Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Affective Representation and Affective Attitudes.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Synthese (4):1-28.
    Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Affective representation and affective attitudes.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3519-3546.
    Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that evaluative standing as having the power to causally motivate (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Intentional Feelings, Practical Agency, and Normative Commitments.Mary Carman - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7):88-111.
    A dominant approach to conceptualizing a role for emotions in practical agency has been to focus on a relation between emotions and reasons, whereby emotions are claimed to track reason-giving considerations via their intentional content. Yet, if we reflect on the phenomenology of emotional consciousness and take seriously a growing consensus that emotions involve intentional feelings then, I argue, such a reason-tracking approach at best only provides part of the story and at worst is fundamentally misguided. This does not mean (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Fear of the Past.Davide Bordini & Giuliano Torrengo - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
    A widespread (and often tacit) assumption is that fear is an anticipatory emotion and, as such, inherently future-oriented. Prima facie, such an assumption is threatened by cases where we seem to be afraid of things in the past: if it is possible to fear the past, then fear entertains no special relation with the future—or so some have argued. This seems to force us to choose between an account of fear as an anticipatory emotion (supported by pre-theoretical intuitions as well (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Wales
    This thesis motivates a novel account of desire as the best explanation of an intuitive datum. The intuitive datum is that often when an agent desires P she will immediately, outright know that she has a reason to bring P about. Existing explanations of the intuitive datum cannot simultaneously satisfy two desiderata. We want to explain how desires enable outright knowledge of reasons and also explain the fallibility of desires. Existing views satisfy the first desideratum at the expense of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•