- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Development of social emotions and constructive agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?Amir Amin Yazdi, Tim P. German, Margaret Anne Defeyter & Michael Siegal - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):343-368.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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Realism and children's early grasp of mental representation: belief-based judgements in the state change task.Rebecca Saltmarsh, Peter Mitchell & Elizabeth Robinson - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):297-325.details
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On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.details
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Don’t Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-Belief Tasks.Paula Rubio-Fernández & Bart Geurts - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):835-850.details
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Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio-Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.details
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Solving belief problems: toward a task analysis.Daniel Roth & Alan M. Leslie - 1998 - Cognition 66 (1):1-31.details
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The relationship between parental mental-state language and 2.5-year-olds’ performance on a nontraditional false-belief task. [REVIEW]Erin Roby & Rose M. Scott - 2018 - Cognition 180 (C):10-23.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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Objects of desire, thought, and reality: Problems of anchoring discourse referents in development.Josef Perner, Bibiane Rendl & Alan Garnham - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):475–513.details
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He thinks he knows: And more developmental evidence against the simulation (role taking) theory.Josef Perner & Deborrah Howes - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):72-86.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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Social relations and understanding the intentional self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.details
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Understanding that looking causes knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.details
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The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.details
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Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.details
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The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks: A New Solution of the Paradox of False Belief Understanding.Albert Newen & Julia Wolf - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):717-744.details
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The basis for understanding belief.Paul E. Newton & Vasudevi Reddy - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (4):343–362.details
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Four-year-old humans are different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.details
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Empathy and Imagination.Nancy Sherman - 1998 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):82-119.details
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Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.details
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Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.details
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But what is the intentional schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.details
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.details
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Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.details
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Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?Peter Mitchell & Laura M. Taylor - 1999 - Cognition 70 (2):167-190.details
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