This chapter considers the encounter of skepticism with the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical enterprise and focuses on the intriguing feature whereby it is assimilated into this enterprise. In this period, skepticism becomes interchangeable with its other, which helps understand the proliferation of many kinds of views under its name and which forms the background for transforming skepticism into an anonymous, routine practice of raising objections and counter-objections to one’s own view. German philosophers of this era counterpose skepticism to dogmatism and (...) criticism, ancient to modern skepticism, and, importantly, conceptualize the transitions from one form to another, which forms the conceptual matrix in which new disciplinary forms, such as psychology, anthropology, and historicism contend for cultural-intellectual standing beside philosophy. I present this assimilationist trajectory by reviewing three well-known moments of this encounter of skepticism and idealism: (1) Kant’s idealization of skepticism as a floating position amidst various philosophical positions through the dialectic, polemics, systematics, and history of pure reason; (2) Fichte’s schematic conception of skepticism as a dispute of systems in the early Wissenschaftslehre following his review of the skeptic G. E. Schulze’s attacks on Critical philosophy; (3) Hegel’s historicizing conception of skepticism in the context of differences between subjective idealism and speculative thought and his early Jena review of another work by the same skeptic Schulze. (shrink)

Diogenes Laertius reports (in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers ix 19) that Xenophanes of Colophon stated that ta polla hêssô nou (in some sense, ‘that the many give way to mind’). After reviewing four alternative but unsatisfactory ways of understanding the remark I argue that it is best understood as ‘the multitude of things (i.e. the cosmos) gives way to—is mastered by—the (divine) mind.’ When understood in this way the remark establishes Xenophanes as one of the earliest Greek thinkers to (...) hold that events throughout the cosmos take place under the control of a supremely powerful divine intelligence. (shrink)

Although Presocratics in 600 B.C founded new research ways in science and philosophy, wrote the first scientific essays, introduced basic conceptions of deduction, and abandoned mythological explanations, all we have of their works is but the fragments in the works of further doxographers, biographers, historians or philosophers who brought their statements between their own words. This would sometimes result in misunderstanding the presocratics’ purposes. Hermann Diels in his Doxographi Graeci raised a new method for dealing with doxography tradition. Diels’ new (...) approach to doxography returned all this tradition to Aristotle’s pupil, Theophrastus. Some scholars like Jaap Mansfield criticized his disregard for the sophists like Gorgias and Hippias, and the successions of philosophers. According to his criticism, some matters like the Sophists’ influence on Plato, Aristotle’s definition of Doxa in the Placita and the influence of the succession and interpretation tradition on doxogtaphy are more noteworthy than Diels has thought. (shrink)