There is an inherent need for education systems and mental health models to begin incorporating principles of non-local science in their approach to education for a population to gain general intelligence. Contemporary education is lagging in comparison with scientific progress due to the adoption of concepts that are considered outdated in current scientific terms. While education systems have not moved away from physical theories the scientific community began departing from this scientific framework in the year 1900 with the dawn of (...) the discovery of the Planck constant. The Bhagavata Purana provides a robust framework to encompass various spatial features of reality required to describe non-local sciences. This research attempts to assess the extent toward which the Bhagavata Purana can reconcile the various issues in contemporary scientific theory. Through review of Newton’s Principia Mathematica, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, articles on Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, various academic papers regarding quantum physics as well as published articles on topics of space and time, various reference frames used for perceiving reality is compared to the Bhagavata Purana. The research concludes that the true nature of time according to the Bhagavata is ontological and relative to the reference frame used by the observer to perceive reality and stresses that the only way to perceive the true ontological state of Time is through a practice called devotional service. This research also recommends that there should be further research done in this area through the phenomenological research of time and space. (shrink)

Much has been written on Newton’s concept of matter, as well as Newton’s laws. Meanwhile, the metaphysical and epistemological relationships between these two principal features of Newtonian philosophy are relatively unexplored. Among the existing accounts of the relationship between bodies and laws, two are especially compelling: the “law-constitutive” approach from Katherine Brading and the “formal-cause” approach from Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser. Both accounts argue that Newton’s bodies are (at least partially) metaphysically dependent on the laws. That is, according to (...) Brading, Biener, and Schliesser, Newtonian laws are ontologically prior to the bodies they govern. In this article, I reply to Brading, Biener, and Schliesser. I develop negative arguments against their approaches by closely examining three features of Newton’s ontology—forms, particles, and active principles—and their relationship to the laws. I also offer an explanation as to why “law-first” approaches have (understandably) dominated recent Newtonian exegesis. Finally, I present a positive argument for what I believe to be a superior alternative: Newton’s law-first approach is purely pragmatic. It is a feature of his experimental philosophy that we should begin our inquiry into the metaphysical constituents of the universe with the laws that arise from them. This does not entail, however, that Newton views laws as constituting or forming physical bodies. Newton’s metaphysics should be interpreted as “matter-first,” with bodies giving rise to laws, whereas his epistemology should be interpreted as “law-first,” with knowledge of laws giving rise to knowledge of bodies. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the metaphysical system developed in Cheyne’s Philosophical Principles of Religion. Cheyne was an early proponent of Newtonianism and tackled several philosophical questions raised by Newton’s work. The most pressing of these concerned the causal origin of gravitational attraction. Cheyne rejected the occasionalist explanations offered by several of his contemporaries in favor of a model on which God delegated special causal powers to bodies. Additionally, he developed an innovative approach to divine conservation. This allowed him to argue that (...) Newton’s findings provided evidence for God’s existence and providence without the need for continuous divine intervention in the universe. (shrink)

Newton began his Principia with three Axiomata sive Leges Motus. We offer an interpretation of Newton’s dual label and investigate two tensions inherent in his account of laws. The first arises from the juxtaposition of Newton’s confidence in the certainty of his laws and his commitment to their variability and contingency. The second arises because Newton ascribes fundamental status both to the laws and to the bodies and forces they govern. We argue the first is resolvable, but the second is (...) not. However, the second tension shows that Newton conceives laws as formal causes of bodies and forces. This neo-Aristotelian conception goes missing in Kantian accounts of laws, as well as accounts that stress laws’ grounding in powers and capacities. (shrink)

We may distinguish two interpretations of the relation between Newton’s natural philosophy and Hume’s science of human nature. The first interpretation can be called ‘traditional,’ the second ‘critical.’ This article will not side with either readings of Hume’s Newtonianism (or with some middle positions). Instead, essential points of confluence and divergence will be discussed.