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  1. Schizophrenia, reification and deadened life.Alastair Morgan - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (5):176-193.
    Recent debates concerning the abolition of the schizophrenia label in psychiatry have focused upon problems with the scientific status of the concept. In this article, I argue that rather than attacking schizophrenia for its lack of scientific validity, we should focus on the conceptual history of this label. I reconstruct a specific tradition when exploring the conceptual history of schizophrenia. This is the concern with the question of the sense of life itself, conducted through the confrontation with schizophrenia as a (...)
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  • Thought insertion as a disownership symptom.Michelle Maiese - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):911-927.
    Stephens and Graham maintain that in cases of thought insertion, the sense of ownership is preserved, but there is a defect in the sense of agency. However, these theorists overlook the possibility that subjectivity might be preserved despite a defect in the sense of ownership. The claim that schizophrenia centers upon a loss of a sense of ownership is supported by an examination of some of the other notable disownership symptoms of the disorder, such as bodily alienation and experiences of (...)
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  • The psychopathology of hyperreflexivity.Thomas Fuchs - 2010 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24 (3):239-255.
    The structure of human embodiment is fundamentally characterized by a polarity or ambiguity between Leib and Körper, the subjective body and the objectified body, or between being-body and having-a-body. This ambiguity, emphasized, above all, by Helmuth Plessner and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is also of crucial significance for psychopathology. Insofar as mental illnesses disturb or interrupt the unhindered conduct of one’s life, they also exacerbate the tension within embodiment that holds between being-body and having-a-body. In mental illnesses, there is a failure of (...)
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  • Corporealized and disembodied minds: A phenomenological view of the body in melancholia and schizophrenia.Thomas Fuchs - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):95-107.