In its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy.

The paper argues that some tools from the epistemic injustice literature can be fruitfully applied to the debate on epistemic decolonisation. The first step for such a project is to defuse recent misgivings about the liberatory potential of epistemic injustice scholarship. I group these misgivings under the slogan ‘Epistemic injustice is white-people stuff’, or ‘the WPS challenge’, for short, and use them to set desiderata for good theorising with epistemic injustice tools. I then look at three such tools – epistemic (...) oppression, white ignorance, and contributory injustice – and argue that they advance theorising epistemic decolonisation while meeting the three desiderata. If the argument works, its implications for the topic of this special issue are that we don’t need to decolonise epistemic injustice; we can instead use the tools of the epistemic injustice literature to advance the decolonisation project. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between epistemic freedom, and epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression. I situate epistemic freedom within the larger project of epistemic decolonisation and argue that epistemic freedom is central to both its positive and negative programme. Through exploring the intersections of the notion of epistemic freedom and the scholarship on epistemic injustice and oppression, I argue that one can think of epistemic injustices and oppression as infringements on epistemic freedom. I identify shared themes between the theorisation of (...) epistemic freedom and the literature on epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression, including silencing, active ignorance, and epistemic exploitation. I briefly explore each of these themes, identifying both intersections and divergences. Lastly, I draw on the literature on epistemic injustice and oppression to sharpen Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2018. Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization. London: Routledge) general conception of epistemic freedom and develop a tripartite structure for what substantial epistemic freedom entails. I argue that being epistemically free entails being able to choose one’s epistemic endeavours, having the means to pursue them, as well as being able to meaningfully partake in the shared endeavours of the epistemic communities that one belongs to. (shrink)

Though a common language of science allows for easier communication of the results among researchers, the use of lingua franca also comes with the cost of losing some of the diverse ideas and results arising from the plurality of languages. Following Quine’s famous thesis about the indeterminacy of translation, we elaborate on the inherent loss of diverse ideas when only one language of science is used. Non-native speakers sometimes experience epistemic injustice due to their language proficiency and consequently, their scientific (...) insights get marginalized. Thus, it is important epistemically to include the results of all researchers independent of their native language. As a solution, we promote epistemic equity and inclusion both on the individual level and on the level of the scientific community. Epistemic equity means that researchers who suffer disadvantages because of their language skills get support from the rest of the scientific community that will compensate for their disadvantage and at the same time facilitate their epistemic inclusion. This can be achieved through the introduction of mitigating agents – the individuals and organizations that ought to serve as a communication bridge between individual researchers and the scientific community. (shrink)

The call to decolonise knowledge is gaining increasing popularity in African philosophy. But as scholarly attention to the topic intensifies, so do doubts about the usefulness of theorising it, especially in spaces – like Africa – that are riddled with deeper problems such as mass poverty and social disempowerment. I focus on three challenges that Bernard Matolino has recently issued. If these challenges are on the right track, they threaten to derail the whole project of epistemic decolonisation worldwide, since many (...) of the aspects of Africa that Matolino thinks make decolonial theorising unhelpful are shared by the rest of the Global South. In this paper, I develop a conception of epistemic decolonisation that is geared to withstanding such doubts in the contemporary African context, and can hopefully serve others in the Global South who share some of Africa’s problems. (shrink)

Reactivity is usually seen as a problem in the human sciences. In this paper I argue that in emancipatory activist research, reactivity can be an important tool. I discuss one example: the aim of mental decolonisation in indigenous activist research. I argue that mental decolonisation can be understood as the act of replacing harmful looping effects with new, emancipatory ones.

Kwasi Wiredu defines conceptual decolonisation as an activity in which Africans divest themselves of undue colonial influences, but his descriptions of this process are either unrelated to divesting or work quite generally, and not in favour of an African point of view. Wiredu's approach to decolonisation appears to be largely indistinguishable from the business of philosophy.

In her video and sound art practice, artist Shona Illingworth has extensively engaged with atmospheric environments as they are experienced physically and affectively. In the a multi-screen and sound installation, Topologies of Air, Illingworth addresses the conditions and discourses that define today’s perception and understandings of airspaces. This article closely examines Topologies of Air and further relates it to Illingworth’s art research practice, outlining key features and methodologies to argue that Illingworth’s decentralised approach to airspaces is rooted in an ethics (...) of air that fosters empathic understanding. This is congruent with the aim of proposing a new human right on the freedom to live without threats from above put forward through the Airspace Tribunal, an integral component of Illingworth’s project that she has developed in collaboration with human right expert, Nick Grief. (shrink)

This chapter examines the three projects that constitute contemporary African epistemology and suggests various ways in which they can be put on a firmer footing, and by so doing advance the epistemic goal of the discipline. These three projects include ethno-epistemology, analytic African epistemology and what one might call ameliorative African epistemology. Ethno-epistemology is the study of the phenomenon of knowledge from the perspective of particular African communities as revealed in their cultural heritage, proverbs, folklores, traditions, and practices. Analytic African (...) epistemology involves the philosophical study of concepts such as ‘knowledge,’ ‘justification,’ ‘belief’ and ‘truth’ from the African perspective using the methods of analysis, criticism, arguments, ordinary language philosophy, and so on. And finally, ameliorative African epistemology addresses the predicament of African knowledge systems and voices in the global knowledge and credibility economy within the broader context of the problem of epistemic injustice suffered by historically marginalized groups. (shrink)

Private funding of life sciences has been extensively criticized as lacking objectivity (e.g., Bekelman et al. 2003). However, it is also important to point out that public funding of life sciences faces many objections. In order to improve the system of publicly funded life sciences and its ability to respond to global health challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, we should focus on several aspects. First of all, providing existential stability for researchers, in turn, could result in the decrease of (...) academic misconduct. Secondly, COVID-19 vaccines come from all parts of the world and have to be distributed throughout the world, which is a strong argument in favor of the positive stimulation of global science conducted at less-known research institutions and throughout all countries. This brings us to the quest of working on epistemic decolonization and inclusion in contrast to the current elitist paradigm in science. Finally, publicly funded research, which is at the moment mainly focused on foundational questions, should also be extended to applied ones. Public funding of applied research would lead to its development independently of private financial interests. (shrink)