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The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement

Springer Verlag (2019)

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  1. How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - manuscript
    What attitude should philosophers take toward their favorite philosophical theories? I argue that the answer is belief and middling to low credence. I begin by discussing why disagreement has motivated the view that we cannot rationally believe our philosophical theories. Then, I show why considerations from disagreement actually better support my view. I provide two additional arguments for my view: the first concerns roles for belief and credence and the second explains why believing one’s philosophical theories is superior to accepting (...)
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  • The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement.Elif KÜTÜKCÜ - forthcoming - Dini Araştırmalar.
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  • Moral Hinges and Steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.
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  • The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2020 - Social Epistemology 35 (1):85-98.
    In my recent book, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement, I develop a defense of non-conciliationism, but one that only applies in research contexts: Epistemic benefits are more likely in the offi...
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  • Epistemic Paternalism, Open Group Inquiry, and Religious Knowledge.Kirk Lougheed - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (2):261-281.
    Epistemic paternalism occurs when a decision is made for an agent which helps them arrive at the truth, though they didn’t consent to that decision. Common defenses of epistemic paternalism claim that it can help promote positive veritistic results. In other words, epistemic paternalism is often good for inquiry. I argue that there is often a better alternative available to epistemic paternalism in the form of what I call Open Group Inquiry. I then examine how Open Group Inquiry can be (...)
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  • Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
    This paper introduces and motivates a solution to a dilemma from peer disagreement. Following Buchak (2021), I argue that peer disagreement puts us in an epistemic dilemma: there is reason to think that our opinions should both change and not change when we encounter disagreement with our epistemic peers. I argue that we can solve this dilemma by changing our credences, but not our beliefs in response to disagreement. I explain how my view solves the dilemma in question, and then (...)
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  • Islam and Science: The Philosophical Grounds for a Genuine Debate.Ali Hossein Khani - 2020 - Zygon 55 (4):1011-1040.
    What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail to share the meaning of (...)
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