In normative ethical theory, computer ethics belongs to the area of applied ethics dealing with practical and everyday moral problems arising from the use of computers and computer networks in the information society. Modern scholarship usually approves deontological and utilitarian ethics as appropriate to computer ethics, while classical theories of ethics, such as virtue ethics, are usually neglected as anachronistic and unsuitable to the information era and ICT industry. During past decades, an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics has been revived (...) in modern philosophical enquiries with serious attempts for application to computer ethics and cyberethics. In this paper, the author argues that current trends and behaviours in online communication require an ethics of self-care found in Plotinus’ self-centred virtue ethics theory. The paper supports the position that Plotinus’ virtue ethics of intellectual autonomy and self-determination is relevant to cyberethics discussions involved in computer education and online communication. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore an emerging ethical theory for the Digital Age – Flourishing Ethics – which will likely be applicable in many different cultures worldwide, addressing not only human concerns but also activities, decisions and consequences of robots, cyborgs, artificially intelligent agents and other new digital technologies. Design/methodology/approach In the past, a number of influential ethical theories in Western philosophy have focused upon choice and autonomy, or pleasure and pain or fairness and justice. These (...) are important ethical concepts, but we consider “flourishing” to be a broader “umbrella concept” under which all of the above ideas can be included, plus additional ethical ideas from cultures in other regions of the world. Before explaining the applied approach, this study discusses relevant ideas of four example thinkers who emphasize flourishing in their ethics writings: Aristotle, Norbert Wiener, James Moor and Simon Rogerson. Findings Flourishing Ethics is not a single ethical theory. It is “an approach,” a “family” of similar ethical theories which can be successfully applied to humans in many different cultures, as well as to non-human agents arising from new digital technologies. Originality/value This appears to be the first extended analysis of the emerging flourishing ethics “family” of theories. (shrink)

Video games are ethically controversial. Some video games are effective training tools for learning various skills and approaches to problem-solving, but some video games are notorious for promoting discriminatory and barbaric behavior. We consider such ethical pros and cons of video games, but we also present a more fundamental ethical issue about video games. Most video games have a bias toward self-centered decision-making. Often the decision-making driver is not the impact of the decision on society but rather the quantity of (...) rewards for their individual character. This bias can be an obstacle to employing good ethical analysis and good ethical decision-making in video games. In this paper we discuss the ethical theory of Just Consequentialism and show how it can be used to introduce ethical values into video game design and how it can be useful for ethical decision-making, even rapid ethical decision-making, in both virtual world and real worlds. (shrink)

This paper looks at philosophical questions that arise in the context of AI alignment. It defends three propositions. First, normative and technical aspects of the AI alignment problem are interrelated, creating space for productive engagement between people working in both domains. Second, it is important to be clear about the goal of alignment. There are significant differences between AI that aligns with instructions, intentions, revealed preferences, ideal preferences, interests and values. A principle-based approach to AI alignment, which combines these elements (...) in a systematic way, has considerable advantages in this context. Third, the central challenge for theorists is not to identify ‘true’ moral principles for AI; rather, it is to identify fair principles for alignment that receive reflective endorsement despite widespread variation in people’s moral beliefs. The final part of the paper explores three ways in which fair principles for AI alignment could potentially be identified. (shrink)

When discussing AI alignment, we usually refer to the problem of teaching or training advanced autonomous AI systems to make decisions that are aligned with human values or preferences. Proponents of this approach believe it can be employed as means to stay in control over sophisticated intelligent systems, thus avoiding certain existential risks. We identify three general obstacles on the path to implementation of value alignment: a technological/technical obstacle, a normative obstacle, and a calibration problem. Presupposing, for the purposes of (...) this discussion, that the technical and normative problems are solved, we focus on the problem of how to calibrate a system, for a specific value, to be on a specific location within a spectrum stretching between righteous and normal or average human behavior. Calibration, or more specifically mis-calibration, also raises the issue of trustworthiness. If we cannot trust AI systems to perform tasks the way we intended, we would not use them on our roads and at our homes. In an era where we strive to construct autonomous machines endowed with common sense, reasoning abilities and a connection to the world, so they would be able to act in alignment with human values, such mis-calibrations can make the difference between trustworthy and untrustworthy systems. (shrink)

I argue that there is nothing wrong with perfect voyeurism , covert watching or listening that is neither discovered nor publicized. After a brief discussion of privacy I present attempts from Stanley Benn, Daniel Nathan, and James Moor to show that the act is wrong. I argue that these authors fail to make their case. However, I maintain that, if detected or publicized, voyeurism can do grave harm and to that extent should be severely punished. I conclude with some thoughts (...) on the stubborn intuition that perfect voyeurism is wrong despite the absence of harm. (shrink)

Purpose Professional ethics is explored with three main foci: a critique of codes of conduct and the value of creating a global code for information and communication technology ; a critique of ICT professional certification; and the debate over whether ICT is really a profession. Design/methodology/approach This is a conceptual reflection on the current state of the ICT industry internationally, informed by the literature. Findings Compared to a mature profession, such as health, ICT is a young profession. This is evidenced (...) in the disparity of domains of practice, the lack of agreement on universal values governing the industry and the ongoing difficulties in creating international certification. Originality/value Until now, there has been little recognition of the corporatisation of ICT professionals and the effect that has on their ability to engage in appropriate professional ethics. More research is needed to explore appropriate ways in which ethical behaviour can be encouraged in the corporate workplace, including how professional development can be strengthened through building learning organisations. (shrink)