Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on välja töötada olenditeooria mõningad põhimõisted. Olendit määratletakse teatavate eristumisprotsesside lõimimisena ehk "läbivaatusena". Nendel protsessidel on kaks külge, "esi-" ja "isekülg". Esikülg on kõrvutuvuslik, st. paljusus, mille elemendid on üksteise kõrval; isekülg on läbistuvuslik, st. paljusus, mille elemendid läbistavad üksteist. Need kaks külge ei sarnane teineteisega ja nende vahel liikumine kätkeb taandamatut ajalisust, ontogeneesi. Artiklis laiendatakse olendi mõistet "vertikaalis" erinevatele keerukustasanditele (eluline, molekuliline, atomaarne jt) ja "horisontaalis" erinevatele individualiseeritusastmetele. Isekülge käsitletakse liigendatuna piki afekteerimis- ja afekteeritavusviise, mis tähistavad (...) seda, mida olend suudab tajuda ja teostada, ehk seda, milleks ta on võimeline. Lõpuks käsitletakse esi- ja isekülge olemise kui protsessi kahe aspektina, esinemise ja isenemisena. Esinemise ja isenemise ringluste arvukus ja tempo variatiivsus määravad olendi väehulga. A Theory of Beings The paper proposes to work out concepts for describing the individualization of beings on various levels of organization. A being with a certain degree of individuality comes into being when certain processes of differenciation are being integrated together. It is conceived of as having two aspects, self-relation (isekülg) and other-relation (esikülg). The former is a multiplicity where the elements interpenetrate each other and the latter is a multiplicity where the elements are exterior to each other (juxtaposition). The articulations of interpenetrating multiplicity determine how a being can affect its surroundings and be affected by it, and the modes of this articulation can be seen as attractors of the "phase-space" of a being. Ontogenesis is on the one hand the actualization of this virtual phase-space in an actual form with its characteristic ways of spatialization and temporalization. On the other hand, ontogenesis means the revirtualization of juxtaposing elements and processes. The number and intensity of these circuits determines the degree of power of a being. The paper proposes to extend all these notions also to pre-biotic systems.  . (shrink)

Amidst a crowded field of contenders, the Scopes trial retains a powerful claim to the title Trial of the Past Century, with repercussions that have already extended well into the next. As an acutely divisive event in American scientific, legal, political, educational and religious life, the Scopes trial has persistently attracted commentators intent on mapping the dense network of persons and interests forcefully drawn together in Dayton, Tennessee in the often hotly contentious proceedings of July 10–21, 1925. These commentators have (...) been keen to explore both the foundations and the far-reaching consequences of courtroom polemics, sometimes with their own polemical intentions laid bare: from journalist H. L. .. (shrink)

The paper defends the idea that Jamesian pragmatism, Nietzschean perspectivism, and philosophical anthropology represent a consistent triad, for the similarities and connections between the first two positions rest in their engagement with the anthropological question. As will be argued, a) pragmatism is concerned with anthropology and that it deals with a fundamental issue of Nietzsche’s late thought; b) the problem of the type of man (der Typus Mensch) is involved in Nietzsche’s questioning the value of truth, and perspectivism is an (...) alternative view to Platonic and Christian metaphysics which arises from the same phenomenalist conception of knowledge defended by James ; c) Nietzsche’s interest in developing a philosophy that affirms the perspectival character of existence is primarily anthropological, and this is in fact the pragmatic criterion of validity that one can attribute to Nietzschean perspectivism. (shrink)

Continental philosophy of science has developed alongside mainstream analytic philosophy of science. But where continental approaches are inclusive, analytic philosophies of science are not–excluding not merely Nietzsche’s philosophy of science but Gödel’s philosophy of physics. As a radicalization of Kant, Nietzsche’s critical philosophy of science puts science in question and Nietzsche’s critique of the methodological foundations of classical philology bears on science, particularly evolution as well as style (in art and science). In addition to the critical (in Mach, Nietzsche, Heidegger (...) but also Husserl just to the extent that continental philosophy of science tends to depart from a reflection on the crisis of foundations), other continental philosophies of science include phenomenology (Husserl, Bachelard, Merleau‐Ponty, etc.) and hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Heelan, etc.), especially incorporating history of science (Nietzsche, Mach, Duhem, Butterfield, Feyerabend, etc.). Examples are drawn from the philosophy of sciences (chemistry, geology, and biology) other than physics. (shrink)

The paper provides a thorough account of the relationship between Ernst Mach’s thought and that of an apparently more intellectually distant near-contemporary, Friedrich Nietzsche. The consistency of their views is in fact substantial, as I try to show within the paper. Despite their interests being different, both Mach and Nietzsche were concerned with the same issues about our intellectual relationship with the external world, dealing with the same questions and pursuing a common aim of eliminating worn-out philosophical conceptions. Moreover, it (...) can be argued that both Mach and Nietzsche converged on what we now know as the problem of realism versus anti-realism in the philosophy of science, and that they both rejected ‘representational’ (realist) conceptions of science in favour of a certain sort of pragmatic anti-realism, whose focus was on the role science plays as a means of orientation. (shrink)

Continental philosophies of science tend to exemplify holistic themes connecting order and contingency, questions and answers, writers and readers, speakers and hearers. Such philosophies of science also tend to feature a fundamental emphasis on the historical and cultural situatedness of discourse as significant; relevance of mutual attunement of speaker and hearer; necessity of pre-linguistic cognition based in human engagement with a common socio-cultural historical world; role of narrative and metaphor as explanatory; sustained emphasis on understanding questioning; truth seen as horizonal, (...) aletheic, or perspectival; and a tolerance for paradoxical and complex forms of expression. Continental philosophy of science is thus more comprehensive than philosophy of science in the analytic tradition, including (and as analytic philosophy of science does not tend to include) perspectives on the history of science as well as the social and practical dimensions of scientific discovery. Where analytic philosophy is about reducing or, indeed, eliminating the perennial problems of philosophy, Continental philosophy is all about thinking and that will mean, as both Heidegger and Nietzsche emphasize, making such problems more not less problematic. (shrink)