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  1. Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science.Peter Millican - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):647-712.
    The ‘New Hume’ interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about ‘thick’ Causal powers, has been largely motivated by his evident commitment to causal language and causal science. In this, however, it is fundamentally misguided, failing to recognise how Hume exploits his anti-realist conclusions about (upper-case) Causation precisely to support (lower-case) causal science. When critically examined, none of the standard New Humean arguments — familiar from the work of Wright, Craig, Strawson, Buckle, Kail, and others — retains any significant force (...)
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  • Hume’s Determinism.Peter Millican - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):611-642.
    David Hume has traditionally been assumed to be a soft determinist or compatibilist, at least in the ‘reconciling project’ that he presents in Section 8 of the first Enquiry, entitled ‘Of liberty and necessity.’ Indeed, in encyclopedias and textbooks of Philosophy he is standardly taken to be one of the paradigm compatibilists, rivalled in significance only by Hobbes within the tradition passed down through Locke, Mill, Schlick and Ayer to recent writers such as Dennett and Frankfurt. Many Hume scholars also (...)
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  • Hume's Fork, and His Theory of Relations.Peter Millican - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):3-65.
  • Excuses for Hume's Skepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.
  • The Two Definitions and the Doctrine of Necessity.Helen Beebee - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):413-431.
  • Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
    Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I (...)
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