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  1. I, Me, Mine: Body-Ownership and the Generation Problem.Fiona Woollard - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (98):87-108.
    The Body Ownership Thesis states that each person owns her body. I address a prominent objection, the Generation Problem: the Body Ownership Thesis apparently implies that parents own their children: as we own the fruit of our property, if a parent owns her own body, she must own her child and her child's body. I argue that a person does not own the fruit of her property when that fruit is a person or the body of a person. Persons have (...)
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  • I, me, mine: body-ownership and the generation problem.Fiona Woollard - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (98):87-108.
    The Body Ownership Thesis states that each person owns her body. I address a prominent objection, the Generation Problem: the Body Ownership Thesis apparently implies that parents own their children: as we own the fruit of our property, if a parent owns her own body, she must own her child and her child’s body. I argue that a person does not own the fruit of her property when that fruit is a person or the body of a person. Persons have (...)
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  • I, Me, Mine: Body‐Ownership and the Generation Problem.Fiona Woollard - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):87-108.
    The Body Ownership Thesis states that each person owns her body. I address a prominent objection, the Generation Problem: the Body Ownership Thesis apparently implies that parents own their children: as we own the fruit of our property, if a parent owns her own body, she must own her child and her child's body. I argue that a person does not own the fruit of her property when that fruit is a person or the body of a person. Persons have (...)
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  • The Separateness of Persons: A Moral Basis for a Public Justification Requirement.Jason Tyndal - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):491-505.
    In morally grounding a public justification requirement, public reason liberals frequently invoke the idea that persons should be construed as “free and equal.” But this tells us little with regard to what it is about us that makes us free or how a claim about our status as persons can ultimately ground a requirement of public justification. In light of this worry, I argue that a public justification requirement can be grounded in a Nozick-inspired argument from the separateness of persons (...)
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  • Property.Jeremy Waldron - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Property and Ownership.Jeremy Waldron - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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