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The role of emotions in ecological and practical rationality

In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 159--178 (2004)

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  1. Meat made us moral: a hypothesis on the nature and evolution of moral judgment.Matteo Mameli - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (6):903-931.
    In the first part of the article, an account of moral judgment in terms of emotional dispositions is given. This account provides an expressivist explanation of three important features of moral demands: inescapability, authority independence and meriting. In the second part of the article, some ideas initially put forward by Christopher Boehm are developed and modified in order to provide a hypothesis about the evolution of the ability to token moral judgments. This hypothesis makes evolutionary sense of inescapability, authority independence (...)
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  • Emotion, utility maximization, and ecological rationality.Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon - 2014 - Mind and Society 13 (2):227-245.
    This paper examines the adequacy of an evolutionary-oriented notion of rationality—ecological rationality—that has recently been proposed in economics. Ecological rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, and in this sense is a version of what philosophers call ‘practical rationality’. Indeed, the question of the adequacy of ecological rationality as it is understood in the paper, is the question of whether ecological rationality is a genuine notion of practical rationality. The paper first explicates and motivates the notion of (...)
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  • Seeing What is the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in Morality.Peter Goldie - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):347-361.
    I argue that it is possible, in the right circumstances, to see what the kind thing is to do: in the right circumstances, we can, literally, see deontic facts, as well as facts about others’ emotional states, and evaluative facts. In arguing for this, I will deploy a notion of non‐inferential perceptual belief or judgement according to which the belief or judgement is arrived at non‐inferentially in the phenomenological sense and yet is inferential in the epistemic sense. The ability to (...)
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