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  1. Philosophy of Science in Practice and Weak Scientism Together Apart.Luana Poliseli & Federica Russo - 2022 - In Moti Mizrahi (ed.), For and against scientism: science, methodology and the future of philosophy. Lanham/Boulder/New York/ London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 0-0.
    The term ‘scientism’ has not attracted consensus about its meaning or about its scope of application. In this paper, we consider Mizrahi’s suggestion to distinguish ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ scientism, and the consequences this distinction may have for philosophical methodology. While we side with Mizrahi that his definitions help advance the debate, by avoiding verbal dispute and focussing on questions of method, we also have concerns about his proposal as it defends a hierarchy of knowledge production. Mizrahi’s position is that Weak (...)
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  • The Supposed Spectre of Scientism.Amanda Bryant - forthcoming - In Moti Mizrahi (ed.), For and Against Scientism: Science,Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield.
    This chapter considers the assumptions required to make scientisms of different forms genuinely threatening to philosophers, where a genuine threat would consist of a concrete risk to their statuses, the value of their teaching and research, their livelihoods, their preferred research methods, or the health of the discipline. I will find that strong and weak forms of scientism alike require substantive assumptions to make them threatening in those regards. In particular, they require sometimes heavy-handed circumscriptions of philosophy and science, as (...)
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  • Philosophical Sentiments Toward Scientism: A Reply to Bryant.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (11):19-24.
    In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns is that numbers of philosophical publications that mention “scientism” are a “poor proxy for scholarly sentiment” (Bryant 2020, 31). In reply, I conduct a sentiment analysis that is designed to find out whether academic philosophers have negative, positive, or neutral sentiments (...)
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