I hope to clarify and explicate an account of how a creature comes to be brought into the space of reasons – that is, comes to take its place as a rational agent in social practices. My ultimate interest, however, is with a tension apparently generated by the emphasis on training coupled with this attack on cognitivism. If one’s coming to maturity depends on one being embedded in a practice, so that one comes to adopt, with ‘comfortable certainty’, the common (...) ground of that practice’s language games, then there seems to be no position from which to frame a critique of a practice. (shrink)

Both Wittgenstein and Dewey have a role for the concept of skills and techniques in their understanding of practices and thereby the possession of concepts. Skills are typically acquired through training. It can seem, however, that their respective appeals to practice are dissimilar: Dewey’s appeal is, like Peirce’s, programmatic. It is meant to do philosophical work. In contrast, for Wittgenstein, the appeal to practice can seem a primitive, something that is meant to put an end to philosophical work. I argue (...) that Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice is much closer to Dewey’s. The argument arises out of difficulties with Wittgenstein’s concept of training. Wittgenstein’s concept of training is inadequate for bridging the trajectory from initial training to the acquisition of skills that are second nature. The latter seems required for his appeal to practice and the way that grasp of concepts is embedded our practices of going on. The inadequacy of Wittgenstein’s concept of training renders the idea of such a trajectory incoherent, for it manifests a real dilemma about how to understand the transition from rote repetitive training to mastery of skillful activity. I show how we can make sense of the role that training plays in developing skillful activity and how by repetitive training we acquire new skills. The solution to the dilemma comes from acknowledging a point that Wittgenstein shares with Dewey concerning the role of selective attention. By acknowledging the role that attention plays in extending the operation of skills, we can make sense of the acquisition of new skills and provide a granularity to the concept of practice that makes Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice more akin to Dewey’s: a programmatic concept rather than a primitive. Practice is, for Wittgenstein, something to be studied and described in a detail that does explanatory work. Furthermore, the account has a number of points of contact with Dewey. (shrink)

In this paper I take up Peters' invitation to think of education in terms of initiation. I argue that the concept of initiation demands much closer scrutiny and analysis in order to provide a substantive thesis about education. A key challenge concerns how we conceive of the initiate. The very idea of initiation suggests that, in some interesting sense, the pupil qua initiate joins in learning activities; their role is more than that of passive recipient of values and belief. But (...) it is a substantive challenge to give a principled account of the trajectory from initiate to full member of a learning community. It requires that we take seriously the question: ‘How can a pupil be engaged in something that they do not yet understand?’. This can be taken as an abstract philosophical question—a ‘How possible’ question closely connected to the paradox of learning—and also as an empirical question about the preferred specifics of a pedagogy for engaging learners. I sketch options for answering the first and review how my preferred option segues into the details of an answer to the latter. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the prospects of a Neo-Aristotelian position—according to which the difference between the human species and non-human animals is a difference in ‘form’—in the context of the question of how the human form of life is related to the idea of education. Two interpretations of this idea have been suggested by contemporary Neo-Aristotelian philosophy that offer contrasting accounts of the role played by education. According to the first, the idea of a formal difference goes with a (...) notion of potentiality, according to which the distinctiveness of the human is mainly a product of education, and hence a matter of second nature. According to the second, the idea of the human is the idea of a formally distinctive kind of first nature that explains the very possibility of education. I maintain that both interpretations do justice to an important aspect of human life yet fail fully to grasp the significance of the notion of ‘form’ that they employ. I argue that to embrace the insight that the difference of the human is a difference in ‘form’, we must think of the human as a form of life whose very concept contains the concept of education. The concept of education, I argue, is a logical concept, contained in the concept of life that it describes. (shrink)

On the point that, in practices of critical thinking, we respond spontaneously in concrete situations, this paper presents an account on behalf of Wittgenstein. I argue that the ‘seeing-things-aright’ model of Luntley's Wittgenstein is not adequate, since it pays insufficient attention to radically new circumstances, in which the content of norms is updated. While endorsing Bailin's emphasis on criteria of critical thinking, Wittgenstein would agree with Papastephanou and Angeli's demand to look behind criteriology. He maintains the primacy of the practical, (...) and yet contends that a reasonable person lets rules of rationality compel her. These rules are not mere heuristics. I further examine Burbules' conception of communicative reason, and, among others, his interpretation of Wittgenstein's sign-post example. (shrink)

Augustine’s autobiographical Confessions contains one of the first accounts of a child learning to speak. This account, in turn, is central to Klaus Mollenhauer’s Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing, a book internationally regarded as one of the most important German contributions to philosophy of education and curriculum theory in the 20th century. This book’s interpretation of Augustine’s description, as well as its divergence from an earlier interpretation by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations form the initial focus of this paper, (...) which undertakes close readings of both approaches to Augustine. We argue that Wittgenstein’s account, while quite similar to that of Mollenhauer, arrives at an impasse, particularly insofar as training, education and upbringing is concerned. In his subsequent attempt to “rescue” Augustine from Wittgenstein’s critique, Mollenhauer develops three highly original notions that are central to his own understanding of upbringing: presentation, representation and Bildsamkeit. Significantly, the divergence of Mollenhauer’s and Wittgenstein’s interpretations also throws into sharp relief Mollenhauer’s particular, dialogical and pedagogical interpretation of “the call,” as it is originally articulated in Augustine. (shrink)

Hirst always highlighted knowledge when reflecting on the school curriculum. He replaced his early focus on liberal education, the development of mind and theoretical knowledge by emphasizing the practical and practices as a curriculum starting point and for the framing of educational aims. In this paper I explore links between Hirst’s philosophical treatment of knowledge and some currently contested aspects of UK government education policies. I also note some ways in which his work relates to selected present-day debates in philosophy (...) of education. Examples of UK government policy will include Ofsted’s definition of learning as a ‘change in long-term memory’ and the ways in which they place ‘logical sequencing’ at the heart of teaching, learning, and curriculum. Their learning definition treats knowledge as an individual asset rather than something about individuals as embedded in the social world of practices, a perspective more in keeping with Hirst’s later views. The critique of individualistic notions of knowledge and learning includes some explorations of how learners move into the ‘space of reasons’. Where I draw attention to relationships between Hirst’s thought and contemporary philosophy of education debates, I do not always draw any definite conclusions. (shrink)