ABSTRACTIn this brief response to Guus Duindam's reply to my objections to his recent article, I explain why I think my original objections were not sufficiently answered. Although I believe Duindam advances the debate to some extent, I do not think he has fully explained how transcendental idealism accounts for the distinctive epistemic significance of experiments or how it avoids inconsistency in affirming the existence of things in themselves.

I recently argued that critical realists ought to adopt transcendental idealism in favour of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. In response, Dustin McWherter presents two arguments against transcendental idealism: it is inferior to transcendental realism because it cannot account for the epistemic significance of experimentation, and it is internally inconsistent because it affirms the existence of things-in-themselves. This brief reply defends transcendental idealism against both objections.