexamine privacy questions associated withcontemporary information technology, especiallythe internet. In particular, reasonableexpectations of privacy while browsing theworld-wide-web and while sending and receivinge-mail are analyzed.

Purpose – Ubiquitous computing and “big data” have been widely recognized as requiring new concepts of privacy and new mechanisms to protect it. While improved concepts of privacy have been suggested, the paper aims to argue that people acting in full conformity to those privacy norms still can infringe the privacy of others in the context of ubiquitous computing and “big data”. Design/methodology/approach – New threats to privacy are described. Helen Nissenbaum's concept of “privacy as contextual integrity” is reviewed concerning (...) its capability to grasp these problems. The argument is based on the assumption that the technologies work, persons are fully informed and capable of deciding according to advanced privacy considerations. Findings – Big data and ubiquitous computing enable privacy threats for persons whose data are only indirectly involved and even for persons about whom no data have been collected and processed. Those new problems are intrinsic to the functionality of these new technologies and need to be addressed on a social and political level. Furthermore, a concept of data minimization in terms of the quality of the data is proposed. Originality/value – The use of personal data as a threat to the privacy of others is established. This new perspective is used to reassess and recontextualize Helen Nissenbaum's concept of privacy. Data minimization in terms of quality of data is proposed as a new concept. (shrink)

Recent scholarship in philosophy, law, and information systems suggests that respecting privacy entails understanding the implicit privacy norms about what, why, and to whom information is shared within specific relationships. These social contracts are important to understand if firms are to adequately manage the privacy expectations of stakeholders. This paper explores a social contract approach to developing, acknowledging, and protecting privacy norms within specific contexts. While privacy as a social contract—a mutually beneficial agreement within a community about sharing and using (...) information—has been introduced theoretically and empirically, the full impact on firms of an alternative framework to respecting the privacy expectations of stakeholders has not been examined. The goal of this paper is to examine how privacy norms develop through social contract’s narrative, to redescribe privacy violations given the social contract approach, and to critically examine the role of business as a contractor in developing privacy norms. A social contract narrative dealing specifically with issues of privacy is an important next step in exploring a social contract approach to privacy. Here, the narrative is used to explain to analyze the dynamic process of privacy norm generation within particular communities. Based on this narrative, individuals within a given community discriminately share information with a particular set of obligations in mind as to who has access to the information and how it will be used. Rather than giving away privacy, individuals discriminately share information within a particular community and with norms governing the use of their information. Similar to contractual business ethics’ impact on global commerce in explaining how and why norms vary across global contexts, the social contract approach to privacy explains how and why norms vary across communities of actors. Focusing on agreements around privacy expectations shifts the responsibility of firms from adequate notification to the responsibility of firms as contractors to maintain a mutually beneficial and sustainable solution. (shrink)

Within a given conversation or information exchange, do privacy expectations change based on the technology used? Firms regularly require users, customers, and employees to shift existing relationships onto new information technology, yet little is known as about how technology impacts established privacy expectations and norms. Coworkers are asked to use new information technology, users of gmail are asked to use GoogleBuzz, patients and doctors are asked to record health records online, etc. Understanding how privacy expectations change, if at all, and (...) the mechanisms by which such a variance is produced will help organizations make such transitions. This paper examines whether and how privacy expectations change based on the technological platform of an information exchange. The results suggest that privacy expectations are significantly distinct when the information exchange is located on a novel technology as compared to a more established technology. Furthermore, this difference is best explained when modeled by a shift in privacy expectations rather than fully technology-specific privacy norms. These results suggest that privacy expectations online are connected to privacy offline with a different base privacy expectation. Surprisingly, out of the five locations tested, respondents consistently assign information on email the greatest privacy protection. In addition, while undergraduate students differ from non-undergraduates when assessing a social networking site, no difference is found when judging an exchange on email. In sum, the findings suggest that novel technology may introduce temporary conceptual muddles rather than permanent privacy vacuums. The results reported here challenge conventional views about how privacy expectations differ online versus offline. Traditionally, management scholarship examines privacy online or with a specific new technology platform in isolation and without reference to the same information exchange offline. However, in the present study, individuals appear to have a shift in their privacy expectations but retain similar factors and their relative importance—the privacy equation by which they form judgments—across technologies. These findings suggest that privacy scholarship should make use of existing privacy norms within contexts when analyzing and studying privacy in a new technological platform. (shrink)

A growing body of theory has focused on privacy as being contextually defined, where individuals have highly particularized judgments about the appropriateness of what, why, how, and to whom information flows within a specific context. Such a social contract understanding of privacy could produce more practical guidance for organizations and managers who have employees, users, and future customers all with possibly different conceptions of privacy across contexts. However, this theoretical suggestion, while intuitively appealing, has not been empirically examined. This study (...) validates a social contract approach to privacy by examining whether and how privacy norms vary across communities and contractors. The findings from this theoretical examination support the use of contractual business ethics to understand privacy in research and in practice. As predicted, insiders to a community had significantly different understandings of privacy norms as compared to outsiders. In addition, all respondents held different privacy norms across hypothetical contexts, thereby suggesting privacy norms are contextually understood within a particular community of individuals. The findings support two conclusions. First, individuals hold different privacy norms without necessarily having diminished expectations of privacy. Individuals differed on the factors they considered important in calculating privacy expectations, yet all groups had robust privacy expectations across contexts. Second, outsiders have difficulty in understanding the privacy norms of a particular community. For managers and scholars, this renders privacy expectations more difficult to identify at a distance or in deductive research. The findings speak directly to the needs of organizations to manage a diverse set of privacy issues across stakeholder groups. (shrink)

This paper argues in favor of a hybrid conception of identity. A common conception of identity in datafied society is a split between a digital self and a real self, which has resulted in concepts such as the data double, algorithmic identity, and data shadows. These data-identity metaphors have played a significant role in the conception of informational privacy as control over information—the control of or restricted access to your digital identity. Through analyses of various data-identity metaphors as well as (...) philosophical accounts of identity, we argue in favor of a hybrid conception of identity that emphasizes the relations between the ‘real’ and the ‘digital’. A hybrid conception of identity—where the digital is an aspect on par with social relations, self-understanding, and values—ultimately calls for an understanding of privacy as the right to influence one’s own identity. (shrink)

The article provides an instructive in-depth analysis of communicative practices in the personal blog. Its aim is to document the discursive dynamics and interactional ethics of blogging, with a specific focus on negotiations of the blogging self in-between public and private. Based on key findings from an empirical case study of personal blogs, the article addresses the negotiation of the blogging self from three interdependent perspectives: the network structures, patterns of interaction, and thematic orientations of the blog. Instead of approaching (...) the online self as the individual blogger’s self-presentation to an often unknown and unfamiliar audience, I analyse and discuss the ‘blogging self’ as a relational and collaborative accomplishment, as something that is constantly subject to negotiation between author and readers, and is framed by the blog as a communicative genre. The theoretical foundation for this relational approach to the self is inspired by the work of sociologist Georg Simmel on how individuals attune to their networks of affiliation in a process of socialisation (Simmel 1955). The article contributes to the discussion of ethical behaviour and privacy protection in social media by highlighting the role of phatic communication in the blog. Specifically, I demonstrate how participants in the blog network negotiate and maintain an ethos of privacy protection in and through practices associated with the phatic. They do this by adhering to a ‘principle of sociability’, allowing them to experience their communication as personal but not private. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes between two main questions regarding the notion of privacy: “What is privacy?” and “Why do/should we value privacy?”. In developing a social-ontological recognitional model of privacy, it gives an answer to the first question. According to the SORM, Privacy is a second order quality of roles within social practices. It is a function of who is or should be recognized as a “standard authority”. Enjoying standard authority means to have the right to interpret and contest role behavior (...) and role obligations within a specific practice, as well as evaluate the normative structure, the fundamental practice norms as well as the roles and their status. The SORM utilizes the concept of standard authority to explicate privacy with regard to two categories that capture the relevant phenomena of privacy: decisional and informational privacy. Within a practice, an actor is said to have decisional privacy if she as a BCR does not recognize bearers of accidental roles as standard authorities. Vice versa, an actor is said to enjoy informational privacy if all other BCRs recognize her as a standard authority. Additionally, the requirement of mutual recognition by the practice participants as standard authorities introduces a “weak normativity” into the theory, which can be used to identify deficient privacy arrangements within practices. (shrink)

PurposeThis paper aims to argue that traditional ethical theories used in disaster response may be inadequate and particularly strained by the emergence of new technologies and social media, particularly with regard to privacy. The paper suggests incorporation of care ethics into the disaster ethics nexus to better include the perspectives of disaster affected communities.Design/methodology/approachThis paper presents a theoretical examination of privacy and care ethics in the context of social media/digitally enhanced disaster response.FindingsThe paper proposes an ethics of care can fruitfully (...) by used by public and private agents in disaster management. Its relational ontology restores the priority of fostering good relationships between stakeholders, thus giving central importance to values such as transparency and trust and the situated knowledge of disaster-affected communities.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper presents theoretical research and is limited by the availability of empirical data. There is opportunity for future research to evaluate the impact of a conscious adoption of an ethics of care by disaster management agents.Practical implicationsAn ethos of care ethics needs to be mainstreamed into disaster management organisations and digital initiatives.Social implicationsThis paper argues that power asymmetry in disaster response renders the public vulnerable to abuse, and that the adoption of care ethics can support disaster management agents in recognising this power imbalance and wielding power responsibly.Originality/valueThis paper examines the applicability of an alternative ethical framework to novel circumstances. (shrink)

This article presents a conceptual investigation into the value impacts and relations of algorithms in the domain of justice and security. As a conceptual investigation, it represents one step in a value sensitive design based methodology. Here, we explicate and analyse the expression of values of accuracy, privacy, fairness and equality, property and ownership, and accountability and transparency in this context. We find that values are sensitive to disvalue if algorithms are designed, implemented or deployed inappropriately or without sufficient consideration (...) for their value impacts, potentially resulting in problems including discrimination and constrained autonomy. Furthermore, we outline a framework of conceptual relations of values indicated by our analysis, and potential value tensions in their implementation and deployment with a view towards supporting future research, and supporting the value sensitive design of algorithms in justice and security. (shrink)

Due to the technology of machine learning, new breakthroughs are currently being achieved with constant regularity. By using machine learning techniques, computer applications can be developed and used to solve tasks that have hitherto been assumed not to be solvable by computers. If these achievements consider applications that collect and process personal data, this is typically perceived as a threat to information privacy. This paper aims to discuss applications from both fields of personality and image analysis. These applications are often (...) criticized by reference to the protection of privacy. This paper critically questions this approach. Instead of solely using the concept of privacy to address the risks of machine learning, it is increasingly necessary to consider and implement ethical anti-discrimination concepts, too. In many ways, informational privacy requires individual information control. However, not least because of machine learning technologies, information control has become obsolete. Hence, societies need stronger anti-discrimination tenets to counteract the risks of machine learning. (shrink)

Women as individuals experience subtle discrimination regarding career development opportunities as evidenced by research on the Glass Ceiling. This paper looks at the ramifications of technology, specifically the Internet, and how it affects women’s career opportunities.

In this paper, we examine some ethical implications of a controversial court decision in the United States involving Verizon (an Internet Service Provider or ISP) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). In particular, we analyze the impacts this decision has for personal privacy and intellectual property. We begin with a brief description of the controversies and rulings in this case. This is followed by a look at some of the challenges that peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, used to share digital (...) information, pose for our legal and moral systems. We then examine the concept of privacy to better understand how the privacy of Internet users participating in P2P file-sharing practices is threatened under certain interpretations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the United States. In particular, we examine the implications of this act for a new form of “panoptic surveillance” that can be carried out by organizations such as the RIAA. We next consider the tension between privacy and property-right interests that emerges in the Verizon case, and we examine a model proposed by Jessica Litman for distributing information over the Internet in a way that respects both privacy and property rights. We conclude by arguing that in the Verizon case, we should presume in favor of privacy as the default position, and we defend the view that a presumption should be made in favor of sharing (rather than hoarding) digital information. We also conclude that in the Verizon case, a presumption in favor of property would have undesirable effects and would further legitimize the commodification of digital information – a recent trend that is reinforced by certain interpretations of the DMCA on the part of lawmakers and by aggressive tactics used by the RIAA. (shrink)

The present essay is organized into five main sections. We begin with a few preliminary remarks about "cloud computing," which are developed more fully in a later section. This is followed by a brief overview of the evolution of Helen Nissenbaum's framework of "privacy as contextual integrity." In particular, we examine Nissenbaum's "Decision Heuristic" model, described in her most recent work on privacy, to see how it enables the contextual-integrity framework to respond to privacy challenges posed by new and emerging (...) technologies. We then apply that heuristic device to questions surrounding one aspect of cloud computing -- viz., "cloud storage" technology. In particular, we focus on current practices affecting Google Docs as an instance of a cloud-storage system. (shrink)

This essay expands upon an earlier work in which we analyzed the implications of the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay we revisit some of the concerns surrounding this case by analyzing the intellectual property and privacy issues that emerged in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case. These two cases illustrate some of the key tensions that exist between privacy and property interests in cyberspace. In our analysis, (...) we contrast Digital Rights Management and Interoperability and we examine some newer distribution models of sharing over P2P networks. We also analyze some privacy implications in the two cases in light of the theory of privacy as contextual integrity. (shrink)

This paper presents some results of a case study of the usage of the social networking platform studiVZ by students in Salzburg, Austria. The topic is framed by the context of electronic surveillance. An online survey that was based on questionnaire that consisted of 35 (single and multiple) choice questions, 3 open-ended questions, and 5 interval-scaled questions, was carried out (N = 674). The knowledge that students have in general was assessed with by calculating a surveillance knowledge index, the critical (...) awareness towards surveillance by calculating a surveillance critique index. Knowledge about studiVZ as well as information behaviour on the platform were analyzed and related to the surveillance parameters. The results show that public information and discussion about surveillance and social networking platforms is important for activating critical information behaviour. In the case of studiVZ, a change of the terms of use in 2008 that brought about the possibility of targeted personalized advertising, was the subject of public discussions that influenced students’ knowledge and information behaviour. (shrink)

PurposeThere are a lot of discussions about privacy in relation to contemporary communication systems (such as Facebook and other “social media” platforms), but discussions about privacy on the internet in most cases misses a profound understanding of the notion of privacy and where this notion is coming from. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the liberal notion of privacy and explore foundations of an alternative privacy conception.Design/methodology/approachA typology of privacy definitions is elaborated based on Giddens' theory of structuration. (...) The concept of privacy fetishism that is based on critical political economy is introduced. Limits of the liberal concept of privacy are discussed. This discussion is connected to the theories of Marx, Arendt and Habermas. Some foundations of an alternative privacy concept are outlined.FindingsThe notion of privacy fetishism is introduced for criticizing naturalistic accounts of privacy. Marx and Engels have advanced four elements of the critique of the liberal privacy concept that were partly taken up by Arendt and Habermas: privacy as atomism that advances; possessive individualism that harms the public good; legitimizes and reproduces the capitalist class structure; and capitalist patriarchy.Research limitations/implicationsGiven the criticisms advanced in this paper, the need for an alternative, socialist privacy concept is ascertained and it is argued that privacy rights should be differentiated according to the position individuals occupy in the power structure, so that surveillance makes transparent wealth and income gaps and company's profits and privacy protects workers and consumers from capitalist domination.Originality/valueThe paper contributes to the establishment of a concept of privacy that is grounded in critical political economy. Owing to the liberal bias of the privacy concept, the theorization of privacy has thus far been largely ignored in critical political economy. The paper contributes to illuminating this blind spot. (shrink)

The paper outlines a new interpretation of informational privacy and of its moral value. The main theses defended are: (a) informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere, that is, of the forces that oppose the information flow within the space of information; (b) digital ICTs (information and communication technologies) affect the ontological friction by changing the nature of the infosphere (re-ontologization); (c) digital ICTs can therefore both decrease and protect informational privacy but, most importantly, they (...) can also alter its nature and hence our understanding and appreciation of it; (d) a change in our ontological perspective, brought about by digital ICTs, suggests considering each person as being constituted by his or her information and hence regarding a breach of one’s informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s personal identity. (shrink)

The article provides an outline of the ontological interpretation of informational privacy based on information ethics. It is part of a larger project of research, in which I have developed the foundations of ideas presented here and their consequences. As an outline, it is meant to be self-sufficient and to provide enough information to enable the reader to assess how the approach fares with respect to other alternatives. However, those interested in a more detailed analysis, and especially in the reasons (...) offered in its favour, may wish to consult the other articles as well. (shrink)

In this article, I summarise the ontological theory of informational privacy (an approach based on information ethics) and then discuss four types of interesting challenges confronting any theory of informational privacy: (1) parochial ontologies and non-Western approaches to informational privacy; (2) individualism and the anthropology of informational privacy; (3) the scope and limits of informational privacy; and (4) public, passive and active informational privacy. I argue that the ontological theory of informational privacy can cope with such challenges fairly successfully. In (...) the conclusion, I discuss some of the work that lies ahead. (shrink)

We defend public anonymity in the light of the threat posed by digital technology. Once people could reasonably assume that they were fairly anonymous when they left the house. They neither drove nor walked around with GPS devices; they paid their highway tolls in cash; they seldom bought on credit; and no cameras marked their strolls in the park or their walks down the street. Times have changed. We begin with a brief discussion of the concept of anonymity. We then (...) argue that public anonymity helps promote privacy in public. Next, we argue that public anonymity is worth protecting insofar as it promotes autonomy. After that we attempt to show how digital technology threatens public anonymity in the context of CCTV and GPS devices. We argue for a significant scaling back of public surveillance. We close with some thoughts on what we take to be the gratuitous costs imposed on those who would attempt to preserve their anonymity in public. (shrink)

I argue that there is nothing wrong with perfect voyeurism , covert watching or listening that is neither discovered nor publicized. After a brief discussion of privacy I present attempts from Stanley Benn, Daniel Nathan, and James Moor to show that the act is wrong. I argue that these authors fail to make their case. However, I maintain that, if detected or publicized, voyeurism can do grave harm and to that extent should be severely punished. I conclude with some thoughts (...) on the stubborn intuition that perfect voyeurism is wrong despite the absence of harm. (shrink)

Luciano Floridi presents Information Ethics (IE) as an alternative to traditional moral theories. IE consists of two tenets. First, reality can be interpreted at numerous, mutually consistent levels of abstraction, the highest of which is information. This level, unlike the others, applies to all of reality. Second, everything, insofar as it is an information object, has some degree of intrinsic value and hence moral dignity. I criticize IE, arguing that Floridi fails to show that the moral community should be expanded (...) beyond beings capable of suffering or having preferences. Next, I look at Floridi’s extended case against consequentialism generally and utilitarianism in particular. I try to show that his criticisms are flawed. Third, I argue that, for the most part, it is not clear what IE’s practical implications are. I conclude with a critical discussion of the one area of information ethics, traditionally conceived, that Floridi has written about at length, privacy. (shrink)