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Belief as construction: Inference and processing bias

In P. Mitchell & Kevin J. Riggs (eds.), Children's Reasoning and the Mind. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis (2000)

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  1. How do young children process beliefs about beliefs?: Evidence from response latency.Haruo Kikuno, Peter Mitchell & Fenja Ziegler - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):297–316.
    Are incorrect judgments on false belief tasks better explained within the framework of a conceptual change theory or a bias theory? Conceptual change theory posits a change in the form of reasoning from 3 to 4 years old while bias theory posits that processing factors are responsible for errors among younger children. The results from three experiments showed that children who failed a test of false belief took as long to respond as those who passed, and both groups of children (...)
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  • Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts.Sarah Hulme, Peter Mitchell & David Wood - 2003 - Cognition 87 (2):73-99.
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  • Theory-of-mind in individuals with Alström syndrome is related to executive functions, and verbal ability.Hans-Erik Frölander, Claes Möller, Mary Rudner, Sushmit Mishra, Jan D. Marshall, Heather Piacentini & Björn Lyxell - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • What is seen and what is not seen in the economy: An effect of our evolved psychology.Pascal Boyer & Michael Bang Petersen - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:e191.
    Specific features of our evolved cognitive architecture explain why some aspects of the economy are “seen” and others are “not seen.” Drawing from the commentaries of economists, psychologists, and other social scientists on our original proposal, we propose a more precise model of the acquisition and spread of folk-beliefs about the economy. In particular, we try to provide a clearer delimitation of the field of folk-economic beliefs (sect. R2) and to dispel possible misunderstandings of the role of variation in evolutionary (...)
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  • Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 77 (1):25-31.