Natural deduction systems with indefinite and definite descriptions are presented, and interpreted in Martin-Löf's intensional type theory. The interpretations are formalizations of ideas which are implicit in the literature of constructive mathematics: if we have proved that an element with a certain property exists, we speak of ‘the element such that the property holds' and refer by that phrase to the element constructed in the existence proof. In particular, we deviate from the practice of interpreting descriptions by contextual definitions.

The concept of “necessity of thought” plays a central role in Dag Prawitz’s essay “Logical Consequence from a Constructivist Point of View” (Prawitz 2005). The theme is later developed in various articles devoted to the notion of valid inference (Prawitz, 2009, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). In section 1 I explain how the notion of necessity of thought emerges from Prawitz’s analysis of logical consequence. I try to expound Prawitz’s views concerning the necessity of thought in sections 2, 3 and 4. (...) In sections 5 and 6 I discuss some problems arising with regard to Prawitz’s views. (shrink)