- Passionate Akrasia.Michael T. Michael - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):569-585.details
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Weakness of will and akrasia.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.details
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Weakness of Will and Davidson’s Paradox of Irrationality: A Response to Zheng.Alfred R. Mele - 2019 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (4):597-602.details
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Underestimating Self-control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad.A. R. Mele - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):119-123.details
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Twisted Self Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.details
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Self-control, motivational strength, and exposure therapy.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):359-375.details
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Synchronic self-control revisited: Frog and toad shape up.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):305–310.details
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Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (1):25-29.details
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Self-control and belief.Alfred R. Mele - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):419 – 435.details
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Motivation and Agency: Replies: 1. Reply to Wayne Davis. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):295 - 311.details
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Motivated belief and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):353 – 369.details
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Motivation and Agency: Precis.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):243-247.details
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Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
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Irrationality: A precis.Alfred R. Mele - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):173-177.details
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Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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Exciting intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):289-312.details
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Deciding to act.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):81–108.details
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Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 163-179.details
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Autonomy and akrasia.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):207 – 216.details
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Mele's irrationality: A commentary.Brian Mclaughlin - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):189 – 200.details
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To Believe is to Know that You Believe.Eric Marcus - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):375-405.details
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What is mimetic desire?Paisley Livingston - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):291 – 305.details
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Cognitive and motivational bases of self-deception: Commentary on Mele's irrationality.Martha L. Knight - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):179-188.details
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Why ultra-externalism goes too far.R. Kirk - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):73-79.details
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Synchronic Self-control is Always Non-actional.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123-131.details
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Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.details
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Agency Implies Weakness of Will.J. Gregory Keller - 2008 - ProtoSociology 25:225-240.details
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Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints.Charlotte Katzoff - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):455-470.details
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Paradoxes of Self-Deception and the Multiple Aspects of the Self-Concept.Takeshi Kanasugi - 2012 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 45 (2):47-63.details
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Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity.Annemarie Kalis - 2018 - Ratio 31 (S1):65-80.details
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Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity.Annemarie Kalis - 2017 - Ratio 31 (3):65-80.details
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Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97.details
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Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.details
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Self-deception and confabulation.William Hirstein - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.details
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Self-control and mechanisms of behavior: Why self-control is not a natural mental kind.Marcela Herdova - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):731-762.details
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Weakness of will and divisions of the mind.Edmund Henden - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):199–213.details
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What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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Intentions, all-out evaluations and weakness of the will.Edmund Henden - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):53-74.details
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Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will.Nora Heinzelmann - 2020 - Philosophia 1 (1):255-269.details
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Trait Self-Control, Inhibition, and Executive Functions: Rethinking some Traditional Assumptions.Matthew C. Haug - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (2):303-314.details
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Resolving two tensions in (Neo-)Aristotelian approaches to self-control.Matthew Haug - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):685-700.details
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Self-deception and belief attribution.Steven D. Hales - 1994 - Synthese 101 (2):273-289.details
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Frankfurt-pairs and varieties of blameworthiness: Epistemic morals. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (3):351-377.details
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Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.details
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Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.details
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Authenticity-sensitive preferentism and educating for well-being and autonomy.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (1):85-106.details
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Is Synchronic Self-Control Possible?Julia Haas - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):397-424.details
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An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will.Julia Haas - 2018 - Synthese (12):1-21.details
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What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.details
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