Disputants in the debate regarding whether Hume's argument on induction is descriptive or normative have by and large ignored Hume’s positive argument (that custom is what determines inferences to the unobserved), largely confining themselves to intricate debates within the negative argument (that inferences to the unobserved are not founded on reason). I believe that this is a mistake, for I think Hume’s positive argument to have significant implications for the interpretation of his negative argument. In this paper, I will argue (...) that Hume’s positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues, whether normative or causal. I will then focus on the Enquiry version of Hume’s positive argument, arguing that it carries a significant normative conclusion: there, Hume argues that custom plays a normative role in justifying our inductive inferences. Given that Hume’s positive argument should be read as addressing the same issues as his negative argument, we should correspondingly read Hume’s negative argument in the Enquiry as having a normative conclusion. (shrink)

Hume has traditionally been understood as an inductive sceptic with positivist tendencies, reducing causation to regular succession and anticipating the modern distinctions between analytic and synthetic, deduction and induction. The dominant fashion in recent Hume scholarship is to reject all this, replacing the ‘Old Hume’ with various New alternatives. Here I aim to counter four of these revisionist readings, presenting instead a broadly traditional interpretation but with important nuances, based especially on Hume’s later works. He asked that we should treat (...) these— notably the first Enquiry—as his authoritative philosophical statements, and with good reason. (shrink)

The ‘New Hume’ interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about ‘thick’ Causal powers, has been largely motivated by his evident commitment to causal language and causal science. In this, however, it is fundamentally misguided, failing to recognise how Hume exploits his anti-realist conclusions about (upper-case) Causation precisely to support (lower-case) causal science. When critically examined, none of the standard New Humean arguments — familiar from the work of Wright, Craig, Strawson, Buckle, Kail, and others — retains any significant force (...) against the plain evidence of Hume's; texts. But the most devastating objection comes from Hume's own applications of his analysis of causation, to the questions of ‘the immateriality of the soul’ and ‘liberty and necessity’. These show that the New Hume interpretation has misunderstood the entire purpose of his ‘Chief Argument’, and presented him as advocating some of the very positions he is arguing most strongly against. (shrink)

In this article I suggest that section VIII of Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding could be read as a contribution to the foundational issues of a characteristic 18th-century enterprise, namely the ‘science of man’. More specifically, it can be read as a summary of his attempt to place this science on an experimental footing, with an awareness of the lessons he has drawn in the previous sections of the Enquiry. This interpretation fits with an overall reading of the work as (...) responding to the epistemological problems that arise in the context of then-contemporary ways of knowledge production. As I argue, this section is relevant for the methodology of a science of human nature. The main problems it addresses are the following. What kind of knowledge can we hope for about human beings, and how should we pursue it? What are the meaningful questions that can be asked, and what is beyond the reach of this kind of inquiry? Answering these questions sets the scope and limits of this science. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p229 Tanto no Tratado da Natureza Humana como na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano , Hume mostra-se convencido de que “não há acaso no mundo”, e que “aquilo que o vulgo chama de acaso não passa de uma causa secreta e escondida”. Essa tese desempenha papel crucial em sua análise do livre-arbítrio e, conseguintemente, da responsabilidade moral; é também um elemento importante em sua discussão sobre os milagres. No entanto, o próprio Hume ofereceu, no Tratado , um argumento convincente para (...) mostrar que o princípio de causalidade, segundo o qual tudo o que começa a existir tem uma causa, não pode ser conhecido a priori , por intuição ou demonstração. Logo, essa “opinião tem necessariamente de provir da observação e experiência”. O presente trabalho examina essa tese, mostrando, inicialmente, qual era a proposta de Hume para fundar na experiência o princípio de causalidade, e depois qual, de fato, teria sido o mais robusto fundamento para esse princípio: a mecânica newtoniana. Explica-se, por fim, como esse fundamento empírico indireto e o próprio argumento de Hume foram solapados pela física quântica, no século XX. (shrink)

Physical determinism is a metaphysical thesis about the natural world whose consequences for freedom and moral responsibility have been widely discussed. In this paper, I articulate a different form of determinism, motivational determinism, which claims that all intentional action is causally determined by the prior motivational state of the agent. Motivational determinism was defended in a simple form by Hume, but has been neglected in recent philosophical literature. I show that there are important reasons that support the plausibility of MD. (...) I then compare MD with libertarian and physical deterministic theories of agency and note that MD has various attractive features. I show that MD is much more threatening to moral responsibility than physical determinism. I conclude that MD is an interesting theory of human agency that deserves wide attention. (shrink)

Physical determinism is a metaphysical thesis about the natural world whose consequences for freedom and moral responsibility have been widely discussed. In this paper, I articulate a different form of determinism, motivational determinism, which claims that all intentional action is causally determined by the prior motivational state of the agent. Motivational determinism was defended in a simple form by Hume, but has been neglected in recent philosophical literature. I show that there are important reasons that support the plausibility of MD. (...) I then compare MD with libertarian and physical deterministic theories of agency and note that MD has various attractive features. I show that MD is much more threatening to moral responsibility than physical determinism. I conclude that MD is an interesting theory of human agency that deserves wide attention. (shrink)