- Agents in movement.István Zoltán Zárdai - 2019 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 143:61-83.details
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Action: Offshoring Strategies, Creative Governance, and Subnational Island Jurisdictions.Rowland Stout - 2006 - McGill-Queen's University Press.details
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Individual differences in theory-of-mind judgments: Order effects and side effects.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):343 - 355.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5. Springer. pp. 3-20.details
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The Disappearing Agent.Filip Čeč - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. University of Rijeka. pp. 235-253.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5.Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.) - 2019 - Springer.details
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Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
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Deciding Under a Description.Matthew Heeney - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Passive action and causalism.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):295-314.details
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In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):1-14.details
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Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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Does it Matter Who is Driving the Trolley?Matej Sušnik - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):49-63.details
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Können wir uns dazu entscheiden, etwas zu glauben?Simon Walgenbach - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):583-592.details
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Dimensions of naturalness.Helena Siipi - 2008 - Ethics and the Environment 13 (1):pp. 71-103.details
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Intending, believing, and supposing at will.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):321-330.details
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Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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One-particularism in the theory of action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2677-2694.details
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Réponses à mes critiques.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (1):139-159.details
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The disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarianism.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.details
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From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Must Choices and Decisions be Uncaused by Prior Events or States of the Agent?David Palmer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-8.details
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Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will.David Palmer - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):99-107.details
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Free will and control: a noncausal approach.David Palmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10043-10062.details
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
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On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.details
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The Problem of Luck and the Contradictory Nature of Moral Responsibility in the Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Aleksandr S. Mishura - 2019 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62 (10):102-120.details
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The sweet mystery of compatibilism.Eugene Mills - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):50 - 61.details
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Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
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Deciding to act.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):81–108.details
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Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical studies.Hugh J. McCann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.details
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Di Nucci on the simple view.Hugh J. McCann - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):53-59.details
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The volitive and the executive function of intentions.Christoph Lumer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):511-527.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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The role of all things considered judgements in practical deliberation.Edmund Henden - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):295 – 308.details
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Diachronic agency and practical entitlement.Matthew Heeney - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):177-198.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Incompatibilism and prudential obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.details
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Trying and the arguments from total failure.Thor Grünbaum - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.details
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In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.details
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Has Gemes refuted global scepticism?A. C. Genova - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):59-63.details
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