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  1. Ludwik Flecks Gestaltbegriff und sein Blick auf die Gestaltpsychologie seiner Zeit.Claus Zittel - 2014 - NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 22 (1-2):9-29.
    The notion of ‘Gestalt’ plays a prominent role in Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles. This paper scrutinizes how Fleck adopted the concepts and even methods of Gestalt psychology that he sometimes vaguely refers to. Systematically comparing the argumentation and theoretical outlines of Fleck’s social theory of perception and the principles of some Gestalt theories, this article will show and discuss their similarities and fundamental differences. According to Fleck, both science and individual perception rest on social actions and cultural traditions. (...)
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  • „Gerichtetes Wahrnehmen“, „Stimmung“, „soziale Verstärkung“„Directed Perception“, „Mood“, „Social Reinforcement“. Sketches Towards the Historical Semantics of Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact.Julian Bauer - 2014 - NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 22 (1-2):87-109.
    This article analyses three basic concepts of Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It shows first that Fleck’s notion of „directed perception“ is closely linked to Jakob von Uexküll’s writings on the „Umwelt“ of animals and humans. The article then proposes to regard the epistemological debates surrounding parapsychology as an important testing ground for the Fleckian concept of „mood“ and his concomitant hypotheses about „the tenacity of systems of opinion and the harmony of illusions“. It finally argues (...)
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  • Scientific Images as Circulating Ideas: An Application of Ludwik Fleck’s Theory of Thought Styles.Nicola Mößner - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):307-329.
    Without doubt, there is a great diversity of scientific images both with regard to their appearances and their functions. Diagrams, photographs, drawings, etc. serve as evidence in publications, as eye-catchers in presentations, as surrogates for the research object in scientific reasoning. This fact has been highlighted by Stephen M. Downes who takes this diversity as a reason to argue against a unifying representation-based account of how visualisations play their epistemic role in science. In the following paper, I will suggest an (...)
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  • Stimmung/Nastrój as Content of Modern Science: On Musical Metaphors in Ludwik Fleck’s Theory of Thought Styles and Thought Collectives.Paweł Jarnicki - 2022 - Foundations of Science 27 (3):1207-1228.
    Thought style and thought collective are two well-known concepts from Ludwik Fleck’s theory of science, which he originally formulated in Polish and German. This paper contends that these two concepts cannot be fully understood without a third—Stimmung/nastrój, which is one of the musical metaphors that play an important role in Fleck’s thinking. Because it is most often translated into English as “mood”, Fleck’s musical metaphors are mostly lost in translation, appearing as mere rhetoric. Only if and when we understand Stimmung/nastrój (...)
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  • Perception, knowledge and freedom in the age of extremes: on the historical epistemology of Ludwik Fleck and Michael Polanyi. [REVIEW]Michael Hagner - 2012 - Studies in East European Thought 64 (1-2):107-120.
    This paper deals with Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Though both concepts have been very influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to numerous interpretations, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been comparatively analyzed. Both Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology and psychology of the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less the path of logical principles than the path of accepting or rejecting specific (...)
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  • From Rorty to Gaia.Jan Golinski - 2023 - Common Knowledge 29 (1):59-71.
    This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Whatever Happened to Richard Rorty?” endorses Nicholas Gaskill's analysis of Rorty's limited legacy in the field of science and technology studies. It shows how, rather than engaging with scientific practice in a substantial way, Rorty relied heavily on the ideas of Thomas Kuhn. The article surveys the development of science studies since Kuhn's day, sketching an intellectual genealogy for Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, whose work addresses—much more directly than Rorty's—current concerns with the (...)
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  • „Gerichtetes Wahrnehmen“, „Stimmung“, „soziale Verstärkung“: Zur historischen Semantik einiger Grundbegriffe der Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv.Julian Bauer - 2014 - NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 22 (1-2):87-109.
    This article analyses three basic concepts of Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It shows first that Fleck’s notion of „directed perception“ is closely linked to Jakob von Uexküll’s writings on the „Umwelt“ of animals and humans. The article then proposes to regard the epistemological debates surrounding parapsychology as an important testing ground for the Fleckian concept of „mood“ and his concomitant hypotheses about „the tenacity of systems of opinion and the harmony of illusions“. It finally argues (...)
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  • Ludwik Fleck.Wojciech Sady - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.