In his new book, Knowledge: The Philosophical Quest in History, Steve Fuller returns to core themes of his program of social epistemology that he first outlined in his 1988 book, Social Epistemology. He develops a new, unorthodox theology and philosophy building upon his testimony in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District in defense of intelligent design, leading to a call for maximal human experimentation. Beginning from the theological premise rooted in the Abrahamic religious tradition that we are created in the (...) image of God, Fuller argues that the spark of the divine within us distinguishes us from animals. I argue that Fuller’s recent work takes us away from key insights of his original work. In contrast, I advocate for a program of social epistemology rooted in evolutionary science rather than intelligent design, emphasize a precautionary and ecological approach rather than a proactionary approach that favors risky human experimentation, and attend to our material and sociological embeddedness rather than a transhumanist repudiation of the body. (shrink)

It is argued that there are good scientific grounds for accepting that cognition functions in a way that reflects embodiment. This represents a more holistic, systemic way of thinking about human beings, and contributes to the coordination of scientific assumptions about mind and body with those of the faith traditions, moving us beyond sterile debates about reductionism. It has been claimed by Francisco Varela and others that there is an affinity between Buddhism and embodied cognition, though it is argued here (...) that they are less closely aligned than is sometimes assumed. Embodied cognition also accords well with the holistic strand of thinking about human nature in Judeo-Christian thinking. While accepting the persuasiveness of the general case for cognition being embodied it is suggested here that some forms of cognition are more embodied than others, and that it may be one of the distinctive features of humans that they have developed a capacity for relatively nonembodied forms of cognition. (shrink)

I claim that explanations of human behaviour by Edward O. Wilsonand Charles Lumsden are constituted by a religiously functioningmetaphysics: emergent materialism. The constitutive effects areidentified using six criteria, beginning with a metaphorical re-description of dissimilarities between levels of organization interms of the lower level, and consist of conceptual andexplanatory reductions (CER). Wilson and Lumsden practice CER,even though CER is not required by emergent materialism. Theypreconceive this practice by a re-description which conflates thelevels of organization and explain failure of CER in (...) terms oftechnical, not ontological or epistemological reasons. Iinterpret these three practices as a reaction of Wilson againsthis early Christian religious beliefs. Statements by Wilsonindicate this reaction ultimately constitutes his explanations ofsocial, moral and religious behaviour.Tested knowledge about matter at the lower level functions as ametaphysical belief when applied to the higher level becausethere it is untested. I offer twelve criteria for the diagnosisof religious functions of this metaphysical materialism, five ofwhich are satisfied. I show that the constitutive effects of thismaterialism in sociobiology are due to its religious functions,are beneficial for science and do not destroy its public nature. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone analizar la posición de Daniel Dennett con respecto a la realidad y naturaleza del yo. El autor considera que la concepción del yo humano propia del sentido común, en tanto que un elemento único, simple, idéntico y continuo, es fundamentalmente una ficción. A partir de este diagnóstico, Dennett se propone ofrecer una explicación de este fenómeno ilusorio desde una doble perspectiva: la heterofenomenología y la memética. La primera y segunda parte de este trabajo estarán destinadas (...) a desarrollar respectivamente estos dos enfoques. En la tercera parte serán analizadas las afirmaciones hechas por el autor dentro de los mencionados marcos teóricos, con el objetivo de mostrar que ambos desarrollos no se complementan entre sí, sino que, por el contrario, presentan ciertas contradicciones a la hora de reconstruir la postura dennettiana global con respecto al yo humano. (shrink)

For many theologians and philosophers, scientism is among the greatest of intellectual sins. In its most commonly cited form, scientism consists in claiming that science is the only source of real knowledge and, therefore, that what science does not discover does not exist. Because the charge of scientism is frequently levied, it is important to be clear about what exactly is being claimed in its name. I argue that scientism can best be understood as a fallacy, specifically as a kind (...) of category mistake. Being clear about this requires an examination of the relationship of scientism to the question of demarcation between science and nonscience, a question that has potential implications for theology. (shrink)

This essay compares Robert John Russell's work in his recent book Cosmology from Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of Theology and Science (2008) to that of the authors known collectively as "the new atheists." I treat the latter as recent contributors to the modern tradition of scientific naturalism. This tradition makes claims to legitimacy on the basis of its close relations to the natural sciences. The purpose of this essay is to show up the poverty of the naturalist (...) tradition's scientific credentials by contrasting it with Russell's careful account of positive relations between science and Christian theology. (shrink)

This article focuses on the simultaneous co-existence of mythological and descriptive thinking in common sense discourse. Specifically, it concentrates on the synthesis of types of thought in those understandings that are characterized by the well-known expression having (one’s) two-feet-on-the-ground. In order to provide concreteness for the meaning of the expression, I investigated Estonian cyberspace as one of the most prevalent arenas of common sense discourse, and it appeared that two-feet-on-the-ground is used to refer to rationality, sanity and practicality as opposed (...) to, for example, dreamers, bohemians and people who talk about karma or believe in UFOs. People who use having (one’s) two-feet-on-the-ground as a key element in their self-description assume that the way they understand the world is more rational and closer to reality than that of bohemians and spiritualists. Behind the above-mentioned two notions, which in themselves are not easy to define, there is a gleam of a more general tendency of Western thought. This is the conclusion reached by Rein Vihalemm, who has argued that what is accepted as truthful knowledge on the level of common sense is usually understood as being synonymous with scientific knowledge; in turn, the notion of the scientific is usually connected with inductive-empirical science. This article argues that the understandings that are posited as having two-feet-on-the-ground are mixed with categories that cannot be considered as belonging to inductive-empirical logic. The question of values, metaphysics and teleology is always (at least implicitly) present in those representations. That idea seems to be natural in academic discourse but is not as self-evident on the common-sense level. Those who describe themselves as standing with their two-feet-on-the-ground usually think of metaphysics and teleology as being subjective, useless and distant. In describing the specificity of the logic of two-feet-on-the-ground representations, it is fruitful to use the meta-language of cultural semiotics. This allows for the explication of two fundamental and fundamentally different ways of constructing knowledge: mythological and descriptive logics of signification. The general parameters of mythological thinking are that objects belong in the same class and they cannot be organized in intersections or categories. The other aspect that is characteristic of mythological thinking is that the world is structured according to a binary logic – it is divided into Good and Evil, right and wrong, order and chaos. Non-mythological thinking is based on creating abstractions and organizing objects according to the principles of logic. The main structural operation of mythological thinking is the creation of analogies. Descriptive thinking focuses on the relations of chronology, particular-general and cause-effect. Two-feet-on-the-ground understandings have a tendency to create a holistic approach that connects mythological and descriptive thinking. If a statement is recognized as having (one’s) two-feet-on-theground, i.e. if it contains schemes, calculations, formulae or other items that indicate scientificity (=inductive- empirical) etc., then it is likely that at the common-sense level it is perceived as something good=valuable=rational. Some radical two-feet-on-the-ground representations can even use the apparatus of scientific discourse to explain the purpose of life or the way God connects with his addressees during mystical experiences. I do not mean to imply that the presence of mythological thinking in those understandings is bad or dangerous. I agree with Lotman's idea that it is, instead, unavoidable because in contemporary culture pure forms of mythological or descriptive thinking do not exist: they are always entangled to some extent. However, I do think that not acknowledging a high concentration of mythological thinking in understandings that posit themselves as two-feet-on-the-ground can be a bit tricky because resorting to a purely practical interpretation of the phrase (and the understanding) can result in its manipulative use by demagogues who act under the aegis of science. (shrink)

Remedios and Dusek have provided a useful contextualization of Steve Fuller’s recent work in social epistemology. While they have provided some good criticisms of some of Fuller’s new ideas, they fail to provide a systematic critique of Fuller’s retreat from a naturalistic and materialist social epistemology for one embracing transhumanism, intelligent design, and the proactionary imperative. An alternative approach is developed, drawing on Fuller’s early work and incorporating recent work on our biological and cultural evolution as a species.

: The change of territory from religion to spirituality in our secular societies has given rise to the so-called naturalized spirituality within the naturalist tradition. We critically discuss O.W. Flanagan and S. Harris’ proposals and the contemporary naturalist ethos in which they appear.

Searching for common ground in philosophy, science and theology, it seems to us that it would be reasonable to maintain the position of realistic pragmatism that Charles Sanders Peirce had called pragmaticism. In the pragmaticist manner, we typify the knowledge and select the types of knowledge that might be useful for understanding the problems that are of interest to us. We pose a question of how it would be possible to obtain practically useful information about reality, first from the perspective (...) of natural sciences, and then from that of theology; that is, to diversify the ways of knowledge and just maybe, to move toward a productive dialogue between science and religion. (shrink)

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (...) (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail. (shrink)

. In this essay I point toward the difficulties inherent in ontological objectivity and seek to restore our truth claims to validity through a relational ontology and the dynamic of coimplication in signals and noise. Theological examination of art and science points toward similarities between art, religion, and science. All three have often focused upon a “metaphysics of presence,” the desire for absolute presence of the object . If we accept a relational ontology, however, we must accept that the revelation (...) of presence is always simultaneously a concealment. This helps explain technoscientific achievement without recourse to a philosophically flawed objectivity. Twentieth‐century information theory shows the impossibility of a “pure signal.” By accepting that signal and noise are permanently interconnected, we begin to see how noise makes signal possible and even how noise becomes signal . Information theory thus underscores important similarities and leads toward new approaches in aesthetics, Christian theology, and scientific research. By comparing art, religion, and science, I argue that rejecting a metaphysics of presence without rejecting presence itself allows human beings to know the world. Although religion, science, and art often seek the absolute presence of their objects, they function better without. (shrink)

The aim of the present volume is to draw the balance of naturalism's success so far.

Easy-care or natural lambing pertainsto those sheep able to successfully lamb andrear at least one lamb without human assistancein a difficult environment. Such sheep may havea higher survival rate, lower lamb mortality,and require less shepherding at lambing thanother sheep breeds or strains. The farmer orshepherd account of easy-care lambing revealsseveral themes. Firstly, stock were bred tosurvive or suit local environments orconditions, particularly steep hill country inNew Zealand. This involved extensive culling ofundesirable dams, regardless of how well theymight perform in traits (...) other than the abilityto survive and to produce live lambs atweaning. Sheep that did have problems wereoften assisted, recorded or marked and thenculled at an appropriate time; thus bothartificial (culling) and natural selection wereused. Secondly, natural selection enabled theimportant traits to be identified and they weresubsequently incorporated into artificialselection programs. Thirdly, the practice wasnecessitated by the impracticality ofsupervising lambing in difficult terrain andthe cost of skilled farm labor. Finally, it wasacknowledged that disturbance at lambingcreated problems and most importantly, theeasy-care approach reduced some of the problemstraditionally associated with lambing.Easy-care lambing systems thus aim to minimizesome of the detrimental effects associated withcarefully supervised lambing in someenvironments, by selecting sheep to suit boththat environment and modern farm management.They overcame pervasive influences our culturallegacy was exerting on the way we interact withanimals, and may have produced a system more inkeeping with the biology of the animal in anextensive environment. (shrink)

The term Sustainable Development has been used in many different contexts and consequently has come to represent many different ideas. The purpose of this paper was to explore the underlying meaning of the term Sustainable Development, and to assess the dominant ethic behind such meaning. Through this exploration, we uncovered a change in the semantic meaning of the term, and described what that meaning entails. The term Sustainable Development had the potential, we argue, to stimulate discursive engagement with respect to (...) the future development of society within an ethical framework based around the values of inclusivity, diversity, and integration. The importance of philosophical context within which the term is used influences the definitional process of meaning, and has been simulated into the language of the dominant scientific-economic paradigm. We go on to explore how this meaning change has come about. In doing so we looked to the Enlightenment period and the resulting philosophies to explore the foundations of meaning, and then to the work of Jürgen Habermas to explain how the scientific-economic paradigm came to dominate the meaning of Sustainable Development. (shrink)

“Religion and science” often is understood as being about the relationship between two given enterprises, religion and science. I argue that it is more accurate to understand religion and science in different contexts differently. (1) It serves as apologetics for science in a religious environment. As apologetics for technology the role of religion‐and‐science is more ambivalent, as competing and contrary responses to modern technology find articulation in religious terms. (2) In the political context of the modern university, some invoke religion‐and‐science (...) in arguing for a place of theology alongside the sciences. In this context, secular studies of religion are a major challenge, which is hardly addressed. (3) Within the religious communities, religion‐and‐science is a battleground between revisionist and traditionalist ways of understanding religion. (shrink)

Some philosophers have become atheists because of “intellectual probity.” Martin Buber relates two occasions during which he advocated his view of the term “God” and rejected alternative perspectives. He never justified the basis for either his advocacy or his rejection, yet both play an important role in all his writing, especially his specific type of Zionism. Using what has been called the mere theism of William James’ “The Will to Believe” and the criteria for faith that James advances in that (...) essay illuminates both Buber’s general view of the divine and more particularly his Zionism. Once Buber, no less than James, is understood as a mere theist the basis of what he accepts and what he rejects as true religion becomes clearer. Buber’s theism meets James’ requirement of being a live, forced, momentous option and his Zionism also strives to meet those standards. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo queremos abordar un problema que tiene que ver con la creciente obsolescencia de los seres humanos en el contexto de sociedades que son, al mismo tiempo, ultratecnológicas, hiperconsumistas y de mercado. Pretendemos ahondar críticamente en las condiciones psicosociales y antropológicas de un mundo donde las mujeres y los hombres van quedando _rebasados _por una combinación a veces explosiva de velocidad mercantil y capitalismo mundializado. La tecnofilia, verdadero fetichismo de nuestro tiempo, opera a pleno rendimiento como uno (...) de los discursos ideológicos legitimadores de ese proceso histórico por medio del cual los hombres empequeñecen ante su propia creación; hombres _desbordados _por la potencia apabullante de un conjunto de desarrollos tecnocientíficos que, y esto es crucial, se despliegan con relativa e inquietante autonomía y siguiendo dinámicas que en muchas ocasiones no responden a necesidades humanas reales. La tecnología, que nunca es políticamente inocente, adquiere proporciones y alcances inusitados cuando, además, su despliegue responde a una lógica acumulativa capitalista de carácter ilimitado. Es esta problemática, por lo tanto, la que pretende ser dilucidada desde un marco antropológico y filosófico. (shrink)

Though we humans are immensely more gifted than other animals, yet we are not the outcome of an inevitable selection of the ‘fittest’. Nor on the other hand is our importance diminished by our evolutionary inheritance. Besides, we are already here! Faith in inevitable progress is a ‘scientific’, not a Christian, delusion. We realise that the universe has its own rules and complications which intrude on our lives and often thwart our choices. It is therefore legitimate to talk of chance, (...) but we often fail to appreciate the real significance of this word. Chance is not a cause; in essence it refers to our own consciousness that we are immersed in circumstance, and it has no reality without our own purposiveness. Thus chance is not some blind and indifferent or even hostile cosmic mystery; it is the occasion of our own responses, and it even offers the opportunity of human growth. Just as we accept the laws (and dangers) of physics (e.g. gravitation), as the framework of our ordered existence, so also we may accept the surprises of chance without any despairing conclusion either from our latest researches in astronomy or from a fatal accident in the street. (shrink)

The paper provides a brief introduction to Midgley's person and work, and an overview of The Biscuit Tin memorial event-series in honor of Midgley.