Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Social Cognition, Mindreading and Narratives. A Cognitive Semiotics Perspective on Narrative Practices From Early Mindreading to Autism Spectrum Disorder.Claudio Paolucci - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):375-400.
    Understanding social cognition referring to narratives without relying on mindreading skills has been the main aim of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis proposed by Daniel Hutto and Shaun Gallagher. In this paper, I offer a semiotic reformulation of the NPH, expanding the notion of narrative beyond its conventional common-sense understanding and claiming that the kind of social cognition that operates in implicit false belief task competency is developed out of the narrative logic of interaction. I will try to show how experience (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Varieties of Parsimony in Psychology.Mike Dacey - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):414-437.
    Philosophers and psychologists make many different, seemingly incompatible parsimony claims in support of competing models of cognition in nonhuman animals. This variety of parsimony claims is problematic. Firstly, it is difficult to justify each specific variety. This problem is especially salient for Morgan's Canon, perhaps the most important variety of parsimony claimed. Secondly, there is no systematic way of adjudicating between particular claims when they conflict. I argue for a view of parsimony in comparative psychology that solves these problems, based (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • How Theory of Mind and Executive Function Co-Develop.Stephanie E. Miller & Stuart Marcovitch - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):597-625.
    Theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) have traditionally been measured starting in preschool and share a similar developmental progression into childhood. Although there is some research examining early ToM and EF in the first 3 years, further empirical evidence and a theoretical framework for a ToM-EF relationship from infancy to preschool are necessary. In this paper we review the ToM-EF relationship in preschoolers and provide evidence for early development in ToM, EF, and the ToM-EF relationship. We propose that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals.Kimberly Burnside, Cassandra Neumann & Diane Poulin-Dubois - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Surprise! 20-Month-Old Infants Understand the Emotional Consequences of False Beliefs.Rose M. Scott - 2017 - Cognition 159:33-47.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • On-Line False Belief Understanding Qua Folk Psychology?Martin Capstick - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for the existence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Social Cognitive Abilities in Infancy: Is Mindreading the Best Explanation?Marco Fenici - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):387-411.
    I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by claiming (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Mental States as Generalizations From Experience: A Neuro-Computational Hypothesis.Marco Mazzone - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):223-240.
    The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both are supposed (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations