Nondirective genetic counseling developed as a means of promoting informed and independent decision-making. To the extent that it minimizes risks of coercion, this counseling approach effectively respects client autonomy. However, it also permits clients to make partially informed, poorly reasoned or ethically questionable choices, and denies counselors a means of demonstrating accountability for the use of their services. These practical and ethical tensions result from an excessive focus on noncoercion while neglecting the contribution of adequate information and deliberative competence to (...) autonomous decision-making. A counseling approach that emphasizes the role of deliberation may more reliably produce thoroughly reasoned decisions. In such an approach, characterized by dialogue, counselors are responsible for ensuring that decisions are fully informed and carefully deliberated. Counseling remains nonprescriptive, but in the course of discussion counselors may introduce unsolicited information and/or challenge what they believe are questionable choices. By this means clients can be better assured that the decisions they make are fully considered, while counselors demonstrate a limited degree of professional accountability. (shrink)

The traditional legal verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as well as the more recent verdict of guilty but mentally ill rest on often unquestioned epistemological assumptions about human behavior and its causes, unjustified reliance on forensic psychiatrists, and questionable, if not deplorable ethical standards. This paper offers a critique of legal perspectives on insanity, historical and current, based on the altermative epistemological and ethical assumptions of Thomas S. Szasz. In addition, we examine Szasz''s unique rhetorical analysis of (...) mental illness and its implications for forensic psychiatry. (shrink)

In healthcare ethics there is a discussion regarding whether autonomy of personal preferences, what sometimes is referred to as authenticity, is necessary for autonomous decision-making. It has been argued that patients’ decisions that lack sufficient authenticity could be deemed as non-autonomous and be justifiably overruled by healthcare staff. The present paper discusses this issue in relation certain psychiatric disorders. It takes its starting point in recent qualitative studies of the experiences and thoughts of patients’ with anorexia nervosa where issues related (...) to authenticity seem particularly relevant. The paper examines different interpretations of authenticity relevant for autonomy and concludes that the concept, as it has been elaborated in recent debate, is highly problematic to use as a criterion for autonomous decision-making in healthcare. (shrink)

Different ideas of the normative relevance of autonomy can give rise to profoundly different action-guiding principles in healthcare. If autonomy is seen as a value rather than as a right, it can be argued that patients’ decisions should sometimes be overruled in order to protect or promote their own autonomy. We refer to this as paternalism in the name of autonomy. In this paper, we discuss different elements of autonomy (decision-making capacity, efficiency, and authenticity) and arguments in favor of paternalism (...) for the sake of autonomy that have been proposed in the bioethical debate. We argue that if autonomy is valuable, then paternalism for the sake of autonomy may be justified. However, policies allowing paternalism in the name of autonomy may be self-defeating. (shrink)

In a qualitative study, 22 stroke patients undergoing rehabilitation in three nursing homes were interviewed about constraints on and improvements in their autonomy and about approaches of health professionals regarding autonomy. The data were analysed using grounded theory, with a particular focus on the process of regaining autonomy. An approach by the health professionals that was responsive to changes in the patients’ autonomy was found to be helpful for restoration of their autonomy. Two patterns in health professionals’ approach appeared to (...) be facilitatory: (1) from full support on admission through moderate support and supervision, to reduced supervision at discharge; and (2) from paternalism on admission through partial paternalism (regarding treatment) to shared decision making at discharge. The approach experienced by the patients did not always match their desires regarding their autonomy. Support and supervision were reduced over time, but paternalism was often continued too long. Additionally, the patients experienced a lack of information. Tailoring interventions to patients’ progress in autonomy would stimulate their active participation in rehabilitation and in decision making, and would improve patients’ preparation for autonomous living after discharge. (shrink)

Terms such as ‘cultural competence’ and ‘transcultural nursing’ have comfortably taken their place in the lexicon of health care. Their high profile is a reflection of the diversity of western societies and health care’s commitment to provide care that is responsive to the values and beliefs of all who require treatment. However, the relationship between cultural competence and familiar ethical concepts such as patient autonomy has been an uneasy one. This article explores the moral foundations of cultural competence, ultimately locating (...) them in patient autonomy and patient good. The discussion of patient good raises questions about the moral relevance of a value’s rootedness in a particular culture. I argue that the moral justification for honoring cultural values has more to do with the fact that patients are strongly committed to them than it does with their cultural rootedness. Finally, I suggest an organizational approach to cultural competence that emphasizes overall organizational preparedness. (shrink)

Even though respect for integrity is hailed in several authoritative legal and ethical documents, and is typically presented as a complement to respect for autonomy, it is largely neglected in many leading works in ethics. Is such neglect warranted, or does it express a prejudice? This article argues that the latter is the case, and that this is due to misplaced conceptual concerns. It offers some proposals as regards the conceptualization of integrity in social ethics in general and in biomedical (...) ethics in particular. Five main directions of interpretation of “integrity” are discerned and shown to be relevant for different areas of biomedical ethics. The defense of respect for integrity is served by a softening of principlism and by greater attention to context among the initial critics of this principle. (shrink)

The notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or “true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to (...) live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making requires that the decision-maker’s desires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is argued that a method to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories of authenticity is introduced and applied to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach of treating them individually. The conclusion is drawn that, (...) in practice, the authenticity of desires cannot be reliably determined. It is suggested that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent practices in healthcare. (shrink)