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  1. Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism.Giada Fratantonio & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2643-2654.
    According to a version of Infallibilism, if one knows that p, then one’s evidence for p entails p. In her Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has recently developed two arguments against Infalliblism, which can both be presented in the form of a dilemma. According to the first dilemma, the infallibilist can avoid scepticism only if she endorses the claim that if one knows that p then p is part of one’s evidence for p. But this seems to come at (...)
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  • How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: What Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principles?Philipp Berghofer - 2022 - Wiley: Theoria 88 (3):679-700.
    Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 3, Page 679-700, June 2022.
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  • In Defense of Deliberative Indispensability.Matt Lutz - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):118-135.
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  • Explanationist Evidentialism and Awareness.Daniel Grosz - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):143-157.
    According to evidentialism, a belief is propositionally justified just in case it fits one’s evidence. A fully developed evidentialist theory of justification will require an account of the evidential fit relation. Some evidentialists have embraced an explanationist account of this relation. Some of these accounts, such as Kevin McCain’s, place an awareness requirement on evidential fit. That is, they claim that a proposition, p, fits a subject’s evidence, e, only if the subject is aware of the explanatory connection between p (...)
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  • Explanationism provides the best explanation of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1811-1828.
    In this paper, I provide a novel explanationist framework for thinking about peer disagreement that solves many of the puzzles regarding disagreement that have troubled epistemologists over the last two decades. Explanationism is the view that a subject is justified in believing a proposition just in case that proposition is part of the best explanation of that subject’s total evidence. Applying explanationism to the problem of peer disagreement yields the following principle: in cases of peer disagreement, the thing that the (...)
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