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  1. Non-Human Animals Feel Pain in a Morally Relevant Sense.James Simpson - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (1):329-336.
    In a recent article in this journal, Calum Miller skillfully and creatively argues for the counterintuitive view that there aren’t any good reasons to believe that non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense. By Miller’s lights, such reasons are either weak in their own right or they also favor the view that non-human animals don’t feel morally relevant pain. In this paper, I explain why Miller’s view is mistaken. In particular, I sketch a very reasonable abductive argument for (...)
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  • Neo-Cartesianism and the expanded problem of animal suffering.Phil Halper, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf & Perry N. Fuchs - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (2):177-198.
    Several well-known theodicies, whatever their merits, seem to make little sense of animal suffering. Here we argue that the problem of animal suffering has more layers than has generally been acknowledged in the literature and thus poses an even greater challenge to traditional Judeo-Christian Theism than is normally thought. However, the Neo-Cartesian (NC) defence would succeed in defanging this Expanded Problem of Animal Suffering. Several contemporary philosophers have suggested that recent evidence either supports the NC view or at least should (...)
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