The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. According to the principle of double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a (...) means to bringing about the same good end. Does the principle of double effect play the important explanatory role that has been claimed for it? To consider this question, one must be careful to clarify just what the principle is supposed to explain. Three misinterpretations of the principle’s force or range of application are common. 1. To ensure that Double Effect is not misunderstood as principle issuing a blanket permission on causing any unintended harm that yields a benefit, applications must require that the agent seek to minimize the harm involved. 2. Since it is widely accepted that it is wrong to aim to produce harm to someone as an end, to rule this out is not part of double effect’s distinctive content. 3. Harms that were produced regretfully and only for the sake of producing a good end may be prohibited by double effect because they were brought about as part of the agent’s means to realizing the good end. (shrink)

“Terminal sedation” refers to the use of sedation as palliation in dying patients with a terminal diagnosis. Although terminal sedation has received widespread legal and ethical justification, the practice remains ethically contentious, particularly as some hold that it foreseeably hastens death. It has been proposed that empirical studies show that terminal sedation does not hasten death, or that even if it may hasten death it does not do so in a foreseeable way. Nonetheless, it is clear that providing terminal sedation (...) in combination with the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatments such as fluid and nutrition can foreseeably hasten death significantly—what is here called early terminal sedation . There are ethical justifications for the use of sedation in palliative care and thus it would seem that ETS is an ethically and legally acceptable practice. However, what emerges from the literature is the repeated assertion that terminal sedation must be restricted to use in imminently dying patients—the “imminence condition”—and that therefore ETS is unacceptable. This restriction has taken on greater significance with the trend of palliative care to include the care of patients who are not imminently dying. This paper proposes to show that although there is widespread intuitive support for the imminence condition, it does not follow from the justifications for sedation as palliation, and that explicit arguments for the imminence condition are needed. (shrink)

In 2017, Italy passed a law that provides for a systematic discipline on informed consent, advance directives, and advance care planning. It ranges from decisions contextual to clinical necessity through the tool of consent/refusal to decisions anticipating future events through the tools of shared care planning and advance directives. Nothing is said in the law regarding the issue of physician assisted suicide. Following the DJ Fabo case, the Italian Constitutional Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy of article 580 of the criminal (...) code in the part in which it does not exclude the punishment of those who facilitate the suicide when the decision has been freely and autonomously made by a person kept alive by life-support treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology, the source of physical or psychological suffering that he/she considers intolerable, but fully capable of making free and conscious decisions. Such conditions and methods of execution must be verified by a public structure of the national health service, after consulting the territorially competent ethics committee. This statement admits, within strict and regulated bounds, physician assisted suicide, so widening the range of end-of-life decisions for Italian patients. Future application and critical topics will be called into question by the Italian legislator. (shrink)

Gegenwärtig gibt es eine intensive internationale Diskussion zum Stellenwert der Sedierungsbehandlung am Lebensende. Auch in Deutschland sind der grundsätzliche Status und die medizinethische Bewertung palliativer bzw. terminaler Sedierung noch nicht ausreichend geklärt. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt anhand der Analyse sechs möglicher klinischer Szenarien differenzierte Beispiele für die Situation von Patienten vor einer Sedierungsbehandlung dar. Dazu wird ein Vergleich mit Standardsituationen der Sterbehilfe vorgenommen. Für die moralische Bewertung werden Aktionen und Intentionen der Sedierungsformen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aufklärung und Autonomie diskutiert. (...) Aus Perspektive einer klinisch orientierten Ethik sind eine differenzierte Entscheidungsanalyse, die Form informierter Zustimmung sowie der Ablauf der Sedierungs- und Ernährungsbehandlung von Bedeutung. Eine kritische Debatte zur moralischen Legitimität der Sedierung am Lebensende ist notwendig für die medizinethische Kultur ärztlicher Praxis. (shrink)

Die Medikalisierung des Sterbens hat dazu geführt, dass ein „guter Tod“ zunehmend auch von medizinischen Interventionen erwartet wird. Die Möglichkeiten einer „terminalen Sedierung“ bis zum Tode werden von vielen als Ausweg angesehen, wenn bei unerträglichem Leid und aussichtsloser Prognose der Wunsch nach aktiver Sterbehilfe angesprochen wird. Durch eine Sedierung können zwar bei schwerstkranken Patienten schwerste therapierefraktäre Leidenszustände effektiv gelindert werden. Diese Therapieoption kann aber auch in der Absicht angewendet werden, den Todeseintritt medizinisch zu beschleunigen, so dass im Zusammenhang mit der (...) Euthanasiedebatte auch das Thema der terminalen Sedierung kontrovers diskutiert wird. Richtlinien zu Indikation, Technik und Dokumentation sind notwendig, um Stellenwert und Grenzen der terminalen Sedierung im Rahmen der palliativen Betreuung am Lebensende zu verdeutlichen und durch Transparenz Fehlentwicklungen zu vermeiden. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the intentions of physicians are multiple, ambiguous, and uncertain—at least with respect to end-of-life care. This claim provides support for the conclusion that the principle of double effect is of little or no value as a guide to end-of-life pain management. This paper critically discusses this claim. It argues that proponents of the claim fail to distinguish two different senses of “intention,” and that, as a result, they are led to exaggerate the extent to which (...) clinical intentions in end-of-life contexts are ambiguous and uncertain. It argues further that physicians, like others who make life and death decisions, have a duty to get clear on what their intentions are. Finally, it argues that even if the principle of double effect should be rejected, clinical intentions remain ethically significant because they condition the meaning of extraordinary clinical interventions, such as that of palliative sedation. (shrink)

Along with the growing utilization of the total artificial heart comes a new set of ethical issues that have, surprisingly, received little attention in the literature: How does one apply the criteria of irreversible cessation of circulatory function given that a TAH rarely stops functioning on its own? Can one appeal to the doctrine of double effect as an ethical rationale for turning off a TAH given that this action directly results in death? And, On what ethical grounds can a (...) physician turn off a TAH in view of the fact that either the intent of such an action or the outcome is always, and necessarily, death? The aim of this article is not to answer these questions but to highlight why these questions must be explored in some depth given the growing use of TAH technology. (shrink)