Each thinker, according to Heidegger, essentially thinks one thought. Plato thinks the idea. Descartes thinks the cogito . Spinoza thinks substance. Nietzsche thinks the will to power. If a thinker does not think a thought, then he or she is not a thinker. He or she may be a scholar or a professor, a producer or a consumer, a fan or a fake, but he or she would not be a thinker. Thus, if Heidegger is a thinker, he essentially thinks (...) one thought. What is Heidegger’s one thought? It is neither life nor death, neither me nor you. It is neither technology nor art. It is neither spirit nor language. Heidegger’s one thought is being—or more precisely, the question of the meaning of being. And what is being? Neither presence nor absence--but rather, an ambiguous uncertainty. (shrink)

Se examina la noción de institución de un sentimiento, que Merleau-Ponty expone en curso en el College de France, y se toma como caso ejemplar el amor, en particular, el de Swann, descrito por M. Proust. Se delinea primero la noción central de institución, para trazar luego los principales aspectos de la institución del amor y confrontar así la visión de ambos autores. The aim of the following article is to examine the notion of the institution of a feeling, as (...) presented by Merleau-Ponty in his Course Notes from the Collège de France, using love as an example; we will more specifically analyze Swann's love, described by M. Proust. In order to achieve our aim, we will first try to delimit the core notion of institution. We will then outline the main aspects in the institution of love and compare both of the authors' visions. (shrink)

This work tries to show that the metapoetic meditation developed by Ramos Rosa throughout his very extensive poetic work not only did not condemn his poetry to a cold cloister in the textual plane, but also contributed decisively to the opening to the real, to the effect of evidence and to the sense of communion that would become increasingly sensitive in his writing. To this end, we propose to clarify the thread that, under the aegis of the poetic lucidity consecrated (...) by the author, leads us from his metapoetic meditation to a poetic meditation of an ontophenomenological and sapiential nature, that is, from his metapoetry to a poetry whose wisdom provides a set of intuitions with a sapiential and philosophical accent. It is our intention to contribute, in this way, to the understanding of the (cognitive and ontological) demand and scope of Rosa’s poetic path, as well as, collaterally, to the debate around topics such as poetic (self-)reference, the ontological status of the poetic text or the philosophy-literature relationship. (shrink)

This study explores the pathways from the aspiration to make a difference in the world to vision and action of social entrepreneurs. Based on the qualitative analysis of interviews with 23 individuals who have pioneered institutions and initiatives around corporate responsibility, we find two predominant pathways to vision. The deliberate path starts with aspiration and moves through purpose toward a relatively intentional vision that ultimately leads to, and is subsequently informed by, action. The emergent path also begins with aspiration then (...) moves directly to action and only retrospectively to a sense of a vision behind the actions taken. The emergent path, in which action precedes vision, is contrary to the dominant assumption that vision leads to action in an entrepreneurial context and may be further characterized as either inadvertent or developmental. In advancing a conceptual model of the vision–action or action–vision trajectories of social entrepreneurs, this study highlights the iterative nature of vision. This study also demonstrates the importance of considering formative experiences that contribute to the aspiration to make some kind of a difference in the world, a sense of purpose or intentions, and core values and beliefs in examining the ethicality of social entrepreneurship. (shrink)

La pregunta por el tiempo, junto a la pregunta por el cuerpo y el lenguaje, ocupa un lugar central en la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty. La restitución ontológica de la vida sensible, corporal -proyecto en el que se podría enmarcar toda su obra- lleva consigo una revisión de la idea del tiempo. El tiempo, sostiene Merleau-Ponty, se forma en nuestra experiencia corporal. Este tiempo en 'gestación', en 'estado naciente', es lo que el autor llama tiempo salvaje. Este trabajo se centra en (...) mostrar que la concepción del sentido en la obra de Merleau-Ponty -particularmente sus reflexiones sobre el sentido de la experiencia sensible y del lenguaje- se encuentra atravesada por la idea de un tiempo salvaje. Esta idea la desarrollamos en tres apartados: 1. introducción, 2. El ser salvaje del tiempo y la formación del sentido y 3. Tiempo y lenguaje. The question of the time, along with the question of the body and language, is central to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. The ontological restitution of the sensible, corporal life -project in which all his work- could be framed, and carries itself a review of the idea of time. "Time" says Merleau-Ponty, is formed in our body experience. This time in 'period of gestation' in 'nascent state', is what the author will call wild time. This work focuses on showing how the conception of the sense in the work of Merleau-Ponty, particularly his reflections on the sense of the sensible experience and the language, which is crossed by the idea of a wild time. We develop this idea into three sections: 1. introduction, 2. The wild being of the time and the formation of the sense and 3. Time and language. (shrink)

Nuestro punto de partida es la concepción de Merleau-Ponty del lenguaje como "habla". Sostenemos que esta, como experiencia corporal del lenguaje -como lenguaje "en" nosotros-, permite comprender el fenómeno de la /nter-culturalidad como un fenómeno esencialmente /ntra-cultural, en el sentido de una experiencia de la cultura "desde dentro", es decir, desde la experiencia que cada quien hace del lenguaje. Este carácter endógeno e individual de pensar la cultura pone en evidencia, sin embargo, un "entre-lazamiento" recíproco originario entre lo propio y (...) lo extraño que impide de entrada privilegiar ya sea una visión universalista o totalizante o bien individualista o regionalista de la cultura. En dos momentos doy cuenta de este planteamiento: 1. Mundo de la vida y diversidad cultural y 2. El habla como lugar de acceso a las culturas. Our starting point is the conception in Merleau Ponty of language as "speech". We support this concept as corporal experience of language -as language "in" us - allows to understand the phenomenon of ¿nter-culturality as an essentially ¿ntra-cultural phenomenon, in the sense of an experience of culture "from within", that is to say; from the experience that everyone does with the language. This endogenous and individual character of thinking about culture highlights, however, a reciprocal "entanglement" originated among one's own and the strange that initially prevents to privilege, even a universal or totalizing or either an individualistic or regionalist vision of culture. Two moments I take on this approach: 1. World of life and cultural diversity. 2. Speech as an access place to the cultures. (shrink)

In this article I focus on a specific knot in the articulated and, as Paul Ricœur famously said, “heretical” constellation of French phenomenology. The aim is to account for a transition that appears to be particularly interesting from both a theoretical and a historical point of view: that from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s recasting and overcoming the lifeworld in terms of all-encompassing and more originary conceptions of Being and Nature during the 1950s and the 1960s, to the radical transgression (...) of the phenomenological horizon itself accomplished by their disciple Jean-François Lyotard between the 1950s and the 1970s. As I will argue, far from being simply sidelined, in Lyotard the theme of the lifeworld is instead deconstructed in favor of a dramatic and “scattered” picture of the shattering impact of capitalism and modern technologies on our daily experience. Within this context, art and aesthetic experience become a privileged site of exploration and experimentation. (shrink)

Several works published in the last decades defend the claim that the concept of creativity should be demystified. With the aim of showing that creativity is not an obscure power owned by only few individuals and free from constraints, authors working at the intersection field between philosophy and cognitive science have notably focused on the structure and evolution of cognitive mechanisms underlying our creative capacities. While taking up the suggestion that we should try not to mystify creativity, this article argues (...) that what is required for such demystification is primarily a transcendental and phenomenological inquiry. Kant’s and Merleau-Ponty’s works are here discussed in order to develop such a transcendental inquiry into creativity. Both Kant and Merleau-Ponty bring to the fore the conditions of possibility for creative acts, and highlight fundamental role of creativity itself in the formation of meaningfulness. The keystone of both philosophers’ inquiries is the emphasis on the interdependence between creativity and rules. Yet, due to the different approaches to the transcendental, Kant’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts do not fully converge, but should rather be considered as complementary. (shrink)

The transition from “natural” sensation to “phenomenological” perception is revealed since the dynamic temporality within perception is elaborated by Merleau-Ponty. Inheriting Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness and clarifying temporal elements within body schema, Merleau-Ponty assimilates phenomenological temporality into phenomenal body. With the analyses of spatial synthesis in terms of “depth,” the original unity between temporality of perception and spatiality of body is illuminated. It makes the transition from “temporality of consciousness,” to “temporality of body ” possible. Further, by introducing the corporeal (...) temporality and its dynamic model into the phenomenology of Nature that is considered as the foundation of phenomenology of body, Merleau-Ponty put forward a new concept of time. Time as Schema in this sense is integrated into symbiotic structure with Nature and flesh in the name of chiasme. (shrink)

Este trabalho pretende comentar a doutrina que Merleau-Ponty expõe, em seus distintos períodos, sobre o que caracteriza a obra clássica e sua interpretação. Aponta-se como pressupostos dessa doutrina a admissão de uma certa filosofia da linguagem, bem como de uma particular teoria da produtividade. Em função disso, pergunta-se se, efetivamente, foi feita, ali, uma crítica radical da "filosofia da consciência", como usualmente se supõe.  .

La noción de sistema de equivalencias adquiere en la fenomenología merleaupon-tyana un lugar central, puesto que allí subyace una función general de transposición tácita. Se trata de un principio de comprensión sin explicación analógica, una síntesis sin análisis, tal como puede observarse, por ejemplo, en la plasticidad, la transferi-bilidad y la analogicidad que caracteriza a los hábitos. Sobre esta base, este artículo seguirá un camino regresivo a fin de desvelar que el sentido de las equivalencias y transposiciones está latente en (...) "las matrices simbólicas", que ofrecen una clave para comprender que los fenómenos de expresión, que tienen lugar en el mundo a través del cuerpo, del lenguaje, de la historia y del arte, deben ser vistos como nudos, emblemas de sentido en los que se hace visible una dimensión temporal. Las matrices simbólicas son "centros organizadores" y, por lo tanto, "centros de significación" que se retoman una y otra vez. The notion of a system of equivalences comes to have in Merleau-Ponty's phe-nomenology a central place because lying under there is a general function of tacit transposition. It is a principle for understanding without analogical explanation, i.e., a synthesis without analysis, as can be seen, for example, in the plasticity, transferability, and likeliness that characterizes habits. On this basis, the article will follow a regres-sive way in order to show that the meaning of the equivalences and transpositions is latent in "the symbolic matrixes" that offer a clue to understand that the phenomena of expression, which occur in the world by means of the body, language, history, and art, should be seen as nodes or emblems of meaning in which a temporal dimension shows itself. Symbolic matrixes are "organizing centers", and thus "centers of signi-ficance" that are taken up over and over again. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo parte del supuesto que Merleau-Ponty realiza en su filosofía una formulación y caracterización del conocimiento humano. Se explican cuatro notas que dan cuenta, no exhaustiva, de los rasgos centrales de su pensamiento gnoseológico. La característica principal, de la que se desprenden las otras tres notas, es la primacía de la percepción. La segunda nota, que dice relación con la opacidad del conocimiento, se explica tomando una expresión de Bech: “el pensamiento de la no-coincidencia”. La tercera nota corresponde (...) a la interrogación radical y la cuarta se expone a través del concepto de no-filosofía.The article starts from the assumption that Merleau-Ponty, in hisphilosophy, formulates and characteriges human knowledge. Four traits are explained, each of which gives account, in a non-exhaustive way, of hisgnoseological thinking centralfeatures. The main feature, from which emerge the other three, is the primay of perception. The second feature, which is related to the opaaty of knowledge, is explained by Bech ’s expression of “the thought of non-coincidence”. The third feature corresponds to radical interrogation and the fourth is explained through the concept of non-philosophy. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca interrogar al fenómeno de la apelación. Para ello, se examinará el vínculo entre fenomenología y apelación preguntándonos qué es preciso entender por la máxima husserliana que conmina a un retorno a las cosas mismas; en segundo lugar, intentaremos dilucidar cómo la obediencia crítica a la consigna fenomenológica ha supuesto una recomprensión de fenómeno al punto de transformar la consigna husserliana en un verdadero “retorno de las cosas mismas”. Finalmente, nos proponemos interrogar la apelación del fenómeno, a (...) partir del diálogo entre Marion y Romano. No solo intentaremos dilucidar cuál es la especificidad de la apelación, sino qué relación estricta hay entre fenómeno, particularmente insigne o saturado y apelación. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to an embodied-enactive account of mathematical cognition. I first identify the main points of interest in the current discussions of embodied higher cognition and explain how they relate to Merleau-Ponty and his sources, in particular Husserl’s late works. Subsequently, I explain these convergences in greater detail by more specifically discussing the domains of geometry and algebra and by clarifying the role of gestalt psychology in Merleau-Ponty’s account. Beyond that, I explain how, for Merleau-Ponty, (...) mathematical cognition requires not only the presence and actual manipulation of some concrete perceptible symbols but, more strongly, how it is fundamentally linked to the structural transformation of the concrete configurations of symbolic systems to which these symbols appertain. Furthemore, I fill a gap in the literature by explaining Merleau-Ponty’s claim that these structural transformations are operated through motor intentionality. This makes it possible, in turn, to contrast Merleau-Ponty’s approach to ontologically idealistic and realistic views on mathematical objects. On Merleau-Ponty’s account, mathematical objects are relational entities, that is, gestalts that necessarily imply situated cognizers to whom they afford a specific type of engagement in the world and on whom they depend in their eventual structural transformations. I argue that, by attributing a strongly constitutive role to phenomenal configurations and their motor transformation in mathematical thinking, Merleau-Ponty contributes to clarifying the worldly, historical, and socio-cultural aspects of mathematical truths without compromising what we perceive as their universality, certainty, and necessity. (shrink)

Resumen: El texto propone un diálogo entre fenomenología y teoría crítica, concretamente en Merleau-Ponty y Adorno. Sostenemos que la labor asignada por ellos a la filosofía pone en evidencia una concepción dialéctica de la experiencia en la que se reivindica el sentido de ésta como experiencia viva. No obstante las fuertes objeciones dirigidas a la fenomenología por Adorno, Horkheimer y Marcuse, identificamos a modo de introducción la negatividad de la experiencia como rasgo característico en Husserl, Heidegger y Merleau-Ponty. En segundo (...) lugar, nos ocupamos de la concepción de percepción como experiencia sensible en Merleau-Ponty, con el fin de precisar el sentido dialéctico de esta. En tercer lugar, señalamos la importancia que Adorno asigna al trabajo conceptual de la filosofía con el propósito de ver el sentido dialéctico de este que lo vincula a la experiencia viva de las cosas. Por último, identificamos a modo de conclusión puntos de encuentro en la concepción de la dialéctica en ambos autores y presentamos una reflexión sobre la actualidad de esta.: The text proposes a dialogue between phenomenology and critical theory, specifically in Merleau-Ponty and Adorno.We argue that the work assigned by them to philosophy highlights a dialectical conception of experience in which its meaning as living experience is vindicated. Notwithstanding the strong objections to phenomenology by Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, we identify by way of introduction the negativity of experience as a characteristic feature in Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Second, we deal with the conception of perception as sensible experience in Merleau-Ponty, in order to clarify its dialectical meaning. Third, we point out the importance that Adorno assigns to the conceptual work of philosophy in order to see its dialectical meaning that links it to the living experience of things. Finally, by way of conclusion, we identify meeting points in the conception of dialectics in both authors and present a reflection on its current relevance. (shrink)

This article aims to establish an understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s view of creative expression, and of its phenomenological function, setting out from the intriguing statement in his essay “Cézanne’s Doubt” that the painter (or writer or philosopher) finds himself in the situation of the first human being trying to express herself. Although the importance of primary or creative expression in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is well known, there is no consensus among commentators with respect to how this notion is to be understood, and (...) of its apparently paradoxical relation to experience in his philosophy. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty seems to presuppose that there is an original meaning pre-given in experience; on the other hand, expression is described as a hazardous enterprise, because the meaning to be expressed does not exist before expression has succeeded. In order to resolve this tension, I explore the significance of the precariousness of creative expression, arguing that it must be related to its other side: the constituted, all too often petrified meaning that we must start out from. (shrink)

L’auteur essaie de montrer que le paradigme anthropologique de l’incarnation, présenté par Thomas Csordas sous l’inspiration de Merleau-Ponty, entre autres, ne trouve pas de soutien dans la Phénoménologie de la perception, mais dans les textes intermédiaires de Merleau-Ponty . En plus, l’auteur propose que l’idée de perception informée culturellement, contenue dans ces textes, permet d’assouplir l’opposition entre conceptualistes et non-conceptualistes dans le débat contemporain sur la perception .The author tries to show that the anthropological paradigm of embodiment, put forward by (...) Thomas Csordas, who drew his inspiration from Merleau-Ponty among others, is not supported by Phenomenology of Perception but by the intermediate texts from Merleau-Ponty . In addition, the author proposes that the idea of culturally informed perception, comprised in such texts, allows us to minimize the opposition between conceptualists and non conceptualists in the contemporary debate on perception. (shrink)

Following Merleau-Ponty´s inspiration, B. Waldenfels deals with embodiment emphasizing its responsive dimension, i.e., modes of bodily behavior and experience that respond to interpellations of the strange. From this view, the article aims to ex­plaining the intertwining of body and nature with the intention of showing that nature, understood as another side of human being, implies an alterity that cannot be reduced to the logic of intentionality nor to the logic of communication. The interpellation that arises from Nature has, on the (...) one hand, the meaning of appeal in the sense of an address to somebody, and, on the other, of pretention as an interpellation to something. Based on these presuppositions, the second part of the article tries to show how, by means of painting, a responsive action is set in motion. The features of singularity, unavoidable­ness, subsequence, asymmetry, and innovation that characterize the logic of the answer guiding this action. (shrink)

Autism Spectrum Condition presents a challenge to social and relational accounts of the self, precisely because it is broadly seen as a disorder impacting social relationships. Many influential theories argue that social deficits and impairments of the self are the core problems in ASC. Predictive processing approaches address these based on general purpose neurocognitive mechanisms that are expressed atypically. Here we use the High, Inflexible Precision of Prediction Errors in Autism approach in the context of cultural niche construction to explain (...) atypicalities of the relational self, specifically its minimal, extended, and intersubjective aspects. We contend that the social self in ASC should not be seen as impaired, but rather as an outcome of atypical niche construction. We unpack the scientific, ethical, and practical consequences of this view, and discuss implications for how the challenges that autistic persons face should be approached. (shrink)

Autism Spectrum Condition presents a challenge to social and relational accounts of the self, precisely because it is broadly seen as a disorder impacting social relationships. Many influential theories argue that social deficits and impairments of the self are the core problems in ASC. Predictive processing approaches address these based on general purpose neurocognitive mechanisms that are expressed atypically. Here we use the High, Inflexible Precision of Prediction Errors in Autism approach in the context of cultural niche construction to explain (...) atypicalities of the relational self, specifically its minimal, extended, and intersubjective aspects. We contend that the social self in ASC should not be seen as impaired, but rather as an outcome of atypical niche construction. We unpack the scientific, ethical, and practical consequences of this view, and discuss implications for how the challenges that autistic persons face should be approached. (shrink)

Článek si klade za cíl objasnit a obohatit Merleau-Pontyho pojetí promlouvající mluvy v kontrastu k mluvě, jíž se mluví. V kontextu tvůrčích vyjadřovacích výkonů, zejm. umění, píše Merleau-Ponty o promlouvající mluvě především jako o mluvě, jež otevírá nové horizonty zkušenosti a vede ke kognitivnímu obohacení recipienta. Mluva, jíž se mluví, je naproti tomu řečovou sedimentací kulturního významu, jejímž prostřednictvím jsou ustavené poznávací vzorce tradovány. Ve studii nejprve vysvětlujeme, jak se promlouvající mluva tvoří na pozadí běžné mluvy, jíž se mluví, a (...) jak souvisí s vnímaným světem. Poté se soustředíme na dva specifické případy promluv, jimiž se sám Merleau-Ponty explicitně nezabývá. Zaprvé jde o sekundární literaturu, jejímž posláním je sloužit nějakému původnímu autorskému dílu. Sekundární literatura sama o sobě nepřichází s původní stylotvornou vizí světa, a přesto tvoří mluvu, jež moderuje a mnohdy vůbec umožňuje porozumět původnosti myšlenek autorů v silném slova smyslu. Zadruhé se zaměřujeme na případy promlouvajících mluv, jež nás manipulují, nevedou k bohatšímu poznání světa, a přitom jsou schopny zakládat nově sdílený vzor. (shrink)

Buddhist schools of thought share two fundamental assumptions about language. On the one hand, language is identified with conceptual thinking, which according to the Buddhist doctrine separates us from the momentary and fleeting nature of reality. Language is comprised of generally applicable forms, which fuel the reificatory proclivity for clinging to the distorted – and ultimately fictious – belief in substantial existence. On the other hand, the distrust of language is mitigated by the doctrine of ineffability, which although asserts that (...) reality is beyond the scope of linguistic description, submits that philosophical analyses of key Buddhist concepts is a means of overcoming the limitations that language imposes on our experience and facilitating insight into the nature of reality. This paper provides an overview of Buddhist philosophy of language, with an emphasis on the dialectical view of language as indispensable but ultimately insufficient for contemplation. The Buddhist discussions of ineffability are explicated and compared with its treatment in modern Occidental thought, specifically the similarities and differences with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. (shrink)

Hyppolite stresses his proximity to Merleau-Ponty, but the received interpretation of his “anti-humanist” reading of Hegel suggests a greater distance between their projects. This paper focuses on an under-explored dimension of their philosophical relationship. I argue that Merleau-Ponty and Hyppolite are both committed to formulating a mode of philosophical expression that can avoid the pitfalls of purely formal or literal and purely aesthetic or creative modes of expression. Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to navigate this dichotomy, I suggest, closely resembles Hyppolite’s interpretation of (...) Hegel’s “speculative” mode of expression. In particular, his emphasis on the “mediating” character of philosophical language, which moves between descriptive and creative expression, suggests a debt to Hyppolite. This reading provides more evidence to think that Hyppolite cannot be straightforwardly understood as an anti-humanist or post-phenomenological thinker, and paves the way for a _rapprochement_ between his work and the broader phenomenological tradition. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that (...) post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research. (shrink)

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff’s Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such (...) performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how Merleau-Ponty develops Husserl’s genetic phenomenology through an elaboration of language, which is largely influenced by Saussure’s linguistics. Specifically, my focus will be on the unpublished notes to the course Sur le problème de la parole. I show how Merleau-Ponty recasts Husserl’s notion of the historicity of truth by means of an inquiry into the relation between truth and its linguistic expression. The account that Merleau-Ponty offers differs from Husserl’s in two important respects. Firstly, whereas (...) Husserl describes a regressive inquiry of truth, Merleau-Ponty describes a regressive movement of truth, where every acquired truth seizes the tradition that precedes it. Secondly, this new notion of truth, and its dependency on its proper expression, opens up a new understanding of literature. (shrink)

This thesis wrestles with the normativity of language, its usage and its practices while questioning the signifié-signifiant reality. A structural reading of language designs its translational practices within the source-target framework, thereby essentialising its relationship en passant: everything has meaning as long as we accept the hidden framework of a universal language. Therefore, language outlined as a system of signs is a product of transcendental considerations and consequently it renders practice into a hermeticrealm in which the distinction between eidos and (...) eidolon, right and wrong, familiar and unfamiliar, grammar and gibberish makes perfect sense and in which the translation from A to B is simply a matter of transferring identities. Linguistic power neutralises through its transcendental conditioning ephemera in life and world. We will discover that a phenomenological reading of language is open to layers which questions the dialectic setting of linguistic knowledge production. Phenomenology proposes to study life-world relationships by reducing the power of dialectical denomination to the power of gazing or to the lenses of ambiguity. Theorising language and translational practices within the phenomenological realm follows the concept of being oriented towards body-life-world while laying bare the phenomenon language. This revealing method supersedes empirical considerations since phenomenological methodology questions permanently our very own positioning. Hence, the transfer from A to B will be challenged by possibilities which are temporary: it is about a transfer zone featuring A as A’ to B or A’ in B / C. However, the phenomenological possibility reveals that the price for ephemera is tamed by the condition of its possibilities: indeed, the aporia of linguistic identity in polyvalence requires not only phenomenological brackets but also a transcendental backup. Chapter I and II study the translational practice of language and phenomenology by explaining its analysis via dynamised transcendental conditions. The disillusion of the phenomenological inquiry will be yield by radicalising phenomenological reading of language towards a phenomenographical practice of language. Chapter III goes to the extremes in exposing a language without content. The introduction of the trickster figure Narcissistgrotesque Face will be the anti-metaphor in which the grotesque line up forces us to learn bearing A with B and in which the non-content materiality of linguistic practices resemble le bas matérialisme. Not explanation, understanding and rendering things plausible is the movens for language but it is all about the spur of its enactment, its style and its story telling that renders translational practice visible. Chapter III is a performative practice in which we turn the text into texture. Translation happens then when your are perplex and the translational void enacts you and me. (shrink)

[In French] This paper outlines Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of higher-order cognition as a fundamentally embodied process that is enacted by motor subject situated in natural and cultural environment. More specifically, I exemplify Merleau-Ponty’s interdisciplinary approach to cognition on his interpretations of motor intentionality, operative speech, and mathematical reasoning, which are based on neuropathology, linguistics, and gestalt psychology, respectively. In this analysis, I aim to show that the body is involved in cognition as an operator of the phenomenal structuration of the environment (...) even at the level of linguistic, rational, and abstract experience. (shrink)

The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty’s lectures L’institution dans l’histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka’s project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts “institution” and “transcendence”, there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, (...) Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from the present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how an attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other. (shrink)

This work is an investigation into the analytical debate on pictorial representation and the theory of pictorial art. My main concern are a critical exposition of the questions raised by the idea that it is resemblance to depicted objects that explains pictorial representation and the investigation of the phenomenon of abstract painting from an analytical point of view in relation to the debate on depiction. The first part is dedicated to a survey of the analytical debate on depiction, with special (...) attention to the fortunes and misfortunes of the resemblance theory of depiction. In the first chapter I give an outline of the main contemporary theories on offer, contextualised within an historical background that stretches from Plato to Descartes. I have decided to focus on the theory of resemblance more than on other approaches on depiction, because much of my research is dedicated to an analysis and implementation of one of the theories that have recently sought to re-discover the resemblance paradigm, although with certain important modifications. Namely, the second chapter is dedicated to the exposition of John Hyman’s basic resemblance theory of depiction, to the elucidation of its presuppositions and to the discussion of some criticisms and objections that the theory has raised. The third and the fourth chapter are dedicated to the implementation of Hyman’s theory in relation to the phenomenon of abstract painting. There are two peculiarities about Hyman’s theory: first, it is in counter-tendency in comparison with all the other accounts of depiction on offer, in that it does not need to conceive of pictorial representation as of representation of particulars or kinds of objects that we can easily identify. Second, it is a theory that gives art a prominent role: Hyman illustrates his claims with many examples taken from the history of figurative art. The second part of my work is inspired by the idea that the basic resemblance theory can be applied to abstract paintings as well. Developing an analysis of abstract painting from an analytical point of view is a task that very few authors have tried to accomplish so far – as far as I am aware. However, it is evident that the task abstract painters have set themselves is interestingly akin to the task philosophers try to accomplish when arguing about depiction. It is widely agreed that one of the main topics of contemporary art is art itself and that one of the main topics of abstract painting is the art of painting itself, the art of producing pictures, the exploration of its limits and its conventions. With these considerations in mind, I have sought to sketch my proposal for a basic resemblance theory of abstract painting, critically engaging with philosophers such as Richard Wollheim, Kendall Walton, Lambert Wiesing and with art-critics and historians such as Clement Greenberg and Ernst Gombrich. (shrink)

Resumo: O problema da intersubjetividade, tal como colocado pela filosofia da consciência, exigiu de Merleau-Ponty uma investigação de alguns aspectos essenciais envolvidos no fenômeno da comunicação, tais como o valor expressivo da palavra e a questão da verdade, o que acabou por inserir o filósofo no cenário das grandes discussões linguísticas. Pelo aprofundamento especulativo em direção à camada pré-reflexiva da existência, a análise da linguagem e da intersubjetividade favoreceram não apenas a compreensão da questão da criação de novos significados: ela (...) também possibilitou uma autêntica experiência de comunicação. Foi pela realização desse estudo que o filósofo radicalizou seu pensamento em direção a uma ontologia indireta, afastando-se da noção de cogito tácito como condição de possibilidade da experiência intersubjetiva. O objetivo desse artigo é acompanhar esse percurso realizado por Merleau-Ponty na década de 1950, a fim de evidenciar a relação entre o fenômeno da criação no domínio da linguagem e a possibilidade da experiência intersubjetiva. Palavras-chave: criação; intersubjetividade; linguagem; verdade. (shrink)

En varias oportunidades, el filósofo francés Maurice Merleau-Ponty plantea que hay una "carne del lenguaje" que se puede entender como la comprensión paradójica de sí y del otro en el seno mismo del lenguaje; esta "carne" está en relación con el desarrollo de la vida humana y da testimonio del cambio en los individuos que, observándose a sí mismos, quieren ser individuos nuevos a cada momento. Siguiendo a Merleau-Ponty, el presente ensayo se propone reconocer la condición del ser reinventado continuamente (...) por la expresión del lenguaje. On several occasions, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty says there is a "flesh of language" that can be understood as a paradoxical understanding of self and the other within the same language. This "flesh" is related to the development of human life and bears witness to the change in individuals, observing themselves, who want to be new individuals each time. Following Merleau-Ponty, this essay proposes to recognize the condi-tion of being continually reinvented by the expression of language. (shrink)

In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new analysis of rational thought in order to clarify its link with corporeal-perceptive life. The formulation of thought in language as the most elaborate human activity of expression explicitly takes over what we already observe in perception as the implicit and mutual reference between the perceiving subject and that which is perceived.The article reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, based on his preparatory notes for the lectures, and provides (...) an interpretation of the key concepts of “expression” and “body schema”. [In Czech Language]. (shrink)

El texto se propone abordar el problema de la expresión en la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty bajo tres aspectos generales: 1. Hacia una ontología de lo sensible, 2. Expresión y diferencia corporal y 3. Cuerpo y expresión creadora. A partir de la noción de naturaleza se busca, con el primer apartado, destacar el carácter ontológico de la percepción, con el fin de comprender por qué la percepción es ya expresión. En segundo lugar, se pretende ahondar en la tesis del cuerpo como (...) expresión y de esta manera poder precisar su vínculo esencial con el lenguaje. A partir de la distinción entre el lenguaje hablante y el lenguaje hablado se precisa, finalmente, el carácter paradójico de la expresión, su sentido encarnado. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende mostrar las líneas fundamentales de la teoría merleaupontyana acerca de la violencia, centrándonos en sus «escritos de guerra». Consta de cuatro epígrafes: una Introducción en la que describimos la situación histórica que influye en la propuesta de Merleau-Ponty, así como explicamos las expresiones «mains sales»-«mains propres». Un segundo apartado en el que caracterizamos las «manos limpias» en base al optimismo democrática el cual se apoya en una conciencia pura. En el tercer epígrafe hacemos patente la crítica merleau-pontyana (...) a los fundamentos teóricos de los «manos limpias» y señalamos su nuevo concepto de humanismo cuya figura central es Maquiavelo. Asimismo, nos detenemos en la ambigüedad existente entre la coexistencia primigenia y la violencia, de modo que una llama a la otra. Finalmente, concluimos definiendo a Merleau-Ponty como «filósofo de la Modernidad», concepto que adquiere un nuevo matiz en su obra.  . (shrink)

Resumen: Siguiendo la inspiración de Merleau-Ponty, B. Waldenfels se ocupa de la corporalidad y pone énfasis en su dimensión responsiva, es decir, en modos de comportamiento y experiencia corporales que responden a interpelaciones de lo extraño. Desde esta perspectiva, este trabajo aspira a elucidar el entrelazamiento cuerpo-Naturaleza con la intención de mostrar que la Naturaleza entendida como otro aspecto del hombre implica una alteridad que no se reduce ni a la lógica de la intencionalidad ni a la lógica de la (...) comunicación. La interpelación que proviene de la Naturaleza tiene, por una parte, el significado de una apelación, comprendida como alocución a alguien, y, por otra, el de una pretensión, en el sentido de una interpelación a algo. Con base en estos presupuestos, la segunda parte de la exposición apunta a ilustrar la manera como a través de la pintura se pone en marcha un actuar responsivo, que se orienta por los caracteres singularidad, ineludibilidad, posterioridad, asimetría e innovación que caracterizan a la lógica de la respuesta.: Following Merleau-Ponty´s inspiration, B. Waldenfels deals with embodiment emphasizing its responsive dimension, i.e., modes of bodily behavior and experience that respond to interpellations of the strange. From this view, the article aims to explaining the intertwining of body and nature with the intention of showing that nature, understood as another side of human being, implies an alterity that cannot be reduced to the logic of intentionality nor to the logic of communication. The interpellation that arises from Nature has, on the one hand, the meaning of appeal in the sense of an address to somebody, and, on the other, of pretention as an interpellation to something. Based on these presuppositions, the second part of the article tries to show how, by means of painting, a responsive action is set in motion. The features of singularity, unavoidableness, subsequence, asymmetry, and innovation that characterize the logic of the answer guiding this action. (shrink)